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**LOCATING THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS IN THE TERRORIST ACTIVITY
CYCLE:
The case of Hezbollah and FARC**

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Tese apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em
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Orientadora: Rashmi Singh

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To my parents, Newton and Miriam (*in memoriam*).

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“Be strong and courageous...”
Deuteronomy 31:6

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“What kind of man is this? Even
the winds and the waves obey him?”
(Mt 8. 23-27)

“Who are you to live in all these many forms?
Your death that captures all.
You too are the source of all that is gonna be born.
Your glory, mercy, peace, truth....
You give calm a spirit, understanding, courage...
The contented heart.”
(*The Thin Red Line*, 1998)

“Maybe all men got one big soul where everybody is part of,
all faces are the same men,
one big self,
(*The Thin Red Line*, 1998)

“Dear hero, do not fear, for I am with you everyday.”
M.E. 2019

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to address and explain the types of connections between organized crime and terrorism in South America – through the steps of the terrorist activity cycle - considering that their connections are multifaceted. Terrorism functions as a cycle – with discrete activities leading up to the attack and being followed after the attack. When studying the nexus between crime and terrorism, one realizes that there has been an evolution in the relationship between terrorism, organized crime and the state. This evolution led to the eventual crossing of their paths. To this end, I chose to do case studies on Lebanese Hezbollah and the Colombian FARC, I categorize both as terrorist organizations, and both operate in South America. Hezbollah is probably one of the best examples of the crime/terror nexus phenomenon. The criminal activities in which the group is involved span the globe. FARC, in its turn, has endured an unconventional war in Colombia for nearly six decades. It is maybe the best example of the crime x terror nexus that was born in Latin America. Crime and terrorism play a central role for Hezbollah and FARC. Having these two groups as my case study, I showed the terror threat that these groups represent for the region, since they are deeply rooted in the continent. That is why the geographic focus is mainly South America, considering that this thesis seeks to debate this theme to support/assist future public policy discussions that address the confrontation of this danger in Brazil and the region.

Key words: terrorism; crime; nexus; Hezbollah; FARC; South America.

RESUMO

O objetivo deste estudo é abordar e explicar os tipos de conexões entre crime organizado e terrorismo na América do Sul – através das etapas do ciclo da atividade terrorista – considerando que suas conexões são multifacetadas. O terrorismo funciona como um ciclo – por meio de uma sequência de atividades que levam ao ataque e que são seguidas ao ataque. Ao estudar o nexu entre crime e terrorismo, percebe-se que houve uma evolução na relação entre terrorismo, crime organizado e Estado. Essa evolução levou ao seu eventual cruzamento. Para tanto, optei por fazer estudos de caso sobre o Hezbollah libanês e as FARC colombianas, os quais categorizo como organizações terroristas, e ambos atuam na América do Sul. O Hezbollah é provavelmente um dos melhores exemplos do fenômeno do nexu crime/terror. As atividades criminosas nas quais o grupo está envolvido são de abrangência global. As FARC, por sua vez, enfrentam uma guerra não convencional na Colômbia há quase seis décadas. Talvez elas sejam o melhor exemplo do nexu crime-terror nascido na América Latina. O crime e o terrorismo desempenham um papel central para o Hezbollah e as FARC. Tendo esses dois grupos como meu estudo de caso, demonstrei a ameaça terrorista que esses grupos representam para a região, uma vez que estão profundamente enraizados no continente. Por isso o foco geográfico é principalmente a América do Sul, tendo em vista que esta tese busca debater esse tema para subsidiar/auxiliar futuras discussões de políticas públicas que abordem o enfrentamento dessa ameaça no Brasil e região.

Palavras-chave: terrorismo; crime; nexu; Hezbollah; FARC; América do Sul.

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