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Bruna Luiza Souza

**TOWARDS A GRAND SELECTIVE ENGAGER: Scholarly Recommendations
for American Strategy After the Cold War**

Belo Horizonte

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Dissertação apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Mestre em Relações Internacionais.

Orientador: Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz
Costa

Área de Concentração: Inteligência, Estratégia e
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Área de Concentração: Inteligência, Estratégia e Contraterrorismo

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*Eu vou ver o jogo se realizar de um lugar seguro
Seguro de que vale ser aqui
onde a vida é de sonhar...*
(CAMELO, Marcelo; DOMINGUINHOS. 2008)

RESUMO

O fim da Guerra Fria e seus impactos no Sistema Internacional trouxeram profundas transformações que merecem ser estudadas no campo das Relações Internacionais. Uma nova configuração entrou em vigor quando, da noite para o dia, a ameaça manifesta deixou de existir. Os Estados Unidos se estabeleceram como uma potência inalcançável em um novo sistema e, como resultado, todas as partes foram forçadas a adaptar seu foco estratégico. Forjar uma grande estratégia para um sistema em transição seria uma tarefa difícil; no entanto, os Estados Unidos seguiram um caminho consideravelmente coerente de preponderância ao longo dos anos. Nesse período, a literatura buscou prescrever grandes estratégias americanas, cada uma delas buscando de alguma forma apresentar uma perspectiva sobre o comportamento ideal a ser seguido pela grande potência mundial. Assim, identificar qual estratégia principal é mais prescrita pela literatura pode auxiliar na inferência de qual comportamento a literatura sugere que seja melhor tomado em vez da preponderância. Esta pesquisa busca identificar qual grande estratégia foi mais prescrita pela literatura, para tanto a base de dados escolhida foi a *International Security*. O resultado alcançado foi a grande estratégia de engajamento seletivo, uma opção envolvendo uma combinação de premissas realistas e liberais para o comportamento do ator mais poderoso do sistema na configuração pós-Guerra Fria.

Palavras Chave: Grande estratégia americana; Neorealismo; Engajamento Seletivo

ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War and its impacts on the International System brought about profound transformations worth studying in the field of International Relations. A new configuration came into place when, overnight, the manifest threat ceased to exist. The United States has established itself as an unreachable power in a new system, and as a result, all parties have been forced to adapt their strategic focus. Forging a grand strategy for a system in transition would be a difficult task, however, the United States followed a considerably coherent path of preponderance throughout the years. In this period, the literature sought to prescribe American grand strategies, each one of them seeking in some way to present a perspective on the ideal behavior to be followed by the great world power. Thus, identifying which major strategy is most prescribed by the literature can assist in the inference of which behavior the literature suggests is best to be taken instead of the preponderance. This research seeks to identify which grand strategy was most prescribed by the literature, for this purpose the database chosen was the International Security. The result achieved was the grand strategy of selective engagement, an option involving a combination of realist and liberal assumptions for the behavior of the most powerful actor in the system in the post-Cold War configuration.

Keywords: American grand strategy; Neorealism; Selective Engagement

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1 INTRODUCTION¹

The end of the Cold War and its impacts on the International System brought about profound transformations worth studying in the field of International Relations. Immediate shifts in the system had governed international relations for decades. A new configuration came into place when, overnight, the manifest threat ceased to exist. The United States has established itself as an unreachable power in a new system, and as a result, all parties have been forced to adapt their strategic focus.

Forging a grand strategy for a system in transition would be a difficult task, however, the United States followed a considerably coherent path of preponderance throughout the years. In this period, the literature sought to prescribe American grand strategies in order to present different perspectives on the ideal behavior to be followed by the great world power. By identifying which major strategy is most prescribed by the literature may assist in the inference of which behavior the literature suggests is best to be taken instead of one of preponderance.

The system is now presented to the unprecedented primacy of the United States, as the sole superpower holding the greatest material and political capacities in the world. This new fact has permeated the debate in academia around the idea of whether the U.S. can shape the world as unipolar, and especially regarding the limits of its power to act in the world (as in Wohlforth, 1999). A period of relative stability was being set in place, built upon the influence of the United States, the world's most powerful nation. Americans held the world's steering wheel under the global liberal order, a moment that was also called as the Pax Americana². A behavior guided by the promotion of liberal values - such as democracy and human rights - granted by military might, has forged the dominant strategy of the United States as the world's peace keeper since the Post-Cold War era.

It is interesting to think how the most powerful country in the world has used this position throughout a systemic transition. Considering the capacity of military power concentrated by this State, the configuration of the international system would tend to be built based on the will of this powerful actor, or at least, to be influenced by it. Looking back at this period, new hypotheses can be raised about what major strategies this country could have followed. Under the light of the theoretical precepts, the analysis of this actor's trajectory in the

¹ The present dissertation was executed with the aid of the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa de Minas Gerais (FAPEMIG) from August 2018 to August 2020.


² See more in KUPCHAN, Charles. A. (1998) *After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity*; or check WOHLFORTH, William C. (1999), *The Stability of a Unipolar World*.

system may bring several contributions. One of them is the understanding of the behavior of the actor recently established as more powerful within an anarchic system in transition.

When looking at grand strategy, one seeks to understand how the military instruments were handled to achieve the vital interests of a state (Art, 1991). As such interests make up the main national objectives of the State. Objectives which are outlined through the way the state perceives the systemic configuration in which it is inserted and how it wishes to act within it.

An overview of the problem can be established, for instance, by looking at how American military investment took place during the post-Cold War period, specifically between the years 1991 and 2004. World Bank (2021) data may illustrate how the American power wielded its military expenditures (% of GDP) during this period.

Figure 1. Military Expenditure (% of GDP). World Bank 1991 to 2004



1991 - 2004

Source: STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI). Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Military expenditure (% of GDP): United States. In: Military expenditure (% of GDP) U.S.: 1991 to 2004. The World Bank Data, 2021.

The peak occurred from 1991 to 1992 can be related to the change of government, the end of the mandate of the Republican George H.W. Bush and the beginning of the mandate of the Democratic President William Jefferson "Bill" Clinton. The Democratic American president had his mandate based on the idea of engagement and enlargement (Layne, 1997). He

assumed a more multilateral and interventionist American position, as an indispensable balancer for the world order. The United States, during his mandate, had a huge decrease in spending on military expenses, despite the great international campaign, the United States acted mostly in conjunction with other countries and organizations, with the purpose of keeping peace in the system. The strategy was to spread liberal and democratic values around the world and acted mostly in peace operations (LAYNE, 1997).

The number of troops stationed abroad were smaller during the years under Clinton's administration, since American initiatives during this period were mostly conducted multilaterally. The tables (1;2) below illustrate the participation and losses during the major battles faced by the United States from the 1990s to the early 21st century. It also shows the change in the number of Armed Forces since the Cold War and afterwards.

Table 1. ADAPTED: Participation and Losses, Major Wars, 1990–2011				
	Served Battle	Battle Deaths	Other Deaths	Wounded
Gulf War, 1990 – 1991	2,225,000	147	235	467
War in Afghanistan, 2001 - present	320,000 est.	1,488	386	15,282
War in Iraq, 2003 – 2011	930,000 est.	3,526	962	32,229

Source: Adapted from MILLETT, Allan R.; MASLOWSKI, Peter; FEIS, William B. For The Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012. 3. ed. rev. and updated. New York: The Free Press, 2012. (Appendix A).

Table 2. The Armed Forces of the Cold War and After					
	Defense Spending (Billion Dollars) Force	Strength* U.S. Army	Strength* U.S. Air	Strength* U.S.Navy	Strength* USMC
1990	301.0	761,000	531,000	578,000	198,000
1995	252.6	509,000	401,000	435,000	175,000
2000	260.8	477,000	353,000	371,000	172,000
2005	401.7	489,000	352,000	359,000	179,000
*Rounded to the thousands.					
<i>Source: Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992 (Government Printing Office, 1992), 334–342; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), www.defense.gov/Releases. (1990–2011).</i>					

Source: Adapted from MILLETT, Allan R.; MASLOWSKI, Peter; FEIS, William B. For The Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012. 3. ed. rev. and updated. New York: The Free Press, 2012. (Appendix C).

The change in the numbers of its military forces abroad may reflect choices of grand strategies to be followed by the United States during a given period and world organization.

Figure 2. Military Expenditure (% of GDP). World Bank 1992 - 2004

Source: Adapted from: STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI). Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Military expenditure (% of GDP): United States. In: Military expenditure (% of GDP) U.S.: 1991 to 2004. The World Bank Data, 2021

An increase in military spending and the overseas troop contingent rose again at the end of Clinton's term and the beginning of the term of the 43rd U.S. president, the Republican George W. Bush. It ushered into a more active American behavior in the prevention of terrorism. Spending has risen dramatically again since the end of 2001, a change that can be attributed mainly to the September 11 attack at the World Trade Center. Bush, once again, increased military investment and acted more aggressively in the world, under the premise of the War on Terror. Bush's government was based on the logic of the "New World Order" to be imposed by the United States (Layne, 1997).

Table 3. U.S. Troops Stationed Abroad*

	1995*	2000*	2005*
Europe	110,359	113,140	98,765
Former U.S.S.R.	87	152	132
Latin America	15,730	1,686	2,043

North Africa, Near East & South Asia	4,733	13,113	3,836
Iraq and Kuwait	—	—	207,000
Afghanistan	—	—	20,400
Pakistan	28	22	146
East Asia & Pacific	76,065	76,863	65,646
Sub-Saharan Africa	696	325	1,576
Afloat	53,456	115,848	128,398
*As of last day of year.			
<i>Source: Congressional Research Service and Washington Headquarters Service (Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense)</i>			

Source: Adapted from MILLETT, Allan R.; MASLOWSKI, Peter; FEIS, William B. For The Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012. 3. ed. rev. and updated. New York: The Free Press, 2012. (Appendix D).

Table 4. ADAPTED: American Military and Diplomatic Deaths, Terrorist and Military Actions, 1990–2000			
	Battle Deaths	Other Deaths	Wounded
Mogadishu, Somalia, 1992–1994	29	14	175
Haiti, 1994–1996	0	4	3
Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, (Terrorist Attack) 1996	19	0	372
Kenya Tanzania, (Embassy Bombings) 1998	52*	0	12
USS Cole, Yemen, (Terrorist Attack) 2000	17	0	39
*Includes all U.S. and foreign civilian and military embassy personnel.			
<i>Sources: Department of Defense, "Military Casualty Information," http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm; Center for Defense Information, Military Almanac: 2001–2002, http://www.scribd.com/1Anonymouspatriotusa/d/12928711-Military-Almanac-20012002; Department of State, "Bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998," http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/board_victims.html.</i>			

Source: Adapted from MILLETT, Allan R.; MASLOWSKI, Peter; FEIS, William B. For The Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012. 3. ed. rev. and updated. New York: The Free Press, 2012. (Appendix E).

American behavior in this period was mostly unilateral, which may explain the increase in the country's military spending and the larger contingent of U.S. troops. The strategy was basically Deter/Defeat aggression, countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (C-WMD) and maintaining overseas presence. The regions of American military action were mainly Eurasia, especially Afghanistan, in occasional operations in Africa, and in a few, but long, expeditions in Iraq (MILLETT; MASLOWSKI; FEIS, 2012).

From the beginning of the 1990s to *circa* 2004, the literature presented relevant discussions regarding predictions of how the world dynamic would be restructured as well as prescriptions of American strategies to be adopted within the “world” the authors were expecting for the XXI century. This “world” would be built under the new post-Cold War configuration, in which no state or combination of states could match its power capabilities to the great American power. In this environment, no threat to American power was expected to present itself any time soon. The literature's prescriptions for the United States were taking the form of Grand Strategies, encompassing the new vital American interests to be pursued in the medium to long term. Envisioning either a multipolar world with complex and more fragmented relations, or a world where the United States could extend to the longest its unipolarity.

Although United States primacy endures, the world today might or might not be quite what some authors expected it to be. For instance, regarding other nations behavior, some specialists discussed how the States are adopting bandwagoning and buck-passing instead of balancing against the United States³, and how this behavior has been common towards fashioning global dynamics since 1991. Therefore, it is important to check, what prescriptions were most recommended by the academia to be taken by the United States, whether some of those predictions came to happen or not, were they close enough to what came to be the XXI century reality? Were the prescriptions for military strategy and use of force followed by the United States? If the answer is negative, what were the reasons?

According to Layne (1997), the United States had been pursuing the same global engagement strategy since the 1940s until at least the second half of the 1990s – called *preponderance*:

The key elements of this strategy are creation and maintenance of a U.S.-led world order based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power, and on American values; maximization of U.S. control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in Europe and East Asia; and maintenance of economic interdependence as a vital U.S. security interest (LAYNE, 1997 p.88).

For Layne (1997), this strategy, fundamentally based on the preponderance strategy, aims to create interdependence by expanding politically and economically abroad, as well as its values and power to create, therefore, stability and peace as the U.S. shape it.

We can understand the American position toward the international system in the post-Cold War era when we acknowledge the conceptual approach made by Michael Doyle (1986.

³ BROOKS, Stephen G. WOHLFORTH, William C. *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008

p. 12) which claims “*hegemony ... to mean controlling the leadership of the international system as a whole*”. The George H. W. Bush administration's "new world order" and the "engagement and enlargement" of the Clinton administration's strategy echoes the way American power and American values were instrumentalized to shape the international system (Layne, 1997). The assumption of leadership based on the U.S.' preeminence within the International Relations has come with predetermined responsibilities postulated by the American position as the world's peacekeeper, as the British Prime Minister Tony Blair⁴, speaking in Chicago, justified NATO's attack in Kosovo by saying “*those nations which have the power, have the responsibility*”. By "predetermined responsibilities", I mean, almost as if the United States has a role to play by virtue of its position of hegemony, in all international situations, and even more so in those related to security. That behavior, according to Layne (1997), fundamentally reflects a fear of a world without the U.S.' influence and power upon – as the greatest actor.

Underlying this condition of sole leader, there is the U.S. fear of weakening its hegemony by allowing the rise of any other hegemonic challenger (1997). According to Layne (1997), more than through preponderance strategy, American strategy is about taking control of the liberal order and guaranteeing that all its values are being spread worldwide not aiming solely on power accumulation – as preponderance assumes – but also on maintaining its status within the International System.

In the 21st century alone, countless interventions were made by the U.S. in the name of democratic values and war on terror, both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) invasions – that ended up in wars that the U.S. fights in each country until today – are the biggest examples of how global engagement doesn't always work as expected. On the other side of the coin, in 1998 U.S. troops intervened in Kosovo successfully stopping the ongoing civil war in the region, and helped strengthen NATO's credibility, as well as exposing the inability of the European countries to deal with the situation on their own (Layne, 2002). However, when Washington declared itself with the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other states – pointing out the disparity between American and European geopolitical power – it ultimately brought about a perverse result. It provoked the perception of a threatening military hegemony and created a rather critical precedent – to act despite the international principle of sovereignty of states. In light of this, an anti-US alliance was beginning to emerge composed of Indian, Russian and

⁴ UNITED KINGDOM. Prime Minister (1997 – 2007: Tony Blair). Doctrine of the International Community. Chicago, april, 1999. Available in: <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=279>. Last access: april, 2020.

Chinese counterweights⁵. The alliance envisaged military and technological cooperation among these actors as well as spreading the idea of a multipolar world (LAYNE, 2002).

These few examples would outline how sometimes the security strategy adopted by the United States may not have the expected results, but rather be seen by other states as a threatening action. By aiming to maintain its primacy and role as the world leader the United States has adopted a foreign military policy that is not as some authors envisaged, whether through NATO or unilaterally. This positioning brought about unexpected and, in some perspectives, perverse outcomes, which can cause tension among poles toward the U.S. despite American efforts to shape the world as its will.

When we look through the lens of Neorealist theory, put forth by Waltz in 1979, a position in which the state seeks preponderance must always be rejected. In this theory's logic, a preponderant behavior of a state would cause the other actors of the system to perceive it as a threat to their security, and cause them to seek to counter it. For Neorealism, the state must always act to maintain its position in the system, which is defined by the relative capabilities of that state. The incessant quest for power is perceived by the system as threatening, because it puts the sovereignty of states in check. A state that seeks power may engage in imperialistic activities. Therefore, preponderance is always a behavior that is rejected by this theory. When perceiving a preponderance behavior performed by the United States in the post-Cold War, the literature has tried to present several strategy prescriptions that corroborated or not with the premises of this grand strategy. It is of interest to find out whether among the prescriptions, the theoretical bases that support the main arguments are in accordance with the Neorealist premises.

This dissertation seeks to perform a systematic review of literature, to map prescriptions and predictions by authors about the United States from the '90s to 2004, to lay out the ideas that envisage foreseeing states balancing behavior, as well as prescriptions given by the literature regarding American strategies of use of force. To categorize these prescriptions for the use of force into three categories, defense, deterrence, and compelling, and finally, to analyze the prescription that was most common among the authors. Altogether in order to respond to the following questions: *what grand strategies were most predicted and/or prescribed by the literature for The United States in the post- Cold War era? On what theoretical premises did most of the prescriptions rest?*

⁵ For further information on this alliance, see Layne (2002: 240).

It is necessary first, to define and delimit in detail the methods used to put research into practice. The method chosen for this research is the Systematic Review of Literature (SRL). The method will be carried out by investigating and examining the selected literature in order to extract information. The investigation will be conducted with determined technical procedures in order to select the information and categorize it. All the information collected will be reanalyzed in the light of the chosen theoretical perspective.

The theoretical chapter of this paper regards a study of neorealism literature, to establish the concepts of the theoretical perspective that will guide the entire research as well as it is necessary for the understanding of the problem. Along with the definition of the concepts that will be mobilized, the criteria for categorizing each world configuration (unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity) will be presented. Followed by the classification of each type of grand strategy and its premises.

After the presentation of the method and research design in the methodology chapter, the second part of the paper will focus on clarifying each author's idea by employing the mapping technique. In order to attribute each of their strategy prescriptions to the respective expected scenario. Afterwards, the concepts will be instrumentalized to analyze the correspondence of each strategy proposed by the authors with evidence of the post-Cold War reality. American actions in this period will be traced in order to analyze the American behavior adopted in relation to the literature prescriptions.

2 NEOREALISM

This is not to say that power and security are the sole or even the most important objectives of mankind; as a species we prize beauty, truth, and goodness.... What the realist seeks to stress is that all these more noble goals will be lost unless one makes provision for one's security in the power struggle among social groups (Robert Gilpin, 1981. p. 305).

How to understand a State's behavior after one of the greatest conflicts in history? The dissolution of the Soviet Union has not only defined the end of the tensest period of strategic dispute between the two major world powers of that time, but it was also a milestone in the history of International Relations in refashioning the contemporary world order. The end of the Cold War was also an example of how conflict might be shaped within contemporaneity through disputes of power guided by balancing behavior rather than undertaking a warlike conflict. It is not that armed conflicts are no longer a thing in international relations; rather, States' willingness to engage in these fights has been decreasing over time. Among the pool of questions and assumptions brought about by the end of the Cold War, one of them regards the world's sole power: how would The United States act in international relations?

The unprecedented amount of power held by the United States shapes the world as unipolar and generates debates in realist academia, especially as regards the exceptionality of the U.S. capabilities (as in Wohlforth, 1999) and the limits of its power of action in the world. According to offensive realism scholars (Layne, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2001), power has an intermediate role in State's existence, the aggressive behavior seeking expanding power capabilities relies on a State's primary goal: its survival. Hence, the optimal way of maximizing a State's security is by maximizing its relative power (Diniz, 2007). For Mearsheimer (2001), a great power, such as the United States, must always seek to become the strongest, because the guaranteed survival comes with the achievement of a hegemonic status, the hegemon is able to respond and overturn any form of threat or control by other states. Which is to say, according to offensive realism scholars (1997; 2001), States must pursue hegemonic status and, if it is achieved, strive to maintain it as to guarantee their own security.

Offensive realism theory takes the United States as a Hegemony within the modern International System, accordingly, its expected strategic behavior is the attempt to sustain its status, maximizing its relative power in order to assure its security. A way of maximizing security in a competitive world according to this theory is by accumulating military, economic, diplomatic powers, in order to maintain global stability. The offensive logic considers that the constraint keeping the International System harsh and aggressive is the anarchic structure, which produces an environment of fear and insecurity where there is no place for trust. The

anarchic structure makes the International System dangerous by constraining its units into behaving aggressively. The State will not cease until it accumulates the biggest amount of power in order to assure its capacity of resistance to any kind of threat and then, assure its survival (MEARSHEIMER, 2001).

Power in this logic, according to Mearsheimer (2001), is conceptualized in two definitions, the Potential Power and the Concrete Power. The latter is measured by “*material elements such as the army, military capabilities, territory*” and, the former “*refers to the forces that maintain the concrete power throughout time, such as population and wealth capability*” (Diniz, 2007, p.80). The social dynamic is determined by the system's anarchy, which constrains all their constituent units to act in an endless struggle for power, to ensure systemic stability and consequently their own security. In this sense, the strongest state of the system is more likely to assure its own security. The hegemon, in this sense, has greater tendency to seek external expansionist policies in an attempt to accumulate power (LAYNE, 1997).

Hence, the Offensive Realism theorized by Mearsheimer (2001), acknowledges that the anarchic constraint of the International System provides more *carrots* to expansionists policies to be taken. The States' pursuit for power underlies their own survival, thus being their main goal within the anarchic International System. By this logic, in order to maintain its existence each State will attempt to obtain as much power as possible to guarantee its sovereignty. Stability in the system is the only thing that produces states' expectations regarding the absence of war, and/ or aggressive security competitions. Through this perspective, the U.S.' endeavor to maintain its hegemony is the expected line of action, and how they would maintain the status quo (LAYNE, 1997; MEARSHEIMER, 2001).

On the other hand, there is the Structural Realism put forth by Waltz in 1979. This theory attempts to explain the results of the structure of the International System and its state units, such as the probability of cooperation among them, the patterns of alliance formation, and the possibility of wars. As Diniz (2007, p.76) stresses, “*for Waltz, explicitly, international politics is not identified with the maximization of power, but rather of survival, even for those powers that in the limit aspire to dominate all the other powers of the system*”. Both approaches, offensive realism brought by Mearsheimer (2001) and defensive or structural, by Waltz (1979; 2002), have security as the state's central objective, yet each offers a means of achieving it. However, they agree on the capacity of constraint by the anarchic structure of the system, which influences and shapes the behavior of its constituent unit actors, the States. Similarly, both

perspectives consider that the hegemon's interest is to remain as such, as they claim that the hegemony's positioning in the system dynamics is conservative (DINIZ, 2007).

The present dissertation has the goal of identifying the most common behavior put forth by the academic literature about how the sole power should act following the great systemic shift. The USSR has fallen and the distribution of power in the system has changed, whatever might have changed with it must have affected states' behavior toward the international dynamics. As a manner of trying to understand how the States behave within the world, how their interests are shaped, and what shapes them, the theoretical approach to be taken in this paper will be the Defensive Realism outlined by Waltz (1979). This theory acknowledges anarchy as the guiding principle of the International System (IS), and that States often learn from their experiences. Above that, it allows us to emphasize that all units tend to behave defensively rather than offensively. By the defensive logic, the States' main objective within the anarchic International System is to seek security. When facing a threat, a State tends to respond by trying to “balance” against the potential rival in order to maintain a no-fear environment.

For a deeper understanding of the theory, this chapter will bring a historical background of the Neorealist theory – also called Structural Realism – outlined by Waltz (1979) and its main assumptions regarding the study of International Relations. Then, the guidelines of the Balance of Power theory will be established as well as what the theory conceptualizes as a military strategy for the use of force. In that manner, this chapter aims to build an argument of how the post-Cold War might be better understood and by what theoretical view we should approach American strategy during this historical moment.

2.1 Neorealism by Kenneth Waltz: A First Glance

Kenneth Waltz first outlined Neorealism, or Structural Realism, in 1979 in the book *Theory of International Politics*, wherein he presented a theoretical explanation for the behavior of great powers. Waltz draws attention to the need for a systemic perspective of realistic formulation of international relations, leaving reductionism aside and claiming for himself the establishment of an autonomous theory of international politics. His argument introduces a theory that tries to explain how international relations phenomena – at first sight, considered independent – are defined by one common causal element, the social structure of the system. Waltz proposes, therefore, an analysis of the System of States, considering the environment in which states find themselves as an anarchic system. A system upon which hangs the shadow of

war, since the absence of a central authority to prevent and reconcile conflicts is a source of insecurity (WALTZ, 1979).

The lack of a central government in the system, according to the theory, is seen by the States as an absence of an authority to prevent others from threatening and/or using violence to suppress or destroy them. As Waltz (1959, p. 232) suggests, in anarchy, wars can occur “*because there is nothing to prevent them*”, and thus, “*in international politics, force serves, not only as the ultima ratio but indeed as the first and constant one.*”⁶ The States for that reason, among their motivations to behave in the System, when perceiving themselves as part of an environment with the latency of war they are, at some level, constantly driven by fear and distrust (WALTZ, 1979).

The anarchic system, for Structural Realism (1979), is the primal condition to explain the objects (the Units’) behavior in the international political system. Furthermore, it is the causal principle underlying the regularities of international politics, perceivable in the object's own social structure. This means that the anarchic condition produces explanatory mechanisms for the balance of power in International Relations, which, according to Waltz (1979), manifests themselves regularly among the actors of this system. On the other hand, the behavior of states within the international system is determined by the asymmetric distribution of power within this anarchical environment, and their performance in the system is always defined by the endeavors of preventing others from increasing their relative capabilities.

Notwithstanding Hans Morgenthau’s writings on Classical Realism, which aims to explain the arrangement of international politics as being based on human nature, Waltz's endeavors form a theoretical departure from the classic approach. A result is a systemic approach of the world by the name of Defensive Realism or Structural Realism. Waltz breaks away from traditional premises of Classic Realism and its central focus – the human nature of states' leaders compelling the States to act towards the maximization of its power within the IS – whilst focusing Neorealism’s premises on the system, emphasizing that the anarchic structure compels States to strive for whatever ensures their survival within it (WALTZ, 1979).

The Neorealism premise regards the affirmation that causes are processed bi-directionally. According to Waltz (1979), one must consider causes at the level of the structure of the IS itself to perceive results that sometimes cannot be perceived in a unidirectional cause arrangement – focused only on the results of the state's interaction. Another premise also brings

⁶ WALTZ, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, the state and war: A theoretical analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

a new perspective on determining causal relations, first, by characterizing power as a “means” available to states and not as an “end” in itself. In Waltz’ conception, relative power refers to the combined capacity of a State and its disposition within the international system (WALTZ, 1979).

Just as Grieco (1988 p.16) points that “*states are positional, not atomistic, in character*”⁷, Waltz (1979, p. 126) suggests, “*The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.*”⁸ Thus, in neorealism, the maximization of power does not prevail over security goals, and security is always related to the state’s position in the system. The disposition of each state in the system is in turn defined by their relative power, and for the sake of its security, the states will always seek to prevent others from increasing their relative capabilities (GRIECO, 1988).

The concepts of relative and absolute gains are important to address. The States, within a self-help environment, have “power” as a means-to-an-end, the final end always being the avoidance of their disappearance as political entities. This condition makes the States, under ordinary circumstances, settle for relative gains rather than for absolute ones. The anarchic condition of international politics makes a relative gain more important than absolute gain. Thus, under structural constraints in self-help IS and its lack of security, the state's core interest is in their survival (GRIECO, 1998).

By this logic, the foundation of security is not measured by the absolute power of one State, But by the power of that State in relation to others’. This assumption considers states' relative capabilities as the ultimate foundation of their security as an independent political body within the anarchic system and therefore, of their existence. Anarchy creates an insecure environment built upon constant distrust and fear among its units. A strong ally might as well become a strong enemy in the future. This uncertainty drives the states to constantly worry for their survival. As Grieco (1988, p. 15) stresses, “*the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities*”⁹ and thus, preventing them from ever coming to be a stronger possible enemy. Hence, under normal circumstances of a self-help international context, the state units do not behave to maximize their individual power and obtain the highest payoff but to obtain the higher gain in relation to the gain of the other(s) (GRIECO, 1998).

⁷ GRIECO, J. Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realistic critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. International Organization. Vol 42. Issue 3 (summer 1988), pp. 485-507.

⁸ WALTZ, Kenneth. Theory of international politics. New York: McGraham Hill, 1979.

⁹ GRIECO, J. Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realistic critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. International Organization. Vol 42. Issue 3 (summer 1988), pp. 485-507.

2.1.1 Structural level, Cooperation and Balance of power

Waltz approaches the international states system as composed of both the interacting units – the states – and the systemic structure. For Waltz (1979, p. 100-101), “*the structure, is defined by its ordering principle, the functional differentiation or non-differentiation of the units, and by the distribution of capabilities across the units*”, that is, the international political system is composed of two levels, the structure level and the level of its units, which are simultaneously distinct and interrelated (WALTZ, 1979).

The theory seeks to explain the results of the structure of the International System and its State units, such as the probability of cooperation among them, alliance formation patterns, and the possibility of wars. According to Waltz (1979), the structure of the International System influences the behavior of the states according to the global organization, which is defined primarily by the distribution of power. Therefore, attention should be paid not to the interactions between the units, but to the position that these units occupy in the system, how they organize themselves within the international arena (WALTZ, 1979).

One of neorealism's core arguments regards the notion of the States as being always conscious about this distribution of power, what Waltz (1979) calls *balance of power*. As well as the knowledge that the structure of the system compels states to act in a certain way. Hence, as the structure determines actions, for a structural change to happen, the position of the units within the system has to change. To further explain Waltz' endeavors to demonstrate how the structure designates conditions that constrain the results of international politics, it is important to understand that the System in Structuralist theory is made up of three pillars/foundations: (a) The ordering principle of the system, (b) the system's units and, (c) the capacities distribution or, what the author calls, Balance of Power (WALTZ, 1979).

The first pillar is the (a) ordering principle, which can present itself as hierarchic or anarchic, and Waltz (1979) assumes that this principle defines the international system as anarchic, decentralized, and considers all states as equals. The IS is spontaneous and involuntary, therefore no state can control it and all states are constrained by it. According to Waltz (1979, p.101) “*to achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves*”, and this principle imposes a condition of a system of self-help, the States primary concern is for survival, prevailing over any other State goal. Although, the anarchic structure of the IS constrains the behavior of States, they are free to act as they wish, and the structure creates punishments and rewards for each action they decide to engage in. In short, the structure

imposes constraining rather than coercive conditions on the actions of states, these conditions confer advantages to those who follow them and costs to those who resist them (WALTZ, 1979).

The second pillar refers to (b) the units of the system, the states. Despite particularities in their territorial, wealth and populational composition, states are considered equal, in function and as autonomous political units. The theory argues that States are not the only actors in the IS; the major States, however, labeled great powers, are considered the most relevant. They are responsible for determining the Social Structure's dynamic. Although they face the same constraints and equally compose the social structure, they differ as autonomous political units in terms of capacity to engage and to perform in response to the constraints (WALTZ, 1979).

For neorealist theorists, great powers are the key units to be studied, as units that hold large amounts of power are able to play decisive roles in international politics and are able to shape the social dynamics of the IS, as Waltz states:

(...) the theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era. This is the fashion among political scientists as among historians, but fashion does not reveal the reason lying behind the habit. In international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves. In systems theory, structure is a generative notion; and the structure is generated by the interactions of its principal part (WALTZ, 1979. p. 72).

The units that bear lesser power alone have less impact on international dynamics. Although the balancing behavior in the IS allows them to play an important role by engaging in alliance patterns and balancing against great powers – rather than bandwagoning with them, they are limited when acting alone. Major or great powers, however, are capable of influencing and/or interfering more and for longer in international relations (WALTZ, 1979).

The last pillar of the structure in Neorealism is (c) the distribution of capacities. This pillar, according to Waltz (1979), is attributed by the structure, is a systemic concept, and defines the position to be occupied by the unit in the IS. The more power capabilities a state accumulates for itself – through alliances or short-term cooperation – the higher its position in the system. A change in the distribution of capacities of the States, internally or externally – e.g. through alliances – can change the structure's social dynamics in terms of units' positions. The structure is defined by the disposition of its units, thus, a structural change arises from a change in that disposition (WALTZ, 2002).

Another neorealist premise regards an approach towards States' relations within the international political system that takes the war as the natural state due to the extemporaneous character of its units in choosing whether to use force. However, the same ordering principle of

an anarchic system that makes the structure self-help, also has the ability to constrain its Units enough for them to chase the path of cooperation. Nevertheless, States face the fear of their partners achieving relatively higher gains and increasing their position in the System, a concern that according to Grieco (1988, p. 16), might reduce their willingness to cooperate:

State positionality, then, engenders a “relative gains problem” for cooperation. That is, a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its Commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that partners are achieving, or are likely to achieve relatively greater gains. It will eschew cooperation even though participation in the arrangement was providing it, or would have provided it, with large absolute gains. Moreover, a state concerned about relative gains may decline to cooperate even if it is confident that partners will keep their commitments to a joint arrangement. Indeed, if a state believed that a proposed arrangement would provide all parties absolute gains, but would also generate gains favoring partners, then greater certainty that partners would adhere to the terms of the arrangement would only accentuate its relative gains concerns. **Thus, a state worried about relative gains might respond to greater certainty that partners would keep their promises with a lower, rather than a higher, willingness to cooperate**¹⁰ (GRIECO, 1988. p. 16).

This suggests that States are more likely to behave defensively than offensively due to their higher and constant worry about their partners' gains over their own. Moreover, this relative gain problem for the cooperative engagement between states instills even more enduring uncertainty in the system.

As Grieco (1988, p. 17) posits, “*this uncertainty results from the inability of states to predict or readily to control the future leadership or interests of partners*” which ends up standing in the way of cooperation. He (1988, p. 17) adds that, “*states are uncertain about one another's future intentions; thus, they pay close attention to how cooperation might affect relative capabilities in the future*” which brings up again security as the ultimate concern of the states, embedded in their position in the system. Thus, in accordance with Waltz's (2002) affirmations, it is possible to conclude that where self-help prevails, the units are concerned with survival and favoring themselves more than others, they act to ward off a position of dependency, seeking whenever possible a certain degree of independence. Cooperation is thus linked to the notion of relative gains, which intrinsically determines the security of the state.

Waltz's endeavors in Neorealist theory, therefore, unlike what classical realism claimed, postulates that international politics are defined by a common causal principle: of constraints arising from the structure. According to the theory, as much as States always avoid war, they will always act in a way to safeguard their interests, which can result in a hostile environment. However, if a unit chooses to act divergently, the structure will make it bear alone the losses of

¹⁰ Emphasis added.

this behavior, which ends up relatively increasing the costs of action of this nature. As Waltz (1992, p. 6) stresses, “*those who conform to accepted and successful practices more often rise to the top and are likelier to stay there*”¹¹, as in a game where the rules are “*defined by the structure that determines the kind of player who is likely to prosper*”.

On close analysis, for Waltz (1979; 2002), in a system where self-help prevails, the dominant behavior that the units tend to pursue is balancing, conservative conduct¹², in a combination of internal power capacities and external engagement – in a pattern of alliance with other units, for instance, in order to maintain their position in the system. For a better understanding of what balance of power behavior entails, the next section is dedicated to the Balance of Power Theory.

2.1.2 The Balance of Power Theory

The Balance of Power theory (BOP), presented in the structural perspective of Waltz, caused significant repercussions in the International Relations arena, and has as its main goal to explain international politics. Waltz (1979) claims that there is an identifiable constant factor present in the international system that justifies the international phenomena constantly present in world politics, such as war, alliances, and imperialism, and this factor is the structure of the system itself. Moreover, it is important to consider that the IS’ structure plays an essential role in any general theory in the field of International Relations.

While establishing the founding characteristics of the IS structure – the concern of the units with survival, the power relations in an anarchic and self-help environment, the propensity to conflict – Waltz (1979) no longer draws a parallel with human nature and from the role of governments or individuals. The international system is now understood from a systemic perspective, where the structure is responsible for constraining the behavior of States. According to Waltz’ Neorealist theory, the approach of a systemic balance of power seeks to explain, “*the results of states’ actions, under given conditions, and those results may not be foreshadowed in any of the actors’ motives or be contained as the objectives of their policies.*”¹³

The theory of Balance of Power does not discuss whether balance is maintained once achieved, but rather tries to explain a recurring result that is perceived in the system, that is the formation of balances of power. The theory points to accepting that once the balance changes,

¹¹ WALTZ, Kenneth apud ART, Robert J., JERVIS, Robert. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. Pearson, v. 10. 1992.

¹² DINIZ, Eugenio. Política internacional: um guia de estudo das abordagens realistas e da balança de poder. Belo Horizonte: Editora da PUC Minas, 2007.

¹³ WALTZ, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1979. p. 118.

it is going to be restored in a way or another, because the system itself encourages States to seek security, inducing them towards balance. The main concern of the units is to maintain their position within the system, and thus, guarantee their survival. Furthermore, an important concept should be reiterated: according to Structuralism, within anarchy balancing occurs as a result of the actions of states seeking to ensure their survival, therefore balance behavior is a *result* of structural constraints and not a state's goal (WALTZ, 1979).

It is important to explore further the concepts of the Security Dilemma and Collective Goods, in order to advance the understanding of balancing behavior and for the discussion of internal and external balancing.

2.1.3 Security Dilemma

Robert Jervis in *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma* (1978 p. 169) agrees with John H. Herz's idea¹⁴ that "*many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others*". Even when a state does not intend to attack another, the self-help dynamic created by the anarchic system does not uphold whether the other state's intentions will remain pacific or not. It is then that the dilemma presents itself to the units. States' endeavors to increase their security can result – at best – in the same status quo of lacking security and – at worst – in an increase of insecurity, if their opponents decide to take uneven/unbalanced measures.

The security dilemma does not preclude balancing – on the contrary, States facing the dilemma must either compete or lose. Those who choose not to compete will fall behind those that do and eventually will also face the danger of being eradicated. This is how the costs and benefits of acting upon systemic constraints are presented. As in Waltz (1979. p 118) "*if some - who do choose to compete - do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside. Obviously, the system won't work if all states lose interest in preserving themselves. It will, however, continue to work if some states do.*"

2.1.4 Collective Goods

The concept of collective goods supports explaining in which way the states will balance and which units are more likely in choosing whether to act in a way or another. Robert Jervis (1979. p. 216) defines "Collective Goods" as "*those that, if acquired, benefit everyone whether*

¹⁴ HERZ, John H. (1950) Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. *World Politics*, vol. 2, n. 2, pp. 157-180.

or not he has contributed to their acquisition." Jervis (1979) also affirms that in international politics, collective goods may occur as unintended results of rational individual actions:

If the hegemon is defeated, all states benefit, whether or not they participated in the coalition. Since joining the coalition is costly, the state's first choice would be to have the hegemon defeated without having to join in the opposition. In other words, the state would like to be the 'free rider,' taking advantage of the efforts of others. But since this is true of each of the states, there is a danger that no one will oppose the hegemon, even though all want it stopped (ROBERT JERVIS, 1979. p. 216)

By acknowledging the definition of Collective goods, one can further understand how States are likely to engage its internal balancing. Great powers are the only units that have great responsibilities towards the system and, only they are capable of playing big and decisive roles. The opposite happens with less powerful States, according to Jervis:

[...] since the participation of small states makes less of a difference in the outcome than does the participation of larger states, we would expect them to follow balance-of-power prescriptions less frequently and to be more subject to domino dynamics than are the larger powers (ROBERT JERVIS, 1979. p. 216)

Thus, great powers are the most at risk due to the fact of having more to lose – considering their loss may be a collective good for all the other units – although their preeminent amount of power allows them also to be the ones that are able to strongly influence the outcomes (JERVIS, 1979).

2.1.5 Balancing Behavior

Neorealist theory assumes that units are compelled to balance due to the anarchic structure constraints. Given that their primary goal is their survival, units in a self-help environment have no choice but to seek security and avoid falling behind and being eliminated. As discussed above, rational individual actions in International politics can result in unintended consequences, which can increase the lack of security in the system. The States then tend to assume this risk only when it means a higher increase on its security, since power in this scenario is a means-to-an-end, as Waltz (1979. p. 126) affirms: *"because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions."*

To argue that the pursuit of security is the primary motivation of States is to also affirm that seeking to purely maximize power is not. The State that engages in an endless struggle for power assumes the behavior of preponderance, and in a self-help system preponderance behavior is a threat to its security and the security of others and therefore, involves high risk and costs. Waltz (1979. p. 126) points out that *"in international politics, success leads to failure. The excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition elicits the opposition of others."*

Therefore, even if a unit chooses to bandwagon with an ascending power it would naturally increase the others' attempts to counter coalition them.

Bandwagoning might be a profitable behavior in the short term; in the long term, however, it could be a State's strategy to extend its relative power, which might be prejudicial for the International System. Schweller (1994. p. 74) argues that:

[...] the aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain (SCHWELLER, 1994. p. 74).

When a State decides to help to increase the power of its ally by engaging in bandwagoning behavior, it has only jeopardized its own security.

This broad range of possible behaviors by a State in the International System leads to many questions, one of which is what should the United States have done given the post Cold War era paradigm? How did academia see it and what did the literature foresee?

To try to answer this question it is important to discuss how a country can harness its endeavors in order to engage in balancing behavior, how a state manipulates its capacities to do so, and in what area and statecraft it privileges. To understand how the States decide to balance, Waltz (1979, p.118) points out that there are two ways for them to do so, either by "*internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one)*". Either internally or externally, a country's decision on where to focus its efforts also depends on global polarity. That is to say that the predominance of the kind of balancing behavior that a state decides to engage the most, according to Waltz (1979), hinges on whether the world is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar.

In Waltz's (1989) words,

Interdependence of parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses: These are the characteristics of great-power politics in a multipolar world. Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face them: These are the characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar world (WALTZ, 1989. p. 48).

Although the System's premises are still the same – anarchical nature of the system and survival as the basic motivation of its actors –, the ordering of the system lays out different environments of interaction and allows different kinds of balancing behavior (WALTZ, 1989).

According to Waltz's logic, when there is imbalance in a bipolar world, attempts at adjustments or alignment must be made by two great powers and only through internal efforts.

However, in a multipolar world, where power lies upon multiple centers, internal balancing is not as effective as it would be in a bipolarity. Therefore, further strategies are required – through alliance formations, for instance – so external balancing behavior might come in handy in a way that increases flexibility to the system (WALTZ, 1979).

3 GRAND STRATEGY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

3.1. Grand Strategy: A Military Plan

Foreign policymakers and scholars¹⁵ when referring to a broad strategic plan, where all elements of national power are employed to advance and accomplish the security-related objectives of a state in the foreign sphere, often use the concept of grand strategy. At its essence, this conception considers that a grand strategy outlines the state's security goals and provides an orientation on how the state is to achieve them, in order to defend it from possible threats¹⁶. However, this understanding of grand strategy can sometimes be too narrow when based only upon states' security, and sometimes too broad when it accounts for so many interests and instruments of statecraft that it can be conflated with the concept of foreign policy itself.

In order to direct the concept to the discussion proposed here, Robert J. Art's (1991; 2003) definition of grand strategy was chosen. He proposes a concept that precludes conflict with foreign policy conception, he lays out the realm of grand strategy as a strategic plan of how to achieve state interests using the military instruments as a means. Grand strategy, according to Art (1993), regards not only the how to achieve a state's security goals, but also how to employ military means to achieve its interests. This conception of grand strategy differs from the others that consider security¹⁷ and military goals as its main goal, in consonance with Art's idea when he affirms that (1991, p. 6-7), "*Rather I use it, first, to specify the goals that a state should pursue, including both security and non-security goals, and, second, to delineate how military power can serve these goals.*"

By this logic, in essence, a grand strategy is broader than a military strategy and narrower than a foreign policy. A well-designed grand strategy provides, therefore, guidance on how to connect the means to the proper ends of a state. Different from a pure expression of a state's ambitions, a grand strategy otherwise must, in fact, provide a concrete route to the exploitation of opportunities within the unpredictable system of states. That is to say that a

¹⁵ see, e.g., Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Barry Posen, "A Grand Strategy of Restraint," in *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*, S. Brimley and M. Flournoy, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, 2008), 84;; Beatrice Houser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey, eds., *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹⁶ For instance, as John J. Mearsheimer affirms in *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 17.

¹⁷ Also according to Art (1991), the word "security" in this paper is restricted to the ability of the states to protect their homeland from physical attack, invasion, conquest, or destruction. For analytical clarity and policy utility purposes, the term used is primarily in reference to those military capabilities.

grand strategy must outline a coherent and enlightening rationale for decision-makers in order for them to determine what to do, what not to do, and especially, what path to follow in order to do it (ART, 1991; 2003).

The understanding of grand strategy assumed new shapes in light of the new dynamics that were being established in the post-Cold War period, especially for the United States. The theoretical basis to be built here is founded on the contributions of Keohane and Nye (1977), Robert Jervis (1993)¹⁸, Posen and Ross (1996-1997)¹⁹, and Robert J. Art (2003). As the only remaining great power from the bipolar conflict, according to the authors, the proponents for the most suitable American grand strategy were strategies for a hegemonic actor, tending to delineate around main headings such as hegemonic primacy, selective engagement, offshore balance, neo-isolationism, and integration through collective security efforts. Each of them being different from each other, as well as in their possibilities for wielding the U.S. military instruments. A hegemonic state is one that holds dominion over other states, one that has sufficient capacity to dictate the rules of the International System. According to Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 44) when "*one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so*" this state is in a condition of hegemony. Unlike Primacy, Hegemony is the ability to compel the behavior of other states, it sets up a Hegemonic environment. Primacy, or leadership in the International System, sets up an environment of Unipolarity, where a state that holds this status is relatively ahead of the others in power and capabilities, it is a relatively stronger state (JERVIS, 1993).

Table 5. Ross and Posen's Competing Grand Strategy Visions.

	Neo-Isolationism	Selective Engagement	Cooperative Security	Primacy
Analytical Anchor	Minimal, defensive realism	Traditional balance of power realism	Liberalism	Maximal realism/unilateralism
Major Problem of Int'l Politics	Avoiding entanglement in the affairs of others	Peace among the major powers	The indivisibility of peace	The rise of a peer competitor
Preferred World Order	Distant balance of power	Balance of power	Interdependence	Hegemonic
Nuclear Dynamics	Supports status quo	Supports status quo	Supports aggression	Supports aggression
Conception of National Interests	Narrow	Restricted	Transnational	Broad

¹⁸ The conception of a hegemony strategy presented here are taken from the contributions of Robert Jervis, *International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?* (International Security 17, no. 4, Spring 1993: 52-53) and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

¹⁹ Ross and Posen (1996-97) in *Competing Versions of U.S. Grand Strategy*, discuss four strategies for the United States: Primacy, Selective Engagement, Collective Security, and Neo-isolationism. However, it was chosen to try to combine the Primacy strategy with conception of Hegemony as outlined by other authors.

Regional Priorities	North America	Industrial Eurasia	Global	Industrial Eurasia & the home of any potential peer competitor
Nuclear Proliferation	Not our problem	Discriminate prevention	Indiscriminate prevention	Indiscriminate prevention
NATO	Withdraw	Maintain	Transform & expand	Expand
Regional Conflict	Abstain	Contain; discriminate intervention	Intervene	Contain; discriminate intervention
Ethnic Conflict	Abstain	Contain	Nearly indiscriminate intervention	Contain
Humanitarian Intervention	Abstain	Discriminate intervention	Nearly indiscriminate intervention	Discriminate intervention
Use of Force	Self-defense	Discriminate	Frequent	At will
Force Posture	Minimal self-defense force	Two-MRC force	Reconnaissance strike complex for multilateral action	A two-power-standard for force

Source: Adapted from POSEN, Barry R. and ROSS, Andrew L. *Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy*. International Security, 21 no. 3, winter, 1996-97. p. 6.

Considering both understandings, the proponents of an *American grand strategy of hegemonic primacy* advocates that American interests are guaranteed only if the United States pursues the maintenance of its hegemonic status, by maximizing its power. This grand strategy implies expansive goals and unilaterality, consequently implying higher costs, risks, and threats. The hegemon must have legitimate authority based on its capacities, be able to overcome any competitor, influence the IS' rules as well as enforce them. The system stability needs the hegemony to persevere and the very structure of the system provides incentives for the hegemon to engage as the world's 'police'. It is maintaining hegemony or supremacy to ensure its security and prosperity. The logic behind this strategy is purely offensive, as strengthening itself is synonymous to granting security (POSEN and ROSS, 1996-97).

The *American grand strategy of neo-isolationism*, on the other hand, sees unipolarity as an opportunity for a total withdrawal²⁰ of the United States from international ventures. For advocates of this strategy, the world's security system without the leadership and strength of the United States would remain the same, thus, the U.S. should distance itself from it. American intervention or ventures into other territories to guarantee security are, however, unnecessary, if not threatening. Therefore, from this point of view, the use of force should be handled in the form of defense, only mobilized in case of existential, not merely potential, threat. Moreover, even if there were a threat in other regions, the United States' nuclear deterrent capability would be able to balance it out favorably and avoid any impact of a war. Besides the promotion of

²⁰ Despite the term "total withdrawal," neo-isolationism is precisely the refinement of isolationism. It admits the intricacy of the relations between countries - composed of economic relations, diplomatic relations, etc. - in the international system, and the impossibility of a total disengagement from these relations.

trade, the proponents of this strategy claim that the United States does not have vital interests in other regions. Thus, American interventions abroad are not only uncalled for, but can be seen as threatening, unnecessarily creating an environment of insecurity and distrust among states towards the U.S. (POSEN and ROSS, 1996-97).

On the other hand, an *American grand strategy of selective engagement* does not imply a quest for hegemony. This strategy is intended to maintain a strong military position in regions of vital interest to Washington, with the purpose of ensuring stability favorable to the United States. Those who support this strategy say that American power is essential to maintain the peace of the system, that American leadership is good and necessary to avoid chaos. By this logic, an American primacy does not necessarily aim at the domination of other states in order for stability to be lasting, whereas expansionist aspirations could lead to unnecessary conflict and motivate other states to attempt to counterbalance U.S. power (ART, 2003; POSEN and ROSS, 1996-97).

The United States' goal towards the world through selective engagement is geopolitical, it aims to narrow its scope of action by seeking to preserve a beneficial peace in regions of great importance to the security and prosperity of the United States. It seeks to retain military power to solve the problems that encompass those regions. Although there is disagreement among the authors regarding the ideal commitments for the U.S. abroad, most of them tend to agree on maintaining stability and openness to trade in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, in order to ensure its ability to trade with these regions and prevent a regional power from establishing itself and becoming strong enough to threaten U.S. security interests. It regards a substantial and considerably active American presence in the major power centers of the world, enough to favor and endure stability achieved there, virtually a focused preeminence (ART, 2003; POSEN and ROSS, 1996-97).

Offshore balancing and selective engagement are compatible when it comes to concerns that stability is not self-generated and that there are specific regions of the world that are important to the United States' security. However, the *American offshore balancing grand strategy* implies the withdrawal of American troops from abroad, reinserting themselves only in case of the imminent emergence of a threatening state power, while this withdrawal would entail the reorganization of these regions – by the logic of the balance of power. In the short-term, this strategy involves minimizing U.S. involvement in costly and unnecessary compromises, while reserving its resources to thrive in the long-term. Offshore balancers share many of the analytical assumptions and assessments of isolationists, but maintain that the United States should not isolate itself from international affairs, but rather engage in offshore

balancing by deploying its military forces in situations where a hostile power sought hegemony over a region of vital American interest (ART, 2003; LAYNE, 1997; MEARSHEIMER, 2011; MEARSHEIMER and WALT, 2016).

This strategy involves withdrawing U.S. military forces from Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe, and reintroducing them only if one of these key regions is under threat of being subdued, ensuring that no regional hegemony takes control of one of the world's key regions. Although this strategy at first glance seems less costly in terms of lives, resources, and statecraft, the need to be capable to re-enter key regions by force, even in the face of powerful regional hegemony, makes offshore balancing an option that requires great investment. In addition to the fact that by fortifying itself to do so, the United States may be perceived as a threat to other states, increasing insecurity in the IS (ART, 2003; POSEN and ROSS, 1996-97).

However, when we talk about strategies such as collective security efforts, the proposal becomes outlined in theoretically parallel contours to the research proposed here. An *American grand strategy of collective security efforts* takes a fundamentally different approach than those addressed above, arguing that traditional geopolitical concerns that justify strategies such as hegemony or selective engagement have been or are being superseded²¹. Proponents of this strategy claim that the new American concerns must be transnational in nature because the possibility of interstate conflict is becoming less and less likely²². This strategy goes in opposition to the pillars of neorealist theory, such as that of insecurity and uncertainty as inherent characteristics of the international system.

A strategy of collective security efforts proposes that the U.S. should concentrate on pooling its power with that of other like-minded nations to meet these global challenges. Integratively, the very security considerations of states – including American ones – should be brought together and dealt with collectively – either by American initiative or through existing institutions such as the UN. The collective effort would take the form of an agreement between the U.S. and other states to ensure compliance with the rules and to punish rival states that, for instance, use methods of aggression to achieve their goals. In incompatibility with neorealist foundations, this strategy considers peace and security to be inextricably linked among nations (CHARLES A. and CLIFFORD A. KUPCHAN. 1995).

²¹ e.g, KUPCHAN, Charles A. and Clifford A. Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe. *International Security* 16, no. 1, Summer 1991: 114-161.

²² KUPCHAN, Charles A. and Clifford A. The Promise of Collective Security. *International Security*. Vol. 20, No. 1. Summer, 1995. 52-61.

3.2. Military Strategies: Defense, Deterrence, and Compellence

The strategy is a central area of reflection in the scope of International Relations, in a world of a hostile and often conflicting nature, strategy – even more than the basis of rationalization in the face of conflicts – is an instrument which sovereign actors, in the form of Nation-State, must count on (Posen, 1984). The term strategy provided herein is associated with the ability to employ force to overcome the adversary and achieve the desired goal. It is interpreted also as associated with the idea of government planning when facing conflict. It is imperative, therefore, to associate the understandings regarding the strategy and military strategy with the agent of strategy implementation and planning, herein considered as unitary actors, the States. Considered sovereign autonomous units in the International System, States are responsible for implementing military strategies in the international political environment, all these strategies retaining complexities such as bureaucratic, resources organization, time, space, and state's power capacities. Some International Relations scholars approach major state strategies as "Grand Strategies", which consist of complex processes to achieve state objectives regarding security, power, and diplomacy. For example, according to Barry Posen (1984, p. 13), a *“grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state's theory about how it can best cause security for itself”*.

On the other hand, according to Robert Art (2003):

(...) a grand strategy tells a nation's leaders what goals they should aim for and how best they can use their country's military power to attain these goals. (...) To define a nation's foreign policy is to lay out the full range of goals that a state should seek in the world and then determine how all of the instruments of statecraft—political power, military power, economic power, ideological power—should be integrated and employed with one another to achieve those goals. Grand strategy, too, deals with the full range of goals that a state should seek, but it concentrates primarily on how the military instrument should be employed to achieve them. It prescribes how a nation should wield its military instrument to realize its foreign policy goals (Art, 2003, p. 1-2).

Strategy, therefore, can be understood as the rational way in which the actor, in this case, the State, allocates its power resources in order to achieve its goals. Military strategy thus presents itself as the way that States allocate their resources of military force to achieve their objectives. These usages being either through persuasion/compellence, or deterrence of their opponent by military force, or to defend themselves after any form of attack, as well as to demonstrate such power by making perceptible and clear threats.

The characterization of use of force is another point that needed clarifying: herein it is established in accordance with the goal to be achieved, categorized by deterrence, compellence, and defense. The definition of three forms of use of force is found in various literary sources,

such as Robert J. Art's book *A Grand Strategy for America* (2003), which states that *military power has three political uses*: deterrence, compellence (or coercion), and defense:

Deterrence is the threatened use of force to dissuade an adversary from undertaking something undesirable; it involves a threat to destroy what the adversary values, with the object of dissuading it from starting an undertaking harmful to the deterrer's interests. **Compellence** is the use of military power to bring about a change in an adversary's behavior; it is designed to force an adversary to stop the objectionable actions it has already undertaken. Compellence is usually achieved by employing physical force against the adversary in order to coerce it to alter its behavior, although states can first threaten compellent actions to try to stop the objectionable behavior. If a deterrent threat is effective, the threat will not have to be executed because the adversary will not have taken (or will reverse) the objectionable steps. If a compellent action is successful, the adversary's actions will change to accord with the behavior being demanded of it. **Defense** is the deployment of military power in order either to ward off an attack or to minimize damage from an attack. Defensive preparations are directed against an adversary's military forces (ART, Robert. 2003. p. 5).²³

Therefore, we can categorize each strategy of military force by analyzing the goals to be achieved by the State, these being to prevent another actor's actions or to deter it – by employing military force – from doing something, or to change another actor's behavior, to compel it. Alternatively, when the use of force is to defend against actions already taken by an actor or their threat.

Similarly, according to Thomas C. Schelling (1966), compellence is the same as coercing another actor into action. For Schelling (1966), to compel is to engage in direct action which persuades another State, or the opponent, to give up something that is wanted from it. Schelling's understanding of compellence opposes his understanding of deterrence which he argues, consists of the threat to impose a certain punishment to the State in case it decides to engage in a certain action; deterrence, therefore, aims to discourage one's action. As a military strategy, deterrence is the power to threaten by imposing reprisal in order to inhibit an opponent's power.

As compellence and deterrence strategy are both coercive forms, the former requires harder engagement. One State that decides to compel another must have a clear commitment to act and sometimes it might be costly. In addition, the opponent must have a fear of damaging its reputation in order to be a compelled subject. However, in order to use deterrence, a State needs to make its threat possible and credible enough to the opponent to believe and fear it, as costly actions in deterrence are always something to be avoided. Therefore, given the State's complexity, it is easier to engage in deterrence so the opponent State can simply stay put than to force it to act (SCHELLING, 1966).

²³ Emphasis added.

Schelling (1966) argues that a State can engage in immediate compellence by using diplomacy, which consists of using promises or verbal threats. Another form of compellence is by the form of demonstration, what Schelling (1966) calls “diplomacy of violence” which requires limited use of force combined with the perceived possibility of violence to be increased, a threat of conflict escalation whether the opponent does not act in accordance with that established. In “diplomacy of violence”, the state engages in a demonstration of its military power capabilities, not at once but in stages in order to convince the opponent to consider the consequences of non-compliance.

3.3 Conclusion

Faced with a Cold War context, the polarity of the world was defined by two great powers; however, the fall of the Soviet Union brought about the dissolution of a bipolar ordering of the world. Unlike the history of wars in humanity, the Cold War stood out for not being a total war, but a strategic one. Although it was a type of ‘battle of balancing’ between two great powers, its end came with the complete dissolution of one of the parties. The remains of this war’s end fashioned a new world organization and consequently a new dynamic of interaction. Albeit not abruptly, the balance of power has changed and is certainly no longer bipolar, leaving the question of whether the unipolarity under the United States is going to last.

In this chapter, we sought to discuss the main concepts to be instrumentalized in the research to try to establish comprehension around this question. Initially, the idea of the research was presented and on which theoretical perspective the analysis is going to be approached. Structural realism, as the chosen theory, had a brief history elucidated here, as well as its main premises pointed out. According to theory, insecurity is a result of an anarchic world, so war is seen as inevitable. However, Structural Realism put forth a premise of force as *ultima ratio* as well as the first constant one. Guided by fear and distrust, states act seeking survival. This dynamic builds a structure that promotes explanatory mechanisms for the Balance of Power Theory (WALTZ, 1979; 2002).

According to the Balance of Power theory, a state’s behavior is defined by its power capacities, which when distributed asymmetrically lead to a world where each state unit occupies a certain position given its relative power. The position that a state occupies in the system determines its security inasmuch as, an increase in other state’s power capacity leads to an increase of distrust and insecurity. It characterizes a self-help environment in which the units act in order to avoid the other party enhancing their power capacities, as they focus on the relative gains of each interaction (WALTZ, 1979; 2002).

A change in a state's position produces a change in the structure, the change from a bipolar world to new polarization directly affects how states interact with each other. According to the BOP, States are encouraged to engage in a kind of balancing behavior to adjust any current imbalance. This balancing behavior can occur internally or externally, and the choice of what kind of balancing the states should adhere to also depends on the world's polarity. It sought to bring the concept of security dilemma and collective goods, in order to understand how the behavior of internal and external balancing affects the dynamics of the structure and, at the same time, is determined by it (JERVIS, 179. WALTZ, 1979; 2002).

Through an initial exploration, a brief categorization of the most supported strategy types for the United States was put into place, a conceptual framework for the subsequent investigation, which was based on analysis of known books and articles on the issue, citations within these works, and references from experts, among other sources. Based on this examination, strategies of hegemony, selective engagement, and offshore balancing were selected based on their prominence in the U.S. grand strategy political and academic debate.

In the last section, the types of use of force were elucidated and the concept of grand strategy was introduced. These concepts allow the categorization of each action taken by the units, in how they choose to assemble their power capacities. The next chapter of this paper will present the systematic review of the chosen literature, and every concept herein discussed will be important to achieve the contribution aimed by this research.

4 RESEARCH DESIGN

According to Costa & Zoltowski (2014) the current idea of systematic review of literature (SRL) emerged in the late 1970s and was coined by the researcher Gene Glass in 1976. Based on the already coined concept of meta-analysis, the researcher developed the systematic review method, which allowed him to demonstrate the effectiveness and influence of certain topics in the field of psychology using the pre-existing literature. From then on, the understanding around the systematic review began to consolidate as a wide-range methodology to seek answers to certain questions through a survey of primary studies.²⁴ As Danyer and Tranfiel (2009, p. 672) stresses, the Systematic Review of the Literature is a methodology that *“locates existing studies, selects and evaluates contributions, analyses and synthesises data, and reports the evidence in such a way that allows reasonably clear conclusions to be reached about what is known and what is not known”*.

SRL in Political Science has become more and more outstanding since the last decade, especially regarding the theme of public policy²⁵, although it is still not usual in the field of International Relations. However, as Dacombe (2017, p. 4) argues, *“many of the claims made by empirical research might be made in a far clearer way if they are put across in the context of a comprehensive account of the findings of previous work”*. Hence, SRL is a methodology that should help understand how the actions of a particular country or group of countries are understood by scholars and theorists. According to Dacombe (2017), a systematic review might help to achieve a proper understanding of a particular study, because it allows the researcher to consider and study previous findings from the already existing publications:

(...) proper understanding of the findings of a particular study lies in considering them alongside the results of similar studies testing the same kinds of hypotheses, using similar populations. By making explicit their approach to the identification, inclusion and assessment of literature, researchers undertaking systematic reviews are able to speak with far greater certainty about the wisdom of existing research, highlighting common findings – as well as the shortcomings – in previous studies (DACOMBE, Rod. 2017. p. 3).

The amount of studies of International Relations is extraordinary, such is the range of platforms where they are published in. It is virtually impossible to trace them all. Studies presenting state's behavior and military strategies, although, a subdivision in the field of International Relations, bring new discussions daily, such as new perspectives, critics,

²⁴ PETTICREW, M., & ROBERTS, H. Systematic reviews in the social sciences: A practical guide. Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

²⁵ DACOMBE, Rod. Systematic Reviews in Political Science: What Can the Approach Contribute to Political Research? Political Studies Review. Volume: 16 issue: 2, page(s): 148-157. February 2, 2017.


responses to critics, and a magnitude of overlapping material. When compiled, they can bring an array of insights and ideas that over time, allow the analyst to inquire whether, in a certain way, some perspectives of the world and state behavior are privileged.

The literature review allows the survey of available scientific production, as well as the (re) construction of networks of thoughts and concepts, which articulate knowledge from different sources in an attempt to establish a path towards what is wanted to be known. The SRL method consists of a research process based on predetermined criteria and rigid scientific evidence, its appliance collaborates with the choice of studies and/or tools and enables the development and formulation of original information (SCHÜTZ; SANT'ANA; SANTOS, 2011).

Thus, it is worth analyzing how academia sees the path that the most powerful State in the world should take within a new dynamic. By performing a systematic review, I must start by first describing the research problem; secondly, explaining thoroughly the strategy for studies search – such as criteria for inclusion and exclusion; and, thirdly, how the data extraction and evaluation took place. Hence, the systematic review method will allow me to maximize the potential of a search, by finding the largest possible number of results in an organized way. The result intended to be achieved with this systematic review pervades through finding a chronological relationship or a linear descriptive temporal narrative of the subject of interest herein, but in addition, it will enable the formulation of a reflective, critical and comprehensive work regarding all material analyzed (COSTA & ZOLTOWSKI, 2014).

This research will follow the methodological process of Systematic reviews (SR) according to Biolchini *et al.* (2005), which is conducted in a three-step process, (1) Planning, (2) Execution, (3) Result Analysis,

Figure 3. Systematic Review Conduction Process.



Source: BIOLCHINI *et al.* Systematic Review in Software Engineering. Technical report, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2005.

In the first phase (1), the objectives of the research and a review protocol are established. The protocol encompasses the central question of the study and the tools that will be manipulated to try to answer it. After the planning phase, (2) execution begins, the

identification, selection, and evaluation of the primary studies are made using the eligibility and exclusion criteria previously defined in the review protocol. After selecting the final pool of studies, data is extracted and synthesized in the (3) result analysis phase. It is important to note that the SR activity is verifiable and replicable; therefore, during the performance of all its phases, the results throughout the process must be displayed (BIOLCHINI *et al*, 2005).

Notwithstanding the process' phases, the SR process proposed by Biolchini *et al* (2005) is not purely sequential, since activities may start during the development of the protocol and be refined when necessary. Moreover, it is paramount to constantly verify the entire SR process. Before conducting the systematic review, the research plan must be defined as feasible; whether there is any problem, the researcher must return to the planning phase to review the protocol.

The present paper's goal is to promote a discussion of identified and synthesized information in an attempt to answer a certain question. SRL will enable, in a systematic and verifiable way, to analyze a sample of studies published between the winter of 1990 and the winter 2004²⁶ in the International Security Magazine regarding the subject of grand strategy for the United States. The choice of the International Security Journal (IS) as this research's database was due to its relevance in security studies. Edited by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and published quarterly by the MIT Press, IS is an American initiative in political studies (THE MIT PRESS, 2020).

Since its foundation in 1976²⁷, IS has been responsible for issues of great scientific and political relevance. International Security Journal has renowned prominence of articles debating American national security. With an impact factor of 4,135²⁸, it brings together respected authors with important academic discussions of great impact and worldwide reach.

This research aims to contribute to academia, putting forth content that systematizes post-war worldviews and strategic prescriptions for the current world power, from the perspective of renowned authors and their work in one of the most important magazines in the field of International Relations. Therefore, the problem that moves the proposed research concerns the question: *According to the articles published in International Security from 1990 to 2004, which structural components were imposed or offered to the United States in the post-Cold War period, which corresponded those prescribed and / or predicted by the literature?*

²⁶ The time cut was chosen to try to establish the path taken by the authors in its publications during the final moments of the Cold War, right after its ending, and during the following years. In addition, the period was chosen to make it practical to select articles according to the frequency of publication and issues of International Security and not due to any specific international event.

²⁷ THE MIT PRESS. Journals, 2020.

²⁸ JOURNAL Impact Factor. Journal Citation Reports, Clarivate Analytics, 2019.

Hence, the discussion in this paper takes the condition of the primacy of the U.S. as given and assumes that the costs and risks to the U.S. in brandishing its power are not the same as they were in the '90s. The present dissertation has its foundation on discovering whether or not academia presented accurate predictions for the new global order established since the post-Cold War era and what prescriptions of grand strategy were most recommended by them. For this purpose, this work carried out a systematic review of the literature present in *International Security*, selecting articles published between 1990 and 2004, which put forth prescriptions of military strategy to be adopted by the United States and predictions of world organization regarding the logic of the Balance of Power theory.

Accordingly, the prescriptive articles of grand strategy for the United States will have their prescriptions framed in the concepts of forms of political use of power put forth by Robert J. Art (2003), known as *Defense*, *Deterrence* and *Compellence*, and thus grouped to understand which strategies were most recommended by the authors. Regarding the world organization, the concepts – mostly – discussed by Waltz (1989; 1979) of *Unipolarity*, *Bipolarity*, *Multipolarity* as well as other related concepts²⁹, will be instrumentalized to frame the articles that present some type of prediction of the future context of the post-Cold War world. In addition, it is going to be considered the concept of Grand Strategy, discussed in the previous chapter – mostly – underlying Art's (1991; 2003) conceptual contributions.

After the literature review, the final report will display an analysis of all the prescriptions made by the authors of the selected articles that make up the final pool. The information will be arranged in a comparative and critical fashion in order to perceive patterns, discuss the similarities and ambiguities of the acquired content, and try to conceive of its causes. With the information in the report, it will be possible to reach a conclusion that refers to an answer to the question proposed in this work.

4.1 Goals

4.1.1 Overall

This study aims to conduct a systematic review of the literature on International Security articles that included prescriptions and/or forecasts of use of force (military strategy) by the United States during the period 1990 and 2004 in order to identify what strategy of use of force was the most recommended action by the academia.

²⁹ Concepts such as "hegemony", "primacy" and "leadership" may have room in the discussion, not necessarily from the unique Waltzian perspective.

4.1.2 Specifics:

- a) To survey the International Security journal for reviewing articles that prescribe American military strategy for the use of force.
- b) To organize and relate proposed strategies to their proponents;
- c) To identify the scenarios envisaged by the selected authors;
- d) To organize proposals about the use of force in three categories given by Balance of Power theory: defense, deterrence and compellence;
- e) To frame the prescriptions of American grand strategy into one of the types set forth here: Selective Engagement, Offshore Balancing, Neo-Isolationism, Hegemony, and Collective Security;
- f) To establish unipolar, bipolar and multipolar contexts criteria given the selected theory;
- g) Check correspondence between the gathered data;

5 CONDUCTING THE SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW (SLR)

This study conducts a systematic review of the literature on International Security articles that included prescriptions and/or forecasts of use of force (military strategy) and international context regarding the United States during the period between 1990 and 2004. To carry out this systematic review, the following question was central in the protocol: *what military strategies were most predicted and/or prescribed by the literature for The United States in the post- Cold War era?*

5.1 Systematic Literature Review Process

The systematic review was conducted in three phases: (1) Planning, (2) Execution, and (3) Results Analysis, in accordance to Biolchini *et al.* (2005).

(1) Planning:

Goal: To identify in the literature present in *International Security* published between winters of 1990 and 2004, articles which put forth prescriptions of military strategy to be taken by the United States and predictions of world polarity.

Research Question: what military strategies were most predicted and/or prescribed by the literature for The United States in the post- Cold War era?

Population: Articles that discuss military strategies for the United States published between winter 1990 and winter 2004.

Intervention: Prescription of American Military Strategy or Use of force or Grand strategy

Results: Strategies Identified

Research Database: International Security on Jstor:
<<https://www.jstor.org/journal/intesecu>>

Selected terms and synonyms for search: “United States”; “U.S”; “America”; “strategy”; “Strategy”; “Strategies”; “strategies”; “Grand Strategy”; “grand strategy”; “Relative gain”; “relative gain”; “Relative power”; “relative power”.

Search string: (United States OR U.S OR America) AND (Strategy OR Strategies) AND (Grand strategy) AND (Relative power OR Relative gain)

Inclusion criteria:

- a. Articles published in International Security in the period between winter of 1990 and winter of 2004 available on Jstor;
- b. Articles that predominantly address the themes of **United States, strategy, grand strategy, relative power; relative gain;**
- c. Articles 10 or more pages long.

Exclusion Criteria (excludes the article that has at least 1 (one) of the characteristics below):

- a. Articles that have not been published in International Security Journal;
- b. Articles that do not have any of the pre-selected keywords;
- c. Articles shorter than 10 pages;
- d. Articles that do not predominantly address the themes of the **United States, strategy, grand strategy, relative power; relative gain.**

Study selection process:

- a. To perform the search in the selected database according to the determined period;
- b. The articles returned by the search are inserted in the MAXQDA tool (MAXQDA, 2020);
- c. The set of articles is selected according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. This verification is done by keywords search (string application) and number of pages;
- d. The included and excluded articles are documented in tables.

Copies of all articles are included as results of the initial search, and then reviewed, entirely, by the researcher. The evaluation of the quality of the studies is done according to the publication criteria of the International Security Magazine. The review focused on looking for studies that predict global polarity and prescribe a strategy for the use of force by the United States, especially grand strategy. The only issue considered is that the article must include a description of this prescription, as this description will be part of the data to be extracted. The sources of the documents will be considered to be reliable.

5.2 Carrying Out the Second Step

In this section the second step of the SRL, Execution (2), will be done. The following content is an analysis of data collected by the author from the International Security Journal (IS), obtained from the digital library Jstor³⁰. The articles were separated into folders by year of publication and analyzed through the software called MAXQDA³¹. The results are achieved through the application of a *string* in order to filter the presence of selected words at least once within the text³² of each article. The string is constructed by the terms “United States”; “U.S.”; “America”; “Strategy”; “Strategies”; “Military”; “Grand Strategy”; “Relative power”; “Relative gain”. Each of the terms applied will have its purpose explained throughout the description of the process.

The first gathered data set is composed of a pool of 347 articles published by The MIT Press in the International Security Journal between the winter of 1990 and the winter of 2004, a thirteen-year period (the journal is published quarterly). *The time frame was chosen in order to try to establish the path taken by the authors in its publications during the final moments of the Cold War, right after its ending, and during the following years.* This time frame allowed perceiving how each author considered the world events within the passing years, their endeavors to understand the world as it has become at the time, and the one they were expecting to be configured. International Security is a leading journal in the International Relations and Political Science field when it comes to security-related issues, especially considering articles that address debates on American security affairs, often proposing new discussions and world trends among topics of International Relations³³. Given the purpose of this research, this journal was chosen as the best source of content to try to achieve the goals established herein.


After gathering all data published within the temporal frame, the first goal was to select those articles with at least 10 pages, so that the Font Matter, Summaries, Back Matter and some of the Correspondence documents were excluded from the mapping. After that, the second goal was to create a query string composed of selected keywords working as a filter in order to include and exclude articles, establishing the following research path:

³⁰ JSTOR. Digital Library, 2020. Home. Available in: < <https://www.jstor.org/>>. Access in: oct.14, 2020.

³¹ VERBI Software. MAXQDA 2020 [computer software]. Berlin, Germany: VERBI Software, 2020. Available in: maxqda.com.

³² At first, the research relied on the selection of the articles via search for pre-selected keywords given by the Jstor website and shown at the website description of each article. However, this function was removed from the website on August 21st of 2020. Then, the present research took another direction of selection by using the software MAXQDA and its function called *lexical research*.

³³ THE MIT PRESS. Journals, 2020. Home: International Security. Available in: < <https://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/isec>>. Access in: oct.14, 2020.

Figure 4. Research path: String

Source: Elaborated by the author.


Each part of the process is discussed and thoroughly explained below. It consists of the (i) Keywords search n°1, a preliminary investigation of the articles that contain constructs of the “United States” within its texts including the ones that do, excluding the ones that do not, and first establishing a direction for the selection. Then, (ii) Keywords search n° 2 investigates those articles that at least mention strategy. Trying to put forth a relation between the first selected keywords and the constructs of strategy, the articles containing at least one of these constructs remain in the pool of selection whilst the others are excluded.

After the first two filters were applied, a pool of selected articles allowed assuming a direction of possible discussions regarding the United States and strategy. The second part of this process narrowed the subject theoretically, the (iii) Keywords search n° 3, investigated among the remaining publications, those that have “grand strategy” within its texts, excluding those that do not. Following this logic, in (iv) Keywords search n° 4, the last keyword search, the pool of articles were even more limited to those articles that showed “relative power” or “relative gain” within its texts, and the research took its path to a more Realist discussion to be selected.

5.2.1 i) Keywords search n° 1: United States; U.S; America

The first chosen search of the string aimed to include every article regarding The United States and to exclude those that do not. For that purpose, it was searched for the keywords “United States”; “U.S”, and “America” in every article and a selection of those that at least one of the keywords was shown at least once in the text. After applied, the first filter of the string resulted in an exclusion of seven articles; 340 articles remained.

Although superficial at first, the selection of articles considered all texts that at least mention The United States, in order to start narrowing the filter in each step of the search by keyword. The data generated by the software, among 347 articles, those which have “United States” or “U.S” or “America” within its text were 340, below is the figure showing how frequent they were by year:



Source: Elaborated by the author via MAXQDA.


Among the 347 articles, 340 had at least one of the specific chosen words within its text for at least once. Below is the table of those articles in which none of the specific words was shown within the text and, therefore, were excluded from the research:

Table 6. Excluded Articles: Constructs of United States		
Period	Title	Author (s)
Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter, 1990-1991	The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914	Marc Trachtenberg
Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer, 1991	Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis	Jack S. Levy, Thomas J. Christensen and Marc Trachtenberg
Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall, 1991	How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War	Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh
Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall, 1994	Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace	Christopher Layne
Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer, 1997	History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit	Paul W. Schroeder
Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer, 1999	Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace	Barbara F. Walter
Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall, 1999	Return of the Luddites	Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

5.2.2 ii) Keywords search n° 2: Strategy; Strategies

The next applied search of the string, considered among 340 articles, to find those that had the keywords: “strategy”; “Strategy”; “Strategies’ or “strategies” within its text. These specific constructs of the word “strategy” were chosen to denote which of the remaining articles are discussing or at least commenting about strategy in a manner of trying to establish a relation between the “American” constructs and the subject of strategy. The data generated by the software, among 340 articles, those which have any of the constructs pre-selected of the word “strategy” within its text were 312, and below is the figure showing how frequent they were by year:



Source: Elaborated by the author via MAXQDA.

A pool of 312 articles was included by this search, until this point, as shown in the data; each of the keywords of the string was frequent in the pool of articles³⁴. The other 28 articles excluded, were, therefore:

Table 7. Excluded Articles: Constructs of Strategy		
Period	Title	Author (s)
Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter, 1990-1991	Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security	Bruce M. Russett, Thomas Risse-Kappen and John J. Mearsheimer
Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall, 1992	Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World	Richard A. Bitzinger
Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring, 1993	Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara	William J. Durch
Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring, 1993	UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee: A Look Back	Eric Groveric Grove

³⁴A frequency above 5% of the selected keywords was expected given the subject of the chosen Journal. Considering the qualitative nature of this study, the frequency shown in the graphs is for illustrative content, although it can be useful for further studies.

Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall, 1993	An Economics Agenda for Neorealists	Theodore H. Moran
Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994	China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea	Michael G. Gallagher
Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994	International Politics, Viewed from the Ground	Elizabeth Pond and Kenneth N. Waltz
Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall, 1994	The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace	David E. Spiro
Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer, 1995	New Satellite Images for Sale	Vipin Gupta
Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer, 1995	The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits	Irving Lachow
Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, 1996-1997	Democracy and Peace	Charles S. Gochman, Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa
Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer, 1997	History, Theory, and Common Ground	John Lewis Gaddis
Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall, 1997	The Linkage of Air and Ground Power in the Future of Conflict	Thomas A. Keaney
Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter, 1997-1998	Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy	Philip H. Gordon
Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer, 1998	Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work	Robert A. Pape
Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer, 1999	Rights and Fights: Sexual Orientation and Military Effectiveness	Tarak Barkawi, Christopher Dandeker, Melissa Wells-Petry and Elizabeth Kier
Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall, 1999	Civil-Military Relations: How Wide is the Gap?	Joseph J. Collins and Ole R. Holsti
Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter, 1999-2000	Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia	Ronald Grigor Suny
Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring, 2000	Debating New Delhi's Nuclear Decision	Rodney W. Jones and Sumit Ganguly
Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring, 2001	The Dynamics of Internal Conflict	Anna Simons and John Mueller
Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer, 2001	Start the Evolution without Us	Duncan S.A. Bell, Paul K. MacDonald and Bradley A. Thayer
Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall, 2001	The First Image Revisited	Andrew Parasiliti, Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack
Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter, 2001-2002	Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview	Philip B. Heymann
Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter, 2001-2002	NATO and Democracy	Harvey Waterman, Dessie Zagorcheva and Dan Reiter
Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring, 2002	Russians' Rights Imperiled: Has Anybody Noticed?	Sarah E. Mendelson
Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer, 2002	A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare, 1969-70	Jonathan B. Tucker
Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer, 2003	Democracy and Victory: Fair Fights or Food Fights?	Michael C. Desch

Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer, 2003	Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990-2003	Richard C. Eichenberg
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Source: Table elaborated by the author.

None of the 28 articles above has shown any of the keywords specified by the filter in its texts, that search allowed the assumption that whereas the authors might discuss the United States, none of them discussed strategy and, therefore, were excluded from the research.

5.2.3 iii) Keywords search n° 3: Grand Strategy

The third filter of the string aimed to find a connection with the “strategy” constructs from the previous search, narrowing the filter. Among the first 347 articles, 312 to this point were selected, which leads to the assumption that not only a discussion regarding the United States might take place in some of them, but also regarding strategy. The filter is narrowing, and the articles that did not fit the string were excluded from the research.

In this stage of the research, the filter became narrower due to the goal of finding even more specific content, with the selected keywords being “Grand Strategy”. The order of keywords in the string begins to aim for those articles that not only might talk about American strategy but within them, those in which a discussion of a Grand Strategy also takes place in its texts. The next selected keyword to apply as a filter was “Grand strategy” that by Art’s (2003) definition refers to how a Nation organizes its interests toward the world and wields its instruments of statecraft, especially military power, to achieve its foreign policy goals.

By applying this filter of the string, the result achieved was a pool of 99 articles. After the filter was applied, 213 articles did not make the cut and were thus excluded.

Table 8. Pool of Excluded Articles: Grand Strategy		
Period	Title	Author (s)
Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter, 1990-1991	Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans	F. Stephen Larrabee
	Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid U.S.-Japan Relationship in the 1990s	I. M. Destler and Michael Nacht
	Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914	Jack S. Levy
Vol. 15, No. 4, Spring, 1991	Preempting Revolutions: The Boundaries of U.S. Influence	Robert A. Pastor
	Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma	John W. Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai
	Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case of Global Warming	James K. Sebenius
	Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking about Tactical Nuclear Weapons	Barton J. Bernstein

Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer, 1991	Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?	Steve Fetter
	Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy	Michael Mastanduno
	Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe	Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan
	Did "Peace Through Strength" End the Cold War? Lessons from INF	Thomas Risse-Kappen
Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall, 1991	On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict	Thomas F. Homer-Dixon
	The Trident and the Triad: Collecting the D-5 Dividend	Owen Coté
	The New Game on the Hill: The Politics of Arms Control and Strategic Force Modernization	Paul N. Stockton
Vol. 16, No. 3, Winter, 1991-1992	How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military	Stephen M. Meyer
	Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot	Theodore A. Postol
	Pearl Harbor: Military Inconvenience, Political Disaster	John Mueller
Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring, 1992	Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest: Eastern Europe and East-West Migration	Richard K. Betts
	Nuclear Policy without an Adversary: U.S. Planning for the Post-Soviet Era	Charles L. Glaser
	Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future	Terry L. Deibel
	Why Didn't the United States become a Garrison State?	Aaron L. Friedberg
	Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict	Lisa L. Martin
Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer, 1992	Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe	Richard K. Betts
	CFE and Beyond: The Future of Conventional Arms Control	Jonathan Dean and Randall Watson Forsberg
	Patriot Experience in the Gulf War	Robert M. Stein and Theodore A. Postol
Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall, 1992	China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals	John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di
	Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness	John R. Harvey
	The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect	David A. Welch
	Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-91: A Failed or Impossible Task?	Janice Gross Stein
Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter, 1992-1993	International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War	John Lewis Gaddis
	Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War	Alan Beyerchen
	Security, Stability, and International Migration	Myron Weiner
	Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations	Peter D. Feaver

Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring, 1993	Why International Primacy Matters	Samuel P. Huntington
	From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism	Thomas U. Berger
Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer, 1993	Matching Defense Strategies to Resources: Challenges for the Clinton Administration	Dov S. Zakheim and Jeffrey M. Ranney
	Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security	Peter H. Gleick
	Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of West Bank Water	Miriam R. Lowi
	From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation	Brad Roberts
Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall, 1993	Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives	Alexei G. Arbatov
	The Emerging Structure of International Politics	Kenneth N. Waltz
	Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power	Barry R. Posen
	Why Japan Surrendered	Robert A. Pape
	Getting the End of the Cold War Wrong	Ted Hopf and John Lewis Gaddis
Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter, 1993-1994	Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia	Aaron L. Friedberg
	Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region	Desmond Ball
	The Glorification of War in Japanese Education	Saburo Ienaga
	The Laws of War in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict	Adam Roberts
	Japan as a Superpower?	Michael M. May
Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring, 1994	Hypotheses on Nationalism and War	Stephen van Evera
	Moscow Meltdown: Can Russia Survive?	Jessica Eve Stern
	The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons	Scott D. Sagan
	Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again	Philip Zelikow
Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994	Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases	Thomas F. Homer-Dixon
	The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995	John Simpson and Darryl Howlett
Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall, 1994	How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace	John M. Owen
	The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge	Richard A. Bitzinger
Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, 1994-1995	The False Promise of International Institutions	John J. Mearsheimer
	A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material	Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson and Marvin Miller
Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, 1995	Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters	Stephen Peter Rosen
	The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings	Richard A. Falkenrath
	The Democratic Peace	Bruce Russett, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro and Michael W. Doyle
	The Promise of Institutionalist Theory	Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin

Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer, 1995	The Promise of Collective Security	Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan
	The False Premise of Realism	John Gerard Ruggie
	Constructing International Politics	Alexander Wendt
	A Realist Reply	John J. Mearsheimer
	In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia	Rajan Menon
	History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look	Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman and Paul W. Schroeder
Vol. 20, No. 2, Fall, 1995	Is the Environment a National Security Issue?	Marc A. Levy
	Start II and the Politics of Arms Control in Russia	John W. R. Lepingwell
	Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea	Michael J. Mazarr
	Politics and Peace	Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa
	The Subjectivity of the "Democratic" Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany	Ido Oren
Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter, 1995-1996	Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control	Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser
	Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis	Devin T. Hagerty
	Compromising Westphalia	Stephen D. Krasner
	Environment and Security	Thomas F. Homer-Dixon and Marc A. Levy
Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring, 1996	Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations	Dale C. Copeland
	Setting Precedents in Anarchy: Military Intervention and Weapons of Mass Destruction	Elizabeth Kier and Jonathan Mercer
	East Asia and the "Constrainment" of China	Gerald Segal
	Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars	Chaim Kaufmann
	Democratization and the Danger of War	Reinhard Wolf, Erich Weede, Andrew J. Enterline, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder
Vol. 21, No. 1, Summer, 1996	Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows	Myron Weiner
	Military Responses to Refugee Disasters	Barry R. Posen
	Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter	John C. Matthews III
	Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis	Steve Fetter and Devin T. Hagerty
Vol. 21, No. 2, Fall, 1996	Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas	Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine
	Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict	David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild
	Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay	Sumit Ganguly

	Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War	Stuart J. Kaufman
	Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict	Stephen Biddle
	Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses	David Shambaugh
Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, 1996-1997	Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers	David J. Karl
	Responding to State Failure in Africa	Jeffrey Herbst
	Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping	Herbert Howe
Vol. 21, No. 4, Spring, 1997	The Past as Prologue?: Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy	John Gerard Ruggie
	The Future of Russia's Plutonium Cities	Oleg Bukharin
	Review: The Cold War's Endgame and German Unification: (A Review Essay)	Review by: Thomas Risse
	Current Gains and Future Outcome	Charles L. Glaser and John C. Matthews III
Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer, 1997	Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries	Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman
	Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations	Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy and Stephen D. Krasner
	Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History	Alexander L. George
	Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914	David Stevenson
	The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?	Zeev Maoz
	Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations	Jack S. Levy
Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall, 1997	Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes	Stephen John Stedman
	Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism	Roland Paris
	Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work	Robert A. Pape
	Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology	Daryl G. Press
	What the Gulf War Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about the Future of Warfare	Thomas G. Mahnken and Barry D. Watts
	The Gulf War Debate Redux: Why Skill and Technology are the Right Answer	Stephen Biddle
	Responding to State Failure in Africa	Richard Joseph and Jeffrey Herbst
	Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers	Peter D. Feaver, Scott D. Sagan and David J. Karl
Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter, 1997-1998	A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy	Michael McFaul
	Dayton Report Card	Jane M. O. Sharp
	The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity	John Orme

	Debating the Unipolar Moment	Mark S. Sheetz and Michael Mastanduno
Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring, 1998	Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War	Stephen van Evera
	Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects	Alexei G. Arbatov
	Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea is Easier Than the Pentagon Thinks	Michael O'Hanlon
Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer, 1998	Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya	Gail W. Lapidus
	The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?	Kimberly Ann Elliott
	NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem	Joseph Lepgold
	Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife: Domestic Sources of International Aggression	Kurt Dassel
	The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory	Ted Hopf
Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall, 1998	Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness	Elizabeth Kier
	Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93	Colin H. Kahl
	When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century	Chaim D. Kaufmann
	Evaluating Economic Sanctions	David A. Baldwin and Robert A. Pape
Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter, 1998-1999	Review: The Canon and the Cannon: A Review Essay	Review by: John M. Owen, IV
	Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory	James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann
Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring, 1999	Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies	Stephen M. Walt
	India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program	Sumit Ganguly
	Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices	Samina Ahmed
Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer, 1999	Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate	Robert Jervis
	Who's Behind China's High-Technology "Revolution"?: How Bomb Makers Remade Beijing's Priorities, Policies, and Institutions	Evan A. Feigenbaum
Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall, 1999	Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions	Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow
	The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism	Lisa L. Martin
	The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies	Robert Powell

	All Mortis, No Rigor	Frank C. Zagare
	A Model Disagreement	Stephen M. Walt
	Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East	James T. Quinlivan
	Review: Must War Find a Way?: A Review Essay	Review by: Richard K. Betts
Vol. 24, No. 3, Winter, 1999-2000	Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry	Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky
	China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security	David Shambaugh
	The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice	David A. Baldwin
	Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia	Charles King and Neil J. Melvin
Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring, 2000	Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate	Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman
	The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy	Barry R. Posen
	The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks	Scott D. Sagan
	The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships	Neta C. Crawford
Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer, 2000	The Banality of "Ethnic War"	John Mueller
	Review: Understanding Decisionmaking, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review Essay	Review by: Barton J. Bernstein
	Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)	Peter D. Feaver, Gunther Hellman, Randall L. Schweller, Jeffery W. Taliaferro, William C. Wohlforth, Jeffery W. Lergo and Andrew Moravcsik
Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall, 2000	The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force	Robert S. Ross
	Breaking New Ground or Breaking the Rules: Strategic Reorientation in U.S. Industrial Policy	Glenn R. Fong
	Review: The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay	Review by: Dale C. Copeland
Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter, 2000-2001	Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64	William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson
	Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in the Post-Soviet Space	Alexander Cooley
	Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict: Confused Theories, Faulty Data, and the "Crucial Case" of Papua New Guinea	Benjamin Reilly
Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring, 2001	Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and Failure	Sarah E. Mendelson
	Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist Attack	Richard A. Falkenrath
	Responding to Chemical and Biological Threats	Susan B. Martin and Scott D. Sagan

Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer, 2001	National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy	Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter
	Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions	David A. Lake
Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall, 2001	The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare	Daryl G. Press
	Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?	Roland Paris
	Has Realism Become Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Review Essay	Richard Rosecrance
	Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy	Peter Hays Gries and Thomas J. Christensen
Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter, 2001-2002	The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism	Ashton B. Carter
	The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and beyond	Samina Ahmed
	Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History	Brahma Chellaney
	Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security	P.W. Singer
Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring, 2002	A Surplus of Men, a Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States	Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer
	Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth	Robert D. English
	Tragedy or Choice in Vietnam? Learning to Think outside the Archival Box: A Review Essay	John Garofano
	The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In	Bruce W. Jentleson
	A Global Coalition against International Terrorism	Jusuf Wanandi
	Limited National and Allied Missile Defense	James M. Lindsay, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter
Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer, 2002	The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action	Alexander Cooley and James Ron
	Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula	Victor D. Cha
	Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948-2001	Jerome Slater
	Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay	Glenn H. Snyder
	Institutionalized Disagreement	Robert Jervis, Henry R. Nau and Randall L. Schweller
	South Africa's Nuclear Decisions	Helen E. Purkitt, Stephen F. Burgess and Peter Liberman
Vol. 27, No. 2, Fall, 2002	Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations	Robert S. Ross
	Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia's Nuclear Cities	Sharon K. Weiner

	HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa	Stefan Elbe
	A Modest Proposal: Privacy as a Flawed Rationale for the Exclusion of Gays and Lesbians from the U.S. Military	Aaron Belkin, Melissa Sheridan and Embser-Herbert
Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter, 2002-2003	Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror	Michael Mousseau
	Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited	Ariel E. Levite
	Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons	Jessica Stern
	A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo	Andrew L. Stigler
	Two Dismal Sciences Are Better Than One -- Economics and the Study of National Security: A Review Essay	Ethan B. Kapstein
Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring, 2003	Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense	Robert Powell
	Beyond the MTCR: Building a Comprehensive Regime to Contain Ballistic Missile Proliferation	Dinshaw Mistry
	The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969	Scott D. Sagan and Jeremi Suri
Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer, 2003	Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities	Daniel Byman
	Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause of Conflict	Sarah Kenyon Lischer
	The Power of Democratic Cooperation	Ajin Choi
	Fair Fights? Evaluating Theories of Democracy and Victory	David A. Lake
	Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter	Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam
Vol. 28, No. 2, Fall, 2003	Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?	Jeremy Pressman
	The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy	Zeev Maoz
	Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century	Peter Andreas
	Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer Attitudes toward Transformation	Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds
	Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay	Risa A. Brooks
	The Sources of Terrorism	Charles Knight, Melissa Murphy and Michael Mousseau
Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter, 2003/2004	Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice	Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri
	Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance	Karen Ruth Adams
	Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare	Gregory Koblentz
	A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity	Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

5.2.4 iv) *Keywords search n° 4: Relative power; Relative gain*

The purpose becomes even more restricted by the end of the string, and the inclusion criteria at this point aimed at the articles that show within its text at least one of the next keywords: “Relative gain”; “relative gain”; “Relative power” and “relative power”. The words were chosen in order to select those articles that considered it as a relevant concept by using it at least once within its texts. By applying that as part of the filter, the research is at this point directed to select the content based on a more realist perspective, excluding those articles that, even though they might discuss American grand strategy, do not consider relative power or gains in its discussions.

Of the 99 previously remaining articles, the following 59 were excluded:

Table 9. Pool of Excluded Articles: Relative Power/gain		
Period	Title	Author (s)
Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter, 1990- 1991	Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War	Stephen Van Evera
	Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship	Jonathan Shimshoni
Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer, 1991	South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power	Brahma Chellaney
Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall, 1991	The Middle East and the New World Order: Rethinking U.S. Political Strategy after the Gulf War	Richard K. Herrmann
	Writing for International Security: A Contributors' Guide	Teresa Pelton Johnson
Vol. 16, No. 3, Winter, 1991- 1992	Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb	Gar Alperovitz, Robert L. Messer and Barton J. Bernstein
Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer, 1992	Managing Soviet Disintegration: A Demand for Behavioral Regimes	Ted Hopf
	Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams	Thomas J. Christensen
	Oil and Power after the Gulf War	Robert J. Lieber
Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter, 1992- 1993	Why the Third World Still Matters	Steven R. David
	A Farewell to Arms Control?	Michael J. Mazarr and Richard K. Betts
Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer, 1993	Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe	Charles L. Glaser
	Review: The End of U.S. Cold War History? A Review Essay	Review by: Lynn Eden
Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall, 1993	The Spoils of Conquest	Peter Liberman
Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring, 1994	Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II	Jeffrey W. Legro
Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994	Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In	Randall L. Schweller

	Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security	Denny Roy
Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, 1994-1995	Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia	V. P. Gagnon, Jr.
Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, 1995	Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars	Elizabeth Kier
	Review: Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict: The "Goldilocks Problem" in International Strategy (A Review Essay)	Review by: Richard Rosecrance
Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer, 1995	Democratization and the Danger of War	Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder
Vol. 20, No. 2, Fall, 1995	Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen	Dan Reiter
Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter, 1995-1996	China's New "Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited Deterrence	Alastair Iain Johnston
Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring, 1996	Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I	Paul A. Papayoanou
Vol. 21, No. 1, Summer, 1996	Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action	Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher
Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, 1996-1997	Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb	Scott D. Sagan
Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer, 1997	The Wonderland of the Political Scientist	Edward Ingram
Vol. 22, No. 3, Winter, 1997-1998	Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival	Avery Goldstein
Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring, 1998	What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it?	Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann
Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer, 1998	Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies	Michael C. Desch
Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall, 1998	Assessing European Foreign Policy	Ian Davidson and Philip H. Gordon
Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter, 1998-1999	A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 1976-96	Ole R. Holsti
	Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement	Robert J. Art
Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring, 1999	China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia	Thomas J. Christensen
	New Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States	Christopher S. Parker
Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer, 1999	China's Search for a Modern Air Force	John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai
	Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies	John S. Duffield, Theo Farrell, Richard Price and Michael C. Desch
Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring, 2000	Review: Military "Culture" and the Fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay	Review by: Douglas Porch
	Spirals, Security, and Stability in East Asia	Jennifer M. Lind and Thomas J. Christensen

Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer, 2000	Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security	Keir A. Lieber
	Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination	Ward Thomas
Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall, 2000	Is Strategy an Illusion?	Richard K. Betts
	Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan	Michael O'Hanlon
Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring, 2001	Posing Problems without Catching up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy	Thomas J. Christensen
	Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy	Dan Reiter
Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall, 2001	The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb	Peter Liberman
	China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan	Allen S. Whiting
Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter, 2001-2002	Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy	Stephen M. Walt
	Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism	Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara
	The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics	Barry R. Posen
Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring, 2002	From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research	Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth
	Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia	Jon Western
Vol. 27, No. 2, Fall, 2002	Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters	Michael C. Desch
	The Fall and Rise of Navies in East Asia: Military Organizations, Domestic Politics, and Grand Strategy	Eric Heginbotham
Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter, 2002-2003	Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism	Audrey Kurth Cronin
Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring, 2002	Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks	David C. Kang
	The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain's Commitments to Europe, 1905-39	Kevin Narizny
Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter, 2003/2004	Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?	Amitav Acharya
	Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations	David C. Kang

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

After applying this string and selecting the articles by specific keywords, a pool of 347 articles became one of 40 and allowed the systematic review of the literature to follow a direction guided by the purpose of the research goals. It was easier at this point to analyze each article one by one considering the whole content of its discussions, identifying prescriptions and forecasts made by each author through their main argument.

Below, is Table 10 listing the 40 elected articles that showed at least once, each of the keywords that built the string applied for this research:

Table 10. Pool of Included Articles: Relative Power/gain		
Period	Title	Author (s)
Vol. 15, No. 4, Spring, 1991	A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War	Robert J. Art
Vol. 16, No. 3, Winter, 1991-1992	The International Sources of Soviet Change	Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry
	The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?	Robert Jervis
Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer, 1992	Review: Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay	Review by: Fareed Zakaria
Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring, 1993	Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies	Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara
	International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?	Robert Jervis
	The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise	Christopher Layne
Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter, 1993-1994	Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War	Richard K. Betts
Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994	Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory	Paul Schroeder
Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall, 1994	The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint	Etel Solingen
Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, 1994-1995	Realism and the End of the Cold War	Josef Joffe
	Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help	Thinking about Strategic Culture
Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, 1995	"Bismarck" or "Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity	Josef Joffe
	Thinking about Strategic Culture	Alastair Iain Johnston
Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter, 1995-1996	Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism	Douglas J. Macdonald
Vol. 21, No. 1, Summer, 1996	Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains	Peter Liberman
Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, 1996-1997	Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy	Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross
Vol. 21, No. 4, Spring, 1997	Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War	Michael Mastanduno
	Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation	Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky
Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer, 1997	From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy	Christopher Layne
Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring, 1998	Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy	Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels
Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall, 1998	After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity	Charles A. Kupchan

	Review: Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay	Review by: Sean M. Lynn-Jones
Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter, 1998-1999	Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order	G. John Ikenberry
	Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands	Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders
Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring, 1999	The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century	Robert S. Ross
Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer, 1999	The Stability of a Unipolar World	William C. Wohlforth
Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall, 1999	Is Anybody Still a Realist?	Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik
Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer, 2000	Structural Realism after the Cold War	Kenneth N. Waltz
Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall, 2000	Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics	Bradley A. Thayer
Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter, 2000-2001	Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas	Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth
	Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited	Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
	Review: Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A Review Essay	Review by: Gideon Rose
Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring, 2001	Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In	Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack
Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer, 2001	The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay	Randall L. Schweller
	International Security at Twenty-Five: From One World to Another	Steven E. Miller
	How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict	Ivan Arreguín-Toft
Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter, 2001-2002	Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy	John M. Owen, IV
Vol. 27, No. 4, Spring, 2003	Is China a Status Quo Power?	Alastair Iain Johnston
Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer, 2003	Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony	Barry R. Posen

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

The next part of the systematic review is an information extraction of those articles that prescribe a grand strategy for the United States during this time frame and/or predict a world scenario considering the U.S.' position in the International System.


5.3 Information Extraction Strategy: First Reading

The strategy for extracting information for each selected study after the execution of the selection process took place considering: Title of the document; Author (s); Year of publication

and Relevance of the search result. The pertinence refers to the predominance of the theme relative to the selected keywords.

To identify the prescriptions and/or forecasts put forth by the literature published in the chosen database, the second part of the process³⁵ of including and excluding articles was made after a reading of each of the 40 articles selected in the first part of the process. For that end, each article was selected and had encoded segments via MAXQDA using codes for segments that were classified as *prescriptions*, for those that contained *forecasts*, and for those articles that, even if first selected via keywords, did not contain discussions or arguments that were prescriptive or predictive.

Figure 7. Encoded Segments



Source: Elaborated by the author via MAXQDA.

After reading all the articles, sections of each one were selected – coded, identified as prescriptions and/or forecasts, as well as sections that determined the non-classification of the article's content as relevant for the present analysis. From this first reading and coding, 22 articles were included in the pool, and 18 were excluded.

5.3.1 First review: exclusion process after reading

According to Harris Cooper and Larry Hedges (2009), when performing a systematic review, the reading part can become the decisive one. After selecting data via keyword search and establishing a path, the research begins to go deeper, requiring the complete reading of the entire content by a researcher, their perspective regarding what is relevant and what is not. The decisiveness of this part of the process is not only the reading part but also the possibility of biases. In order to try to avoid any bias, this section will present the reasons why each article from the selection was excluded from the pool, in some of them by presenting the segments

³⁵ This part of the process was carried out in august, 2020.

coded as “NO Prescription OR Forecast”. Three³⁶ of the excluded articles, although legitimately selected by the string inclusion criteria, after reading, were found to have much more explanatory than prescriptive content. After the reading, it was also noticed that some of the words that made up the keyword string found in some of the publications were actually present, in the majority, in the footnotes references and not necessarily present as a subject discussed in their main texts. Therefore, that is another reason not to select these articles as well.

Table 11. Pool of Excluded Articles via SRL		
Period	Title	Author (s)
Vol. 16, No. 3, Winter, 1991-1992	The International Sources of Soviet Change	Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry
Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer, 1992	Review: Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay	Review by: Fareed Zakaria
Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, 1994	Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory	Paul Schroeder
Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, 1994-1995	Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help	Charles L. Glaser
Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer, 1995	History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look	Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman and Paul W. Schroeder
Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, 1995	Thinking about Strategic Culture	Alastair Iain Johnston
Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter, 1995-1996	Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism	Douglas J. Macdonald
Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, 1996-1997	Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy	Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross
Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring, 1998	Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy	Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels
Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall, 1998	Review: Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay	Review by: Sean M. Lynn-Jones
Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter, 1998-1999	Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order	G. John Ikenberry
Vol. 24, No. 2, Fall, 1999	Is Anybody Still a Realist?	Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik
Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall, 2000	Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics	Bradley A. Thayer
Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter, 2000-2001	Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas	Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth
Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring, 2001	Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In	Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack
Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer, 2001	International Security at Twenty-Five: From One World to Another	Steven E. Miller

³⁶ POSEN, Barry R., ROSS, Andrew L. Competing Versions of U.S Grand Strategy. *International Security*. Vol. 21, No. 3, winter, 1996-97; IKENBERRY, John G. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order. *International Security*, [s. l.], v. 23, ed. 3, winter 1998-99; SCHWELLER, Randall L. The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay. *International Security*. Vol. 26, No. 1, summer, 2001.

	How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict	Ivan Arreguín-Toft
Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer, 2001	The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay	Randall L. Schweller

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

The International Sources of Soviet Change by Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry. Vol. 16, No. 3, winter, 1991-1992.

This publication was excluded from the research due to its main subject of discussion. The proposition of this paper aimed to analyze changes in Soviet foreign policy and its domestic behavior during the later years of the Cold War and their effect on the turn of events. This article put forth an analysis of internal soviet behavior from actions taken by the communist party towards the world and the USSR's international behavior given international events. To this end, it presents a perspective that tries to explain how and to what extent the end of the Cold War can be interpreted as a product of the changes in internal and external soviet behavior. The article doesn't expose any prescriptions for the military or grand strategy of the United States, and neither does it present forecasts of the post-Cold War world relevant enough to be taken into account subsequently.

Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay. Review by Fareed Zakaria. Vol. 17, No. 1, summer, 1992.

Although selected through the keywords string, after reading the whole article it was not possible to identify any sort of prescription or prediction that would make the article relevant to remain in the research. As established in its first section by the review's author, his purpose is a discussion against the assumption made by the author of the article *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Jack Snyder. Thereunto, Zakaria (1992) evolves his discussion surrounding the argument that affirms that Snyder "while purporting to combine domestic and international levels of analysis, can do so only because he adopts an erroneous-though increasingly common interpretation of realism that minimizes the powerful effects of the international system on state behavior", and proposing his own analytical and theoretical explanations.

Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory by Paul Schroeder. Vol. 19, No. 1, summer, 1994.

The article written by Paul Schroeder aims to propose a theoretical discussion regarding Neorealism. After reading, it was possible to affirm that its content does not comply with this research's criteria of inclusion. The article does not prescribe any grand strategy for the United States, neither does it try to predict any further understanding regarding the world post-Cold War through neorealist lenses, but whereas, it tries to discuss the theory adequacy as an explanatory framework:

[the article] takes up a question seldom if ever discussed, yet clearly important for international historians and arguably also for international relations theorists, namely, whether neo-realist theory is adequate and useful as an explanatory framework for the history of international politics in general, over the whole Westphalian era from 1648 to 1945, the period in which the validity of a realist paradigm of some sort is widely accepted even by non-realists (SCHOEDER, 1994. P 110).

Given its main purpose, it was decided to exclude this article from the final pool.

Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help by Charles L. Glaser. Vol. 19, No. 3, winter, 1994-1995.

This is also an article proposing theoretical discussion regarding international relations theory, especially Structural Realism. Although the author endeavors to discuss the United States, and Cold War subjects, both of great importance to this research, Glaser's (1994-95) prescriptions are for the future theoretical approaches.

My argument draws on various strands of international relations theory, including arguments about the security dilemma, costly signaling, relative gains constraints, arms control, and cooperation under anarchy. I develop a number of specific arguments that are required to apply these strands of theory to the security realm and to integrate them fully into a structural-realist argument. However, the overall argument is bigger than the sum of the individual strands: it offers a direct and thorough challenge to the standard structural-realist explanation of the prevalence of international competition (GLASER, 1994-95, p. 52)

The author's arguments take into account the Cold War, especially toward its end, analyzing the prospects shown by other neorealists' previous works. His contributions do not correspond to those sought by this research, and therefore were not considered for the final selection.

History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look by Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman and Paul W. Schroeder. Vol. 20, No. 1, summer, 1995.

This discussion presented by the authors regards the level of general contribution of neo-realist theory to the historian. The discussion evolves an analysis of neorealist theory, what it might or might not have to offer to those who study history. Mainly by responding to Paul Schroeder's article, *Historical realism vs. Neo-Realist Theory* (1994-1995), the authors pointed

out his errors and addressed a debate about neorealism, its coherence and theoretical validity as an approach. After reading, it was not possible to identify any prescription or forecast regarding the subjects herein to be studied, therefore this article was also excluded from the final pool.

Thinking about Strategic Culture by Alastair Iain Johnston. Vol. 19, No. 4, spring, 1995.

This article presents a discussion regarding a common understanding of Strategic Culture by outlining methodological and theoretical issues that must be taken into account when discussing it, and which are often neglected. As the author (1995, p.33) affirms his “*article assesses the progress that has been made in studying strategic culture, examines the conceptual and methodological problems in the literature, and offers some possible solutions*”, he also “*suggests some caution about using strategic culture as an analytic tool.*” Therefore, although it is a great contribution to the theoretical debate, it is not relevant to this research.

Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism by Douglas J. Macdonald. Vol. 20, No. 3, winter, 1995-1996.

The ineligibility of Macdonald’s article for this research is clear by its title. Despite making through the application of the string, after the reading, it was possible to acknowledge that the discussion proposed by the author was not relevant to be taken into this research. Macdonald addresses a discussion about the sustainability of Western perceptions of Soviet bloc expansion during the first years of the Cold War through an analysis of new historical pieces of evidence from the east. The content of this article aims to contribute to historical accuracy by revisiting facts and pieces of evidence from the early period of the Cold War and not the post- Cold War era as this research seeks. It was not found, therefore, any prescription or prediction regarding the subject here proposed.

Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy by Barry R. Posen & Andrew L. Ross. Vol. 21, No. 3, winter, 1996-97.

Proving the essentiality of reading and reviewing the material, this article is not considered legitimate for research even though it contains in its text all the key-words that compose the string of the SRL protocol. The exclusion of the article was due to the fact that it does not contain any strategy *prescription*, but rather, the *presentation* of four strategic possibilities to be adopted by the United States, in order to propose a discussion among scholars and analysts.

However, although not considered for the final pool of the literature review, Posen and Ross (1996-97) brought information that was fundamental to the conceptual framework of the results obtained in SRL. Their arguments are going to be discussed in the present research, and serve as a parameter for categorizing the American grand strategy type under the headings of hegemony, selective engagement, offshore balancing, collective security, and neo-isolationism.

Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy by Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels. Vol. 22, No. 4, spring, 1998.

The subject discussed by the authors in this article is Japan's foreign policy after the war from the point of view of two perspectives of realism, the structural and, what they label "mercantile" realism. The authors compared both analyses and predictions put forth by the two realist perspectives in order to compare with pieces of evidence from the current context. The authors also put to test both theoretical analyses with Japan's foreign policy strategy after the cold war, to examine their accuracy. After the reading, it was decided to exclude the article from the final pool given the fact of being a case study regarding Japan and a test between previous structural and mercantile studies, and as such no prediction of a grand strategy for the U.S. or forecast of a world in the post-Cold war were found.

Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay by Sean M. Lynn-Jones. Vol. 23, No. 2, fall, 1998.

In this article, the author Lynn-Jones reviewed Fareed Zacharia's work, *From Wealth to Power* (1998). Lynn-Jones's endeavors are built upon the discussion of the validity of Zacharia's argument regarding the rise of the United States between 1865 and 1908 viewed through realist theory's lenses. The discussion includes a different temporal cut from the one pursued herein. The author seeks to point out Zakaria's article weaknesses, addressing his failure to offer a persuasive critique of defensive realism through a descriptive critic refuting his hypothesis.

Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order by G. John Ikenberry. Vol. 23, No. 3, winter, 1998-1999.

In this article, Ikenberry (1998-99) explains that the order in the West was maintained even after the Cold War mainly because of the adoption of the American strategy of strategic restraint since before the Cold War and the strength of institutions. The U.S. has strengthened

itself through institutions since the post WWII period, and the second-tier states — such as Japan and Germany — have joined the U.S. and participated in this cooperation through institutions that over time have distributed increasing gains. This model, and the conception of the U.S. as the hegemonic leader took hold among the states, and became accepted. Along with the spread of liberal values, such as democracy, the states' fear of a domineering hegemon diminished. Accompanied by a strategy of "strategic restraint", the U.S. gained legitimization from the secondary powers of the West, which further strengthened their ties of cooperation. The U.S. strengthened as a hegemon, but not in a threatening way, as it engaged in a process of liberal expansion of its values - which made it possible to maintain order. This hegemony became strongly institutionalized and path dependent. Although it covers central issues, Ikenberry's article is much more explanatory than prescriptive, and was therefore excluded from the final pool.

Is Anybody Still a Realist? By Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik. Vol. 24, No. 2, fall, 1999.

In this article, Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik seek to bring up a discussion of the premature rejection of realism — and perhaps, all other "isms" in international relations theory, considered by scholars to be inherently vague, contradictory, or wrong. The authors put forth an argument outlining the importance, especially of realism, for the study of world politics, in view of its long history of centrality in the field of IR, which makes it greatly relevant for both research and policy analysis.

Affirming that no other paradigm captures the essence of the lasting way of interstate interaction based on the manipulation of material power in such a parsimonious way, the authors argue against the rejection of realism, recommending instead its reformulation. Therefore, by offering three assumptions the authors tried to highlight the practical advantages for theoretical debate and empirical research of consistently adhering to a narrower and more rigorous reformulation of the realistic paradigm. However, no prescription or prediction pursued herein were found.

Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics by Bradley A. Thayer. Vol. 25, No. 2, fall, 2000.

Bradley A. Thayer's article does not comply with the criteria of inclusion of this research as well. The author proposes Darwin's theory of evolution as an alternative for a better

understanding of realistic theory for international politics. He elucidates that this alternative is considerably stronger because it is based purely on science, contrary to traditional realistic premises with intellectual bases grounded on mystical theological principles or metaphysics.

The author uses the arguments of Reinhold Niebuhr, Hobbes, and Hans Morgenthau to exemplify how their claims have weak intellectual bases, as they focus either on theological strength or on a metaphysical precept to explain the behavior of the State. Thus, Thayer uses the theory of evolution to explain selfishness and domination and argues that they are incorporated in the behavior of individuals — commonly described as "realistic" — as it is a product of the evolutionary process.

Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas by Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth. Vol. 25, No. 3, winter, 2000-2001.

Brooks and Wohlforth sought to build a more robust understanding of the material pressures and incentives faced by Soviet Union policymakers in the 1980s. In bringing new sources of evidence, the authors attempted to outline a more complete understanding of what material pressures Soviet policymakers suffered and how these incentives have influenced the process of decision-making.

A constructivist discussion, it aims to contribute to the literature regarding the role of ideas in world politics. The authors reaffirm the importance of material incentives, clarifying the role they played in the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. However, they point to the voids that are often left by these incentives, which for the authors, accentuates the importance of considering the role of ideas and their ability to change behavior, not only for the understanding of the Cold War but for all phenomena in the field of International Relations. No prediction of the post-Cold war world or prescription of a grand strategy for The United States was found.

Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In by Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack. Vol. 25, No. 4, spring, 2001.

Another article that does not comply with the inclusion criteria. Byman and Pollack in this article sought to highlight the importance and richness of first image analysis in the study of International Relations. Through the analysis of examples represented by historical personalities, such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Lenin, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston

Churchill, Mahatma Gandhi, and Mao Zedong, the authors highlighted the importance of the individual actor in the trajectory of the State.

The author's discussion is an attempt to identify the conditions in which the individual stands out as a determining factor, their impact on International Relations, and what aspects of State behavior they affect. They claim that the first image study, although complex, has an enriching analysis capacity in International Relations. It brings out the importance of resorting to the study of personal goals and beliefs, weaknesses, and individual skills that, in practice, determine the personalities' ability to influence.

The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay by Randall L. Schweller. Vol. 26, No. 1, summer, 2001.

Schweller's article seeks to offer a critique of Ikenberry's arguments in his book *After Victory* (2001). He refutes Ikenberry's conception of order and offers a critique of Ikenberry's prescription of an American grand strategy based on liberal ideas and institutional binding. Schweller's article was selected by the string inclusion criteria, however, after reading the content it was noted that the keywords that did appear, were used to counter argue an external work and not necessarily to offer a prescription. Thus, the content of the article was considered relevant to the formation of the general ideas of this dissertation, however, it was excluded from the final pool because it did not match the selection criteria of the SRL.

International Security at Twenty-Five: From One World to Another by Steven E. Miller. Vol. 26, No. 1, summer, 2001.

Steven E. Miller's publication is an edition that celebrates the 25 years of International Security magazine. With a retrospective format, Miller unfolds his discussion by addressing the trajectory and addressing the changes over the 50 years of the modern field of international security study, half of which the International Security Journal has covered.

Miller presents some reflections on the journal's history, the world that has changed over the years, and how it has affected what the field of international security seeks to understand, explain, and perhaps even influence. The author discusses the magnitude and extent of the contributions of this field of study to history and to society, as well as revisiting important publications recorded in the pages of the International Security magazine over its twenty-five years. It does not match the inclusion criteria and thus was excluded.

How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict by Ivan Arreguín-Toft. Vol. 26, No. 1, summer, 2001.

This article is a manual-like format, the author attempted to test the hypothesis that states how strategic interactions are the best predictor of asymmetric conflict outcomes. Arreguín-Toft presented a relatively better form to predict outcomes during the conflict through the interaction of actor strategies and suggested paths to be followed by further researchers. The author laid out descriptive case studies of asymmetric conflicts and addressed the argument of interest asymmetry. He introduces the strategic interaction thesis, tested his arguments in a quantitative and qualitative way.

Therefore, the article is about the presentation of a thesis elaborated by the author about the potential of predictability of strategic interaction in conflicts, especially asymmetrical ones, emphasizing the path to be followed by those "weak actors" to achieve victory. Although prescriptive, the presented thesis does not regard any of the subjects herein pursued.

5.3.2 Second Reading: Last excluded and Recovered articles

After the application of the query string – in a primary keyword search – and a first reading the obtained quantitative result was of 325 articles excluded either by the process of keywords search, or by their presence only in the footnotes, or due to the non-correspondence with the subject herein proposed. Those that were last excluded (13) are listed in the table below:

Table 12. Pool of Excluded Articles (Footnotes)		
Period	Title	Author(s)
Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter, 1991-1992)	The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?	Robert Jervis
Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993)	Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies	Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara
Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993)	International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?	Robert Jervis
Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94)	Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War	Richard K. Betts
Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, 1994-1995	Realism and the End of the Cold War	Josef Joffe
Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer, 1996),	Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains	Peter Liberman

Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring, 1997)	Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation	Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky
Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter, 1998-1999)	Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands	Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders
Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring, 1999)	The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century	Robert S. Ross
Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer, 2000)	Structural Realism after the Cold War	Kenneth N. Waltz
Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter, 2000-2001)	Review: Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A Review Essay	Gideon Rose Review by: Gideon Rose
Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter, 2001-2002)	Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy	John M. Owen, IV
Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring, 2003)	Is China a Status Quo Power?	Alastair Iain Johnston

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

However, to reach this final result, a detailed screening of the articles was made, evaluating thoroughly **also** those which were excluded for not passing one of the string's filters or that showed the pre-selected keywords only in their footnotes. **As a manner of avoiding instantly discarding the material, a second reading was carried out and three (3) articles were found to be relevant and were, thus, recovered; their prescriptions now enter the pool of final articles.** The final pool reached **12 articles**³⁷, as listed below:

Table 13. Final Pool of Included Articles: SRL		
Period	Title	Author (s)
Vol. 15, No. 4, Spring, 1991	A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War	Robert J. Art
Vol. 16, No. 4, Spring, 1992	Strategies Before Containment: Patterns for the Future **	Terry L. Deibel
Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993)	The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise	Christopher Layne
Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, 1995	"Bismarck" or "Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity	Josef Joffe
Vol. 21, No. 4, Spring, 1997	Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War	Michael Mastanduno
	Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation*	Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky
Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer, 1997	From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy	Christopher Layne

³⁷ It is worth noting that although this work uses the theory of Kenneth Waltz, the texts of this author published in International Security were not selected for the final pool because they do not advocate any prescription of strategy, but broader structural and theoretical predictions. After the two readings and the re-selection of articles, Waltz's articles still did not fit the selection criteria exposed here, but their content was helpful for the theoretical framework adopted here.

Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall, 1998	After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity	Charles A. Kupchan
Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter, 1998- 1999	Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement **	Robert J. Art
Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer, 1999	The Stability of a Unipolar World	William C. Wohlforth
Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter, 2000- 2001	Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited	Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer, 2003	Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony	Barry R. Posen
*: Articles containing the chosen keyword(s) only in footnotes		
**: Articles recovered from string's 2nd phase exclusion ((ii) Keyword search: "grand strategy")		

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

The articles "*Strategies Before Containment: Patterns for the Future*" and "*Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement*" were re-included in the list because, although they don't contain the keywords "*grand strategy*" in their texts, after the screening it was noticed that they prescribe American military strategy for the post- Cold War era. On the other hand, "*Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation*" was included because, although presenting "*grand strategy*" only in footnotes, the theme is discussed and predictions of military strategy were found.

After determining the eligible materials, data from the studies are extracted and synthesized to be finally published in the (3) Result Analysis stage. The next chapter is, therefore, a summary of the main arguments followed by a categorization of all prescriptions and forecasts found in the content of these 13 included articles.

6 EXTRACTING INFO

The following table represents the main argument of each of the 12 articles selected for the final pool.

Table 14. Main Argument

REF.	TITLE	MAIN ARGUMENT
(ART, Robert J., 1991)	A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War	"In this article, I lay out a broad range of potential U.S. goals, but do not deal with all the instruments of statecraft. Instead, I concentrate solely on how America's military power, and especially a continuing U.S. military presence overseas, can facilitate the attainment of its goals. I thus take an internationalist, not an isolationist, posture." p.6
(DEIBEL, Terry L., 1992)	Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future	"This article is intended to contribute to that effort by comparing past strategic patterns with future strategic possibilities (...) it examines U.S. foreign affairs strategies before the Cold War, in three areas of the national interest, for clues about the likely contours of American strategy in the post-Cold War era. Its purpose is to broaden the range of possibilities under consideration, on the premise that strategies designed to serve U.S. interests before the Soviet threat dominated American statecraft may well prove suggestive for strategists attempting to further those interests after the Soviet threat has disappeared." p. 79
(LAYNE, Christopher., 1993)	The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise	"I use neorealist theory to analyze the implications of unipolarity. I argue that the "unipolar moment" is just that, a geopolitical interlude that will give way to multipolarity between 2000-2010. I start with a very simple premise: states balance against hegemony, even those like the United States that seek to maintain their preeminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence than coercion. (...) I conclude by outlining a new grand strategy that could accomplish the two main geopolitical tasks facing the United States in the years ahead: (1) managing the potentially difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity; and (2) advancing American interests in the multipolar world that inevitably will emerge. (...) In the final section of this article, I consider the policy implications and I argue that the strategy of preponderance is unlikely to be successful." p. 7-8
(JOFFE, Josef., 1995)	Bismarck or "Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity	"Short of empire, a primary power must choose between balancing a la Britain and bandwagoning a la Bismarck. For quite a while, the United States need not balance any rivals of weight because those who possess the weight (China, Japan, Russia, Europe) are not really challengers, whereas those who are challengers (e.g., Iraq, Iran) do not have the weight. Hence, U.S. grand strategy should tilt toward Bismarck, all the more so because the United States is so well positioned to play the global hub to key regional spokes." p. 117
(MASTAND UNO, Michael., 1997)	Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War	"This article takes seriously the challenge of the critics and assesses whether realism is useful in explaining U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. The Cold War's passing provides an ideal opportunity to examine the impact of international structural change-a variable of central importance to realism-on state behavior. (...) I focus on two prominent realist theories that offer competing predictions for U.S. behavior after the Cold War. The first is balance-of-power theory, developed most explicitly by Kenneth Waltz. The second is a modified version of the balance-of-threat theory developed by Stephen Walt. I elaborate the logic of each theory and from each I extrapolate specific sets of predictions for U.S. security policy and for U.S. foreign economic policy. I then test these predictions against the (necessarily preliminary) evidence of the post-Cold War era." p. 50-51
(GHOLZ, Eugene <i>et al.</i> , 1997)	Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation	"The United States intervenes often in the conflicts of others, but without a consistent rationale, without a clear sense of how to advance U.S. interests, and sometimes with unintended and expensive consequences. It is time to choose a new course. Here we advocate a foreign policy of restraint-the disengagement of America's military forces from the rest of the world. Restraint is a modern form of isolationism: we adopt its military policy of withdrawal, but reject its traditional economic protectionism." p. 5

(LAYNE, Christopher., 1997)	From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy	"The Soviet Union's collapse transformed the international system dramatically, but there has been no corresponding change in U.S. grand strategy. In terms of ambitions, interests, and alliances, the United States is following the same grand strategy it pursued from 1945 until 1991: that of preponderance. Whether this strategy will serve U.S. interests in the early twenty-first century is problematic. Hence, in this article my purpose is to stimulate a more searching debate about future U.S. grand strategic options. To accomplish this, I compare the strategy of preponderance to a proposed alternative grand strategy: offshore balancing." p. 86
(KUPCHAN, Charles A., 1998)	After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity	"The prospect of the end of American hegemony thus raises a crucial question: Is it possible to construct a stable multipolarity? I argue that the United States should prepare for the inevitable decline of its preponderance by encouraging the emergence of regional unipolarity in each of the world's three areas of industrial and military power-North America, Europe, and East Asia. Unipolarity at the regional level will offset through structural forces the fragmentation and rivalry that otherwise would likely accompany the decline of American hegemony. Because even global wars start at the regional level, securing peace within regions is an essential first step toward securing peace globally." p. 42
(ART, Robert J., 1998-99)	Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement	"In the current era, what grand strategy best serves the United States? There are seven to choose from: dominion, global collective security, regional collective security, cooperative security, containment, isolationism, and selective engagement. I argue that selective engagement is the best strategy, and the purpose of this article is to show why." p. 79
(WOHLFRT H, William C., 1999)	The Stability of a Unipolar World	"In this article, I advance three propositions that undermine the emerging conventional wisdom that the distribution of power is unstable and conflict prone. First, the system is unambiguously unipolar. (...) Second, the current unipolarity is prone to peace. (...) Third, the current unipolarity is not only peaceful but durable." p. 8
(TALIAFERRO, Jeffrey W., 2000-01)	Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited	"This article has sought to advance the intrarealist debate in three ways. First, it drew a distinction between neorealism and neoclassical realism, both of which have offensive and defensive variants. Dividing realism along these lines allows us to distinguish between different assumptions about the implications of anarchy and the empirical range of particular theories. Second, the article examined four auxiliary assumptions underlying defensive neorealism and defensive neoclassical realism (...) Third, the article responded to several criticisms raised by offensive realists and nonrealists." p. 159
(POSEN, Barry R., 2003)	Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony	"I argue that the United States enjoys command of the commons-command of the sea, space, and air. I discuss how command of the commons supports a hegemonic grand strategy. I explain why it seems implausible that a challenge to this command could arise in the near to medium term. Then I review the arenas of military action where adversaries continue to be able to fight U.S. forces with some hope of success- the "contested zones." I argue that in the near to medium term the United States will not be able to establish command in these arenas. The interrelationship between U.S. command of the commons and the persistence of the contested zones suggests that the United States can probably pursue a policy of selective engagement but not one of primacy." p. 7

Source: Table elaborated by the author

6.1 Content Categorization

This report is the result of a systematic review of the literature, which considered articles published in *International Security* between the winters of 1990 and 2004. A review portfolio was built and followed in order to select articles that presented grand strategy prescriptions for the United States. The question that guided the SRL portfolio was as follows: *what military strategies were most predicted and/or prescribed by the literature for The United States in the post- Cold War era?* Among the selected articles, twelve (12) composed the final pool. After reading each of them, we can frame their main arguments according to the table above³⁸.

After performing the selection of the systematic review's results, the information regarding prescription and forecast were classified according to the proposed criteria to further the analysis. The proposed criteria were:

- *Use of Force*: points out which type of use of force the grand strategy or military strategy (ies) prescribed in the article can be framed. The categories mobilized for this criterion were: **Defense, Deterrence, Compellence**³⁹
- *Prescription (grand strategy)*: informs which military strategy or grand strategy the author (or authors) prescribes for the United States. The concepts mobilized for this criterion were: **Hegemony, Selective Engagement, Offshore Balancing, Collective Security and Neo-Isolationism**⁴⁰.
- *Forecast*: points out what type of polarity the author (or authors) imagines in and for the post-Cold War world. Among the forecasting options are the concepts of **Unipolar, Bipolar, Multipolar**.

³⁸ Table 14.

³⁹ Robert J. Art's (2003) definition of forms of political use of military power quoted in the topic 2.1.1.3 of the previous chapter.

⁴⁰ Conception of *grand strategy*, and types of American grand strategy discussed in the topic 2.1.1.2 of the previous chapter.

Table 15. Prescription and Forecast by Author(s)			
REFERENCE	TITLE	PRESCRIPTION (GRAND STRATEGY)	FORECAST
(ART, Robert J., 1991)	A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War	“Retrenchment”	Unipolarity
(DEIBEL, Terry L., 1992)	Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future	Collective Security	Multipolarity
(LAYNE, Christopher., 1993)	The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise	“Strategic Independence”	Multipolarity
(JOFFE, Josef., 1995)	Bismarck or “Britain”? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity	“Globalizing Bismarck”	“Uni-multipolar”
(MASTANDUNO, Michael., 1997)	Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War	“Preponderance”	Hegemonic Unipolarity
(GHOLZ, Eugene <i>et al.</i> , 1997)	Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation	“Restraint”	Uni-Multipolarity
(LAYNE, Christopher., 1997)	From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy	Offshore Balancing	Multipolarity
(KUPCHAN, Charles A., 1998)	After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity	“Benign Unipolarity”	Multipolarity “tripolarity”
(ART, Robert J., 1998-99)	Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement	Selective Engagement	Hegemony
(WOHLFRTH, William C., 1999)	The Stability of a Unipolar World	“Preponderance”	Hegemonic Unipolarity
(TALIAFERRO, Jeffrey W., 2000-01)	Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited	Argues that defensive realists advocate for selective engagement – calls for attention but presents criticism	Unipolarity
(POSEN, Barry R., 2003)	Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony	Selective Engagement	Hegemony

Source: Table elaborated by the author.

6.2 Step Three, Result Analysis: A Report

After reading each of them, it was possible to observe that the deterrence type of use of force was the most prescribed by the authors to compose the guidelines of their grand strategy (Art, 1991; 1998-99; Deibel, 1992; Layne, 1993; 1997; Joffe, 1995; Mastanduno, 1997; Gholz *et al.*, 1997; Kupchan, 1998; Wohlforth, 1999; Taliaferro, 2000-01; Posen, 2003), being prescribed by all of them as a single mode or in conjunction with another type of use of force. It is important to reiterate that according to Kissinger (2001) a grand strategy, crafted and implemented properly, enables coherence and logic to a nation's ad hoc and reactive policies towards the international. Nevertheless, it was and still is a subject of relevant debate in the literature. When it comes to scarce resources and capabilities, grand strategies enable the most

efficient use of a state's assets. In this sense, it is worth remembering that in this work, we adopted Robert J. Art's (1991; 2003) conception of grand strategy, which establishes the national interests to be achieved and how the instruments of statecraft, especially the military, should be manipulated to achieve them. In short, the importance of the efficient manipulation of military resources – as well as the use of force – as a means to achieve state goals.

As explained in the theoretical chapter, according to Art (2003), the use-of-force strategy that is categorized as deterrence refers to the state's ability of political use of force. It is the threat of the use of force that convinces the opponent to refrain from undertaking something undesirable to the deterrent. It involves, for instance, the threat to destroy what the opponent values, as Schelling (1966) also affirms; deterrence aims to discourage other's actions. As a military strategy, deterrence is the power to threaten by imposing reprisal or high costs in order to inhibit an opponent's use of power. As compellence and deterrence strategy are both coercive forms, the former requires harder engagement. To deter, a state needs only to make its threat possible and credible enough to the opponent to believe and fear; it is easier and cheaper to engage in deterrence. For it is easier to project enough power and convince the opposing state not to act than it is to undertake a concrete power that forces the opposing state to change its attitude.

In view of the position the United States found itself in after the Cold War, the most recurrent prescription put forth by the authors was that of deterrence. One discussion that permeated the literature was how the United States would maintain unipolarity, either by achieving a status of hegemony, or leadership for as long as it could. It was realized that by adopting the deterrent behavior, the United States would be able to achieve its interests more efficiently. Grand strategies of deterrence were perceived, however, described in different outlines aiming not always at the same national interests and foreseeing not always the same threats (Art, 1991; 1998-99; Deibel, 1992; Layne, 1993; 1997; Joffe, 1995; Mastanduno, 1997; Gholz *et al.*, 1997; Kupchan, 1998; Wohlforth, 1999; Taliaferro, 2000-01; Posen, 2003). Based on this assessment, the recurrence of strategies of hegemony and offshore balancing has also been identified in the political and academic debate on the U.S. grand strategy, although the strategy of selective engagement was distinguished by its prominence (ART, 1991; 1998-99; JOFFE, 1995; KUPCHAN, 1998; TALIAFERRO, 2000-01; POSEN, 2003).

The report will be in an analytical format, not necessarily following a linear temporality of publication. The strategies will be arranged and their proponents discussed, from the least prescribed to the most prescribed. It was sought, however, always to account for how each strategy proposes that the American state interests be achieved by wielding military

instruments, and the contextual circumstances in which each of the authors published their ideas. Patterns, similarities as well as asymmetries, and ambiguities found throughout the content will be identified, from which a conclusive analysis can be built.

The first pattern identified was regarding the understanding of a unipolarity experienced by the United States in the post-Cold War era, but there isn't much agreement as regards its duration. For some (Art, 1991; 1998-99; Deibel, 1992; Layne, 1993; 1997; Joffe, 1995; Kupchan, 1998; Taliaferro, 2000-01; Posen, 2003), it is a brief moment while for others (Mastanduno, 1997; Gholz *et al.*, 1997; Wohlforth, 1999), it can be a more difficult period to be reconfigured, the strategic predictions are intrinsically linked to the authors' opinions on whether this unipolar moment will or not last. Another pattern could be found in the majority prescriptions for the adoption of strategies that fit the deterrence conception of the use of force. It could also be noted that all the articles included here either consider the American strategic behavior during the Cold War as one of containment threats (Deibel, 1992; Joffe, 1995; Mastanduno, 1997; Gholz *et al.*, 1997) or one of preponderance threats (Art, 1991; 1998-99; Layne, 1993; 1997; Kupchan, 1998; Wohlforth, 1999; Taliaferro; Posen, 2003). From these arguments, the authors base their strategic prescriptions.

In 1992, Terry L. Deibel in *Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future* sought to study the strategic path followed by the U.S. prior to the era of containment - a strategy adopted during the Cold War. The author (1992) studies the three main areas of American interests that guided its foreign relations before the Cold War, with the purpose of searching for strategic patterns that can provide new contours of a new post-Cold War strategy. The author recalls American strategic behavior guided by balance of power principles and admits that this behavior will remain. In the area of global security, the author outlines the contours of a new collective security strategy, based on the principles of Woodrow Wilson's proponents for the League of Nations. The author updates the strategic conception in view of the period of peace that will come about – given the lack of any threat of a new hegemonic economy – along with the multi-polarity framework – given the similar economic capabilities of the major nations. For regional security, the author studies the hemispheric security strategy, by outlining measures of cross-border protection and strengthening of values between the North and South of the American continent (DEIBEL, 1992).

Deibel (1992) draws attention to the fact that the world after the decline of the USSR does not present any actor aspiring to global domination, as well as no actor willing to cause any imbalance in the system. Deibel (1992) stresses that the great powers will continue their

competition, but in spheres such as economy, technology and political influence. Also, that the violent conflicts will not cease, but will occur on a much smaller scale. Deibel (1992), states that a period of world politics is about to be established in which there are no aggressive intentions of global domination, with no critical threats to the physical security of any state.

In this scenario, Deibel (1992) affirms that the great American challenge is to establish its priorities for more complex objectives, which do not necessarily involve war. Although interests such as security of national territory and value diffusion were given greater weight during the Cold War, such interests will no longer mobilize huge investments in military equipment, security assistance, nuclear weapons, or intelligence. Thus, interests such as economic prosperity take the place of the immediacy of defense strategies. According to Deibel,

Today, with no new hegemonic threat on the horizon, with the American economy slipping from control at home and under challenge from Europe and Japan abroad, and with communism utterly bankrupt as an ideology, it seems obvious that containment, economic hegemony, and anti-communism can no longer serve the nation's interests as they did in the Cold War (DEIBEL, 1992, p. 83).

As a long-term security strategy, Deibel (1992) advocates for the continuation of a balance of power behavior, given the possibility that in the future some power similar to the Soviet Union might configure itself. The author, however, believes that no catastrophic threat to American security can present itself in the next 15 years, given the post-Cold War scenario, where:

Among the current great power candidates, Japan seems too anti-military, China too weak, Germany too enveloped by Europe, Europe (at the same time) too disunited, Brazil or India too young, and recovery by any of the larger Soviet republics or the new Commonwealth of Independent States too far in the future to worry about (DEIBEL, 1992, p. 85)

Deibel (1992) predicts that a likely strategy to be adopted by the United States will be regional balancing along with flexible balancing at the global level, given the configuration that will be established in a multipolar world. The author further states that the American position is not seen as oppressive, one of the reasons among which states classify it as an indispensable balancer. With the scarcity of a threat on the horizon the balance of power, according to Deibel (1992), will have a lighter nature, which makes room for experiments with new strategies in the security sphere, such as collective security.

Although he (1992) presents the strategies of collective security, hemispheric security, and isolationism, the author does not believe that the new grand strategy for the United States is a sum of the three. Deibel (1992) also points out the need for economic and fiscal robustness of the U.S. for any major strategic path to be supported. The U.S should formulate an active

rather than a reactive strategy, and the author proposes that in the physical security sphere, international relations should be less globalist and more idealistic and selfish than they were during the Cold War. The author (1992) reiterates that with no threat of expansion or domination by any nation in the world, the U.S. can lessen its concern and spending on defense, and still remain relatively superior in terms of military strength. Economic prosperity and value projection will likely become larger parts of future foreign relations strategies for the United States (DEIBEL, 1992).

Deibel's (1992) strategic prescription can be framed in the conception of an *American grand strategy of collective security* – which considers that the American disparity of power, and the legitimacy of its strength in the world, allows the U.S. to maintain world peace, through institutions such as the WTO and NATO. Deibel (1992), advocates that the costs of intervention in isolated incidents, or in international issues, can be reached by means of collective arrangements, where the military power would be associated with that of the allied powers, Europeans, Japanese, whether through the UN or not, drastically decreasing the costs of solitary undertakings. Deibel (1992) also proposes defensive measures such as post-SDI Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) program, and anti-proliferation regimes through which it can further ensure and manage security in the future.

The focus, however, should be on economic strengthening which should be regionalist if not globalist in scope. As far as power is concerned, the U.S. should be able to capitalize on its position at the end of the Cold War and thus be able to establish a promising future in the multipolar world. According to the author, a context of peace that can match the hegemonic peace configured after the Congress of Vienna (DEIBEL, 1992).

In terms of American behavior in the Cold War, it can also be seen that some authors claim that a preponderance position, instead of containment, was adopted by the United States. According to Layne (1997), this strategy has been adopted by the American state since the 1940s. It is characterized by the search for maximization and expansion of state power in regards to the world. This strategy understands the disparate position of the U.S., which became clear in the post-Cold War period, both economically and militarily. This condition is reinforced by the spread of liberal values, strengthening the world authority of the United States, and allowing it to shape the world to its will. It perceives this position as an advantage to seek to become increasingly stronger and to maintain hegemony for as long as possible. It is possible to conceive the similarity with the *American grand strategy of hegemonic primacy*.

Wohlforth (1999) suggests that an American strategy of preponderance should be maintained. The starting point for the strategy is however the unipolarity of the system perceived as being favorable for the quest to expand power. For him, unipolarity is “prone to peace”, and if Washington is willing to pay, it is also durable. Wohlforth's (1999) article is built around three arguments that contradict the conventional wisdom about the unstable and prone to conflict character of the distribution of power, as for him, the system is unipolar, durable, and prone to peace.

He claims that the U.S. experiences a qualitatively and quantitatively greater amount of power than any other hegemonic power in history,

The United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading state in the last two centuries. Moreover, the United States is the first leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical. To describe this unprecedented quantitative and qualitative concentration of power as an evanescent "moment" is profoundly mistaken (WOHLFORTH, 1999. p. 7).

Their disparity in capabilities is a favorable factor for peace since there is no other hegemonic power on the horizon capable – or willing – to compete for the leadership that the United States possesses. Wohlforth (1999) suggests that competing directly with the United States is futile, that its power projection capability is global (on land, sea, air), wielding superior technological, military, and nuclear capabilities. The author also claims that the country that spends more on defense than all other major powers combined is the U.S., while second-tier states – such as Europe, Japan, China, and Russia tend to maintain or decrease their spendings in this area. The unipolarity is also durable because it is too expensive for second-tier states to try to compete with the U.S., and it is cheaper to bandwagon with it (WOHLFORTH, 1999).

Since there is no risk of competition, in terms of material capabilities, the United States were then able to focus on strengthening itself without being counterbalanced immediately. This also supports Wohlforth's assertion that Unipolarity is not a "moment" but something perhaps as durable as the bipolar moment. Wohlforth (1999), also points out that the U.S. geopolitical position as an offshore power – between oceans on both sides, which distances it from important competitors – privileges it from the risks of a regional counterbalance (WOHLFORTH, 1999).

Another statement that could be framed in the *American grand strategy of hegemonic primacy* conception is that the United States' position of preponderance allows it greater freedom to disregard the international system's incentives. However, the better and greater Washington's responses to systemic incentives, the more durable and peaceful the system will

be. For in a sense, the author (1999) asserts that the system needs and revolves around the U.S., and therefore creates demands for the U.S.' involvement. By this logic, Wohlforth (1999, p. 39) states: "doing too little is a greater danger than doing too much". The historically disparate U.S.' distribution of power contributes to greater systemic incentives for American intervention; they reflect the necessity of American engagement as a global leader – or an ordering provider – for the system to function properly (WOHLFORTH, 1999).

An American strategy that limits or eradicates its external action dooms the unipolar order itself. This can anticipate that other states will seek to accumulate power in order to counterbalance the U.S. This not only would dissolve the unipolar order but would also establish an environment of aggressive competition, open for conflict for new global leadership. The author reiterates that the world must remain unipolar, that the U.S. must manage the security regimes in regions of interest, such as Europe and Asia, and secure its disparate Hegemonic position, making it increasingly difficult for another state to dare to compete (WOHLFORTH, 1999).

As well as in the *American grand strategy of hegemonic primacy*, Wohlforth (1999) affirms the need for hegemony to respond to the systemic demand for intervention for the very maintenance of the system. The proposed strategy is one in which Washington assumes the economic and political risks of the U.S. acting as the global leader and police, that it becomes an "indispensable nation." Otherwise, it will make room for other states to seek to assume this role. For Wohlforth, the incentives of this strategic endeavor are worth the effort, and the costs are modest, the only obstacle to full U.S. unipolarity being the refusal by American institutions to bear them (WOHLFORTH, 1999).

Mastanduno (1997) prescribes a strategic behavior for the U.S. that comprises analytical assumptions of the *American grand strategy of hegemonic primacy*. Mastanduno (1997), like Wohlforth (1999), notes the possibility of more durable American unipolarity, as long as domestic American institutions are willing to bear it. He uses a theoretical discussion of realist conceptions to highlight that the path followed by the U.S. after 1991 resembles the primacy strategy (offered by Posen and Ross, 1996-97) and points out the benefits brought to the country domestically and in international relations (MASTANDUNO, 1997).

He notes a pattern in U.S. Cold War economic and security strategies, where both functioned as complementary policies, which led to the insular position enjoyed by the U.S. after that period. However, with the end of the Cold War, he points to a more divergent theoretical pattern between these policies, whereby the balance-of-power logic drives economic

policy, the balance-of-threat theory underlies American security policy. From this perspective, the U.S. security strategy aims to preserve America's insular position by engaging sparingly and maintaining stability among the other great powers. The author observed this in Bush's and Clinton's administrations and as a result, it decisively shaped U.S. relations with Japan, Germany, Russia and China. However, Mastanduno (1997), realizes that such a mismatch of principles for economic and security policies in the post-Cold War era is the main point of tension within the pursuit of an overall American grand strategy (MASTANDUNO, 1997).

The author (1997) recognizes that the insularity that constitutes unipolarity gives the U.S. more room to act strategically in the world, and this condition creates a temptation for the U.S. government to continue to pursue the maintenance of the status quo. The author (1997) believes that this temptation to pursue durable unipolarity exists because it is easier to remain in a world that revolves around the U.S. than to seek to initiate divergent strategic behavior aimed at a multipolar world. Another reason is the American belief of not presenting itself as a threatening hegemonic power, but rather, that its position is beneficial to the world (MASTANDUNO, 1997).

Mastanduno (1997) then advocates that if the balance-of-threat logic holds, in addition to continuing to strengthen relative power, the U.S. government must be willing to bear the costs diplomatically. The U.S. must work to maintain the perception among states that a hegemonic counterbalance is unrealistic in terms of costs. In addition, Washington should seek to heal the divergence between economic and security policies, preventing it from having deleterious effects on security actions and threatening the balance of the system. They should also mitigate economic tensions with Japan, given the relative disparity that has been growing between them. In this sense, Mastanduno notes the need for security policies to be directed towards a possible Chinese threat to become its main economic competitor, since, unlike Japan, China may not support the status quo (MASTANDUNO, 1997).

Mastanduno (1997) prescribes the pursuit of the behavior of engagement and assurance by the American government, which for the author is the reason for the internal conflict of American foreign policy, which pursues maintenance of the status of hegemon without being willing to bear the costs that come with this condition. The costs of global engagement will be unavoidable due to increased U.S. activity abroad, but they are costs related to maintaining primacy, and assuming them rather than abandoning them may prevent greater tensions in regions that require a greater American presence. The U.S. must be prepared to act alone and deal with the consequences of these actions. However, it must limit itself to the temptation to

assimilate these actions to ideological dissemination and imposition in order to avoid anticipating that other nations seek to restrict its power (MASTANDUNO, 1997).

Other authors have a different view, such as Gholz *et al* (1997) who advocate for Restraint, a strategic proposal for an American grand strategy resembling the *grand strategy of neo-isolationism*. This strategy highlights the importance of seeking to strengthen nationally, bringing focus – and spending – to domestic investments, and abandoning unnecessary military ventures abroad. According to the article also published in 1997, the U.S. after the Cold War settled into a strategic course built upon a “confusing mix of grand rhetoric”. According to the authors, there is no clear explanation for the fact that American interventions in conflicts that are not theirs are so frequent.

Such American engagement does not reflect their national interests but rather, sometimes has unwanted and expensive results. The U.S. enjoys a historically rare position that enables it to achieve its interests without spending large amounts of national wealth on defense. The United States is not only geographically protected, but also holds a power apparatus that makes it practically unreachable, as Gholz *et al* (1997, p. 12) argues, “*given its geographical advantages and nuclear arsenal, the United States would be very secure even if Japan, China, and Russia matched its defense expenditures*” (GHOLZ *et al*, 1997).

Thus, they advocate for a modern form of isolationism, called Restraint. This strategy is about ensuring national security and promoting American prosperity. Unipolarity in this case is durable because of the scarcity of outside threats, in which case for it to be prolonged, Washington must decrease spending on defense ventures and turn its interventions inward. Given its insularity, threats to U.S. security are minor, so the U.S. government must now focus its spending on economic prosperity. The U.S. must not seek a large or busy army, rather aspire to a strong one. Such as the *grand strategy of neo-isolationism*, the author does not propose a total withdrawal from the world, but rather the disengagement from unnecessary and unjustifiably expensive commitments and the return of the army home (GHOLZ *et al*, 1997).

In this strategy, the mobilization of military force will be restricted to the pursuit of interests such as the physical security and economic strength of the nation. To wield military instruments for other interests is a waste of resources, and will lead to – nothing less – than a threat to the current U.S. position. Thus, the United States can enjoy the security it has acquired in the post-Cold War era without incurring absurd defense expenditures, it can seek to manage its own national challenges, and force other nations to deal with theirs. This strategy does not advocate for a pacifist U.S. position, it rejects the current position of global engagement.

Restraint would aim to direct spending toward strengthening itself nationally, reinforcing investments into counter-terrorist intelligence, and attempting to reduce vulnerability and the risk of becoming an obvious target for attacks of this nature (GHOLZ *et al.*, 1997).

Similar to *American grand strategy of neo-isolationism*, the Restraint strategy advocates that the U.S. should dismantle its role in NATO by withdrawing its troops from Europe, and thus it would force the continent's strong states to mobilize their own forces rather than rely on American troops and equipment. The U.S. would save expenses, instruments, and not expose itself to "Windows of vulnerability." Likewise, U.S. troops should be withdrawn from Asia,

The United States should end its commitments to Japan and South Korea, cease military cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), withdraw from the Australia, New Zealand, United States Pact (ANZUS), and terminate the implicit guarantee to Taiwan (GHOLZ, Eugene *et al.* 1997. p, 20).

The authors (1997) attest that this forward presence has lost its Cold War security logic, and besides being expensive to maintain, it only exposes American soldiers to risks. According to Gholz *et al* (1997), the Asian allies do not have any major immediate threat and have the ability to protect themselves, e.g. by aligning with each other in case of a Chinese threat.

However, American troops must remain in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf region, for this is directly linked to the pursuit of American prosperity, one of its central interests. The United States should stay with POMCUS equipment only, withdraw all its ground troops from the Gulf, and reduce its number of air troops. It should dismantle the no-fly zone over Iraq and engage in compellence in case of threatening Iraqi movement. The troop permanence is intended to prevent a regional aggressor from monopolizing the Gulf region's oil. Nevertheless, this presence must be minimized in order to avoid triggering religious or nationalistic pressures, destabilizing its Gulf allies, whilst at the same time being threatening enough to prevent trans-border attacks (GHOLZ *et al.*, 1997).

Similarly, Layne (1993; 1997) prescribes a *grand strategy of offshore balancing*. Closer to neo-isolationism, the main concern of the state would be to strengthen itself, bringing its forces into the national territory. However, the state adopting an offshore balancing behavior would mobilize its force for ventures in regions of vital interest, where it would be ready to intervene in case of the emergence of one potential regional power, preventing it from persevering. This strategy requires a higher cost to strengthen troops sufficiently to act to prevent any regional power from prospering, and thus the strategy in this situation can take the form of a compellence strategy (LAYNE, 1993).

Layne (1993) outlined a strategy of Independence, as the author rejects the preponderance behavior adopted by the U.S., which aimed at maintaining unipolarity. Layne countered with neorealist arguments that the system would naturally cause countries to counterbalance the power, using historical evidence of former unipolar powers that were counterbalanced. Unlike the assumptions analyzed earlier, for Layne unipolarity is an illusion that will be shattered at any moment, and the evidence he uses in this article is the rise of Japan (LAYNE, 1993).

Layne (1993) seeks to outline a strategy that avoids short-term measures, that accepts the evident demise of hegemon status and prepares the U.S. for the multipolar world that will inarguably be configured, bringing with it challenges involving security dilemma and the problem of relative gains. He believes that major conflicts may occur mostly in the economic sphere, mainly due to the fact that some nations have nuclear weapons. However, he does not deny that the shadow of war remains latent in the multipolar system. Thus, the main American concern is to increase its relative power, not in a manner to become threatening, but enough to defend its interests. Layne's proposed Independence Strategy parallels the *American grand strategy of offshore balancing*, in which he proposes new means to become a dominant actor in his main area of interest, Eurasia. (1993). The U.S. would provide military cover for the regional balance of power to prevent the rise of a regional power. However, this involvement would occur exclusively if other states could not effectively balance themselves against a rising Eurasian hegemony (LAYNE, 1993).

Layne (1993) sees the United States as probably the most secure great power in history, given its geography, nuclear weapons and capabilities. With this strategy, American insularity could be used in a multipolar world as an attractive advantage, to be seen as an ally rather than a threat, unlike what the preponderance strategy would cause. Consequently, it would reduce the opening for a direct conflict with emerging powers, such as Japan, besides creating the undeniable opportunity to try to increase America's relative power within the dynamics of multipolarity. Layne claims that by this route the U.S. would achieve a more favorable instability in the system, and would bring a more real condition, which comes closer to absolute security for the United States (LAYNE, 1993).

Layne (1997) reinforced his argument of the need for America's insular position to be capitalized on in order to prepare for a multipolar world. He develops his strategic proposal of Offshore Balancing by proposing the disengagement of American commitments in East Asia and Europe. For him, this strategic path is the way for the U.S. to embark on the 21st century

more safely – by minimizing the risk of American involvement in a great power war (possibly nuclear) – and more powerful - by having the opportunity to invest in the increase of its relative power. A strategy to confront a more dangerous and expensive multipolar world, it delineates American interests around defending territorial integrity and preventing the emergence of a Euro-Asian hegemony (LAYNE, 1997).

Layne's (1997) Offshore Balancing strategy is based on the principle of limited liability; it rejects any American endeavor to perpetuate hegemony and ideological dissemination. The U.S. would not get directly involved in pro-democracy interventions or peace operations, or even make its military apparatus available for any humanitarian intervention. Their endeavor would reduce U.S. troop land operations, and according to Layne (1997), would involve an investment of about 2.5 percent of GDP. As a balancer, the U.S. would disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan and South Korea. For him, the basis of strategy lies in air power, nuclear deterrence behavior, and especially naval power,

In the latter respect, an offshore balancing strategy would stress sea-based ballistic missile defense (crucial in the event the United States has to wage coalitional warfare in the early twenty-first century) and sea-based precision, standoff weapons systems (enabling the United States to bring its military power to bear without committing ground forces to combat). The United States also could use naval power as a lever against others' economic interests to achieve its political objectives. As an offshore balancer, the United States would seek simultaneously to maximize its comparative military-technological advantages and its strategic flexibility (LAYNE, 1997. p. 113).

Layne's (1993;1997) *American grand strategy of offshore balancing* is forged for the multipolar world, and unlike a strategy of preponderance – or as described here, the *grand strategy of hegemonic primacy*, it dismisses any claim that the unipolar world is durable, and then discourages the U.S. from embarking on an endeavor to maintain it. He proposes a strategy of *innenpolitik*, of state strengthening, that allows the U.S. a certain degree of control over its destiny in the face of the world that is emerging. To this end, the U.S. should maintain cooperative relations if necessary only in the short-term, and disengage from permanent alliance relations. Without the ties and pressures of a permanent alliance along with the insular American position, a behavior of external balancing will be very rare, internal balancing will always be more preferable and profitable. Consequently, it will force other nations to assume the risks and costs of balancing where the U.S. does not get involved. Hence, this will give the U.S. the opportunity to increase its relative capabilities, especially compared to China and Japan (LAYNE, 1997).

In the next section, we will discuss the strategy most prescribed by the authors, in an analytical way, portraying the proponents of each author as well as the temporal circumstances

in which they were inserted when they had their article published. We will discuss similarities and differences found in the prescriptions, which, despite portraying the strategy of self-effacing engagement, sometimes follow distinct points of view.

6.2.1 *The most prescribed American Grand Strategy: Selective Engagement*

The first article in which we will analyze the prescription of selective engagement is Art (1991). The author presents a debate about the behavior to be adopted by the American nation right after the fall of the USSR. Adopting an internationalist position instead of an isolationist one, the author believes that it is ideal for the U.S. to establish a grand strategy in a clearer way. As opposed to a foreign policy, the author proposes the formulation as a broader plan of selection of vital interests to be achieved through the handling of its military power. Art (1991) specifies the goals to be pursued by the American state, encompassing both security and non-security goals, and offers ways in which the military instrument can be handled to serve the achievement of these goals (ART, 1991).

In this sense, for the author, American interests after the end of the Cold War would be as set out in the table,

Table 16. Interests, Threats, and a U.S. Presence Overseas. (Art. Robert J.)				
	U.S. Interest	Prime Threat to U.S. Interest	Major Purpose of Overseas Forces	Nature of the Argument for U.S. Forces Overseas
1.	Protect U.S. homeland from destruction	Spread of nuclear weapons	Selectively extend deterrence to retard spread	Based on high cost of low-probability events
2.	Preserve prosperity based on international economic openness	Economic nationalism	Reduce others' relative gains worries to preserve stability	Hedge bets because of indeterminate arguments about today's interdependence
3.	Assure access to Persian Gulf oil	Near-monopoly control by regional hegemon	Deter attack and/or conquest of others	Simple deterrence
4.	Prevent certain wars	Great-power wars in Europe and Far East; conquest of Israel and South Korea	Deter attack and/or conquest of others	Added insurance for low-probability events
5.	Where feasible, promote democratic institutions and certain humanitarian values abroad	Other governments mass-murdering their citizens	Intervention in other states' internal affairs	Humanitarian motives

Source: Adapted from ART, Robert J. *A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War*. International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4. 1991. p. 8.

He also tries to foresee the threats that these interests may face and how American military power can be allocated to counter them. In light of this, he prescribes a strategy of Retrenchment, which does not isolate the U.S. state from the world, but makes its participation in the world more residual. With little likelihood that another war takes place, Art believes that

a smaller role abroad will give the U.S. the opportunity to better define its broader interests and have more clarity to propose the best military strategies to pursue them (ART, 1991).

He equates the Retrenchment strategy with selective engagement. He states that the only thing to worry about at this point is nuclear propagation in the hands of "mad statesmen" and terrorist groups, although this is not likely to happen. The threat is not high. In any case, Art (1991) proposes that the U.S. should maintain some presence abroad so that these threats are prevented, more so that

(1) an acceleration of nuclear weapons spread that could increase the likelihood of nuclear wars into which the United States could be drawn, or that could bring terrorist nuclear threats against it; (2) a serious decline in economic cooperation among the rich industrialized nations, due to a growth of economic nationalism, such that world trade, and thus American prosperity, would suffer significantly; (3) a great power war in Europe or the Far East that could wreck economic openness and hasten nuclear weapons spread; (4) control by a regional hegemon over Persian Gulf oil reserves that could threaten access to them; and (5) the conquest or destruction of either Israel or South Korea, which could fatally weaken other states' belief in the reliability of the United States (ART, 1991. p. 50).

The position of retrenchment then is a preventive one, of gradual withdrawal but not of a complete abandonment of its global military presence. In the author's view, the American presence is essential for the functioning of cooperative relations, as the U.S. should act as a stabilizing agent in the international economic, political and military spheres. Besides being a realistic position in this sense, it is also a defense position. It is convenient given the U.S.' position in the world, and therefore cheaper than the goal of residual U.S. presence in the world occurs in a more secure manner and still ensures security (ART, 1991).

To this end, Art proposes that American military power assume a signaling rather than a threatening role, that its overseas forces be arranged in such a way as to demonstrate enough power to make other states unwilling to confront it. In a symbolic and not offensively destructive way, the U.S. should behave as a powerful state but in a more financially sustainable way, and for that, cuts should be made. Art suggests cutting troops in Europe since the Soviet threat is no longer real. The reduction of its troops would be favorable even for the relationship with Germany, since they would have a less offensive character and the maintenance of even residual troops in these regions would still serve as a way to control the increase of the European countries' search for nuclear weapons. In this sense, the U.S. should still withdraw its entire nuclear arsenal from the continent, and this position would be in line with NATO's statement that nuclear weapons are "weapons of last resort" (ART, 1991).

For the Persian Gulf region, however, the author prescribes a more cautious position in view of the tensions that may occur. Thus, he advocates for an American presence that can

contain possible aggressions but not large enough to be seen as offensive. The U.S. military presence in the Gulf should remain and preferably have shared responsibility, for example through the UN, the U.S. could remain in the region along with other international troops. American presence in Israel must also remain; although it may be seen by the Israeli state as constraining, American financial and military aid are necessary for its security and prosperity. In the case of the Far East, the U.S. must coordinate its troop withdrawal with the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The focus should be on removing American troops from South Korea, which is a strong state, while maintaining mostly aerial and maritime forces in South Korea and Japan (ART, 1991).

The purpose of Art's prescriptions is to propose a visualization of the possible routes of actions to be taken by the U.S. in the world that is now being configured. Advocating for a residual positioning in the world and not extremely isolationist, so as to house its forces sufficiently to maintain a controlling, non-offensive and drastically cheaper position. The author admits the position of Containment adopted by the U.S. in the Cold War given the bipolar context, however, with the dismantling of the USSR the U.S. should adopt retrenchment for the new world that will be configured, not necessarily a world in which the U.S. seeks unipolarity or hegemonic leadership (ART, 1991)

In line with Art's (1991) ideas on containment, behavior adopted by the U.S. during the Cold War, four years later, Josef Joffe (1995) prescribes for the U.S. the strategy of selective engagement. The author evaluates American behavior in the first years after the Cold War, concluding that American grand strategy under George Bush's notion of a new world order was disorganized. He also criticizes Clinton's strategy and the American disorientation in its actions abroad (JOFFE, 1995).

Joffe advocates for a position in consonance with other states for the maintenance of the status quo where the U.S. position is exalted, rather than one where the U.S. seeks to balance against potential rivals. The author argues that this position is one of "selective as insurance" – to bandwagon with others to reinforce U.S. primacy, since the U.S. needs to remain in an unreachable position in view of not having any threats in sight - only potential challengers. In this sense, the strategy prescribed by Joffe is, like Art's (1991), one of prevention, acting in a safe and non-intrusive manner. The U.S. should thus confront threats by acting *ex-ante*, diminishing any incentives for future confrontation (JOFFE, 1995).

For the author, the world's configuration is a Uni-multipolar one, where the U.S. is a primary power. For the author, it is an ideal position to improve and globalize the model that

he proposes and calls Bismarckian. Maintaining good relations with all possible candidates, moving among them and preventing them from eventually balancing to counterbalance it. As the most powerful player in the system, the U.S. has enormous deterrent and compelling power to handle in order to prevent potential threats. Since no concrete threat is on the horizon, U.S. grand strategy should be based on a reason of state that seeks to maintain America's prominence in the international system (JOFFE, 1995).

To this end, Joffe (1995) states that the most convenient path is through the Far and Middle East, since it is the region that concentrates the strongest states that share the notion of maintaining security, given that it is a region of latent confrontation. In this region, the U.S. should seek to be the center of relations. As a primary power, the U.S. has no challenging rival at the moment, and is thus, according to the author, in the ideal position to play the role of a global center that allows it to act as a “spokesman” in the most important regions. According to the author's ideas, the U.S. should assume three main positions,

First, the United States should act as regional protector, by providing security to those potential rivals-Japan, China, Western Europe-who would otherwise have to produce security on their own by converting economic strength into military assets. Historically, the accumulation of such assets has fed conflicts and ambitions, and the latter would surely be turned against the reigning primary power, the United States. Second, in so doing, act as regional pacifier. Insofar as the United States guarantees, explicitly or implicitly, the security of key players *vis-a-vis* each other, it will inhibit conflict and enhance cooperation among them. If nations do not have to worry about security and hence about relative military power, they will invest fewer resources in guns and more in butter, and indeed, in communal ventures. As a result, sub-systems will tend to remain stable, sparing the United States the unpleasant necessity of choice among partners, let alone of fighting on one side or the other. In short, act in order to minimize intervention. Third, universalize the hub-and-spoke architecture. If regional players remain beholden to the center, they are more likely to co-balance with the United States against local delinquents such as Iraq or Libya and cooperate against global threats such as proliferation and protectionism. Synergy equals economy, and economy spells leadership at tolerable costs for a democratic nation loath to play policeman to the world (JOSEF JOFFE, 1995. p. 117).

This behavior would be intended to prevent the rise of new rivals or hostile coalitions, to reduce interventions, and to maximize global stability, and would consequently lead to three outcomes considered as collective goods.

Three years later, Charles A. Kupchan (1998) suggests that thinking about American unipolarity is dangerous, since it is a moment that will soon be undone. The author advocates a strategy that, like the authors of Offshore Balancing, envisions a multipolar configuration of the world. However, with outlines more similar to the selective engagement strategy, the author prescribes a strategy that he calls “benign unipolarity”. The author seeks to establish proponents for a strategy that accepts the decline of American preponderance and seeks to establish a stable multipolarity (KUPCHAN, 1998).

Kupchan admits that the prosperity and peace of the world reside in American power, in the role the country plays as an extra-regional balancer. He believes that this critical American position, especially in Europe and East Asia, is essential for the liberalization of the world economy to continue. Acting as a catalyst for multilateral efforts to combat tensions and facilitate peaceful resolutions (KUPCHAN, 1998).

Kupchan prescribes a strategy of “benign unipolarity”, where the U.S. seeks to establish itself as a regional unipolarity in three regions of interests, which hold greater industrial and military power. Like Joffe's proposal, Kupchan advocates an American position of centrality. However, taking into account the hierarchical position of economic and military power, the U.S. would function as a central axis of influence – a centripetal force – over the weakest, the periphery. Order in this scenario would be through bargaining, the position of the center would be reinforced through multilateral negotiations, jointly established norms and rules, and not necessarily through coercion (KUPCHAN, 1998).

This would form regional spheres of power, which would regulate and order the international system. Negotiation is a primordial element, and order would be achieved by retaining power and not by using it unrestrictedly. Through this strategy, competition between and within these regions would be diminished and, in a way, controlled by the center – the United States — and the world would be configured into a stable multipolarity (KUPCHAN, 1998).

The following year, Robert J Art reinforces his idea of selective engagement (Art, 1999). The author elaborates his idea by stating that an American selective engagement behavior is not only favorable but also necessary. Favorable because of the position of preponderance that facilitates such behavior and necessary because it will play the role of maintaining the stability of the system. For the author, no state can compete with the economic and military potential of the United States (ART, 1999).

The author (1999) uses the same logic of grand strategy as a plan for the effective allocation of American military power as a means for achieving concrete and desirable vital interests, which encompass both military and non-military objectives. He advocates this strategy as the ideal way to most effectively apply military power to also promote its protection. Art (1999. p. 80) sets out six basic national interests to be pursued by this strategy, these being,

- (1) preventing an attack on the American homeland, primarily by keeping out of the wrong hands nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, which are also referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- (2) preventing great power wars and destructive security competitions among the Eurasian great powers;
- (3) maintaining secure oil supplies at stable prices, in large part by keeping Persian Gulf

reserves divided among the oil-rich Gulf states; (4) preserving an open international economic order; (5) fostering the spread of democracy and respect for human rights, and preventing mass murder and genocide; and (6) protecting the global environment from the adverse effects of global warming and ozone depletion (ART, 1999. p. 80)

Art (1999) states that the world needs U.S.' unipolarity – and to that end proposes a strategy that drives the middle ground between an isolationist and expansionist position, balancing between an isolationist, unilateralist course on the one hand and a highly interventionist, “world policeman” role on the other. In keeping with the behavior the U.S. has followed since 1945, Art's proposed strategy delineates an internationalist path of effectively allocating resources to pursue vital national interests through selective engagement. His strategy is categorized by the author as “realpolitik plus” aligning realist and liberal premises, such as a focus on security and prosperity. For this, the U.S. must adopt a good performance that also brings good results to the world and thus persevere in the system (ART, 1999).

In this sense, the strategy of selective engagement is also a preventive strategy, which aims at preventing the emergence of confrontation rather than just seeking to react to them. To this end, the author (1999. p. 81) suggests a forward defense positioning, maintaining core U.S. alliances, for instance via NATO, and also via “the U.S.-Japan alliance, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and those with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait-and the basing of American troops overseas in eastern and western Eurasia and the Persian Gulf to keep these alliances strong” (ART, 1999).

The interests to be pursued by the strategy are classified as vital interests and desirable interests. The former category comprehends issues that could result in considerable costs if not protected and great benefits if they are, as they are realistic objectives relative to national security. Desirable interests, on the other hand, are those based on liberal premises, which, if not protected, will not bring such catastrophic costs. Vital interests include controlling the spread of NBC weapons, maintaining peace among the Eurasian powers, and the division of oil reserves in the Persian Gulf, while desirable interests include keeping the international economy open, spreading and observing liberal values such as democracy and human rights, and seeking to promote measures concerning climate change (ART, 1999).

In this sense, the prescribed strategy of selective engagement suggests that in order to achieve its vital interests, the United States should strengthen its nuclear deterrence capabilities, continue to provide guarantees for the maintenance of America's nuclear umbrella over Japan and Germany, as well as supporting the NBC anti-propagation regime, further reinforcing through compellence its position against the use of NBC for aggressive undertakings. As far as peacekeeping among Eurasian powers is concerned, the strategy prescribes a U.S. military presence either in Western Europe or in East Asia. Regarding the division of oil reserves in the

Persian Gulf, American presence must continue in order to guarantee the supply and stability of oil prices, thus avoiding economic turmoil (ART, 1999).

In terms of desirable interests, Art's strategy suggests that the U.S. should seek to maintain economic openness in the world, disseminate values favorable to the maintenance of the status quo, such as democracy, through reasonable, non-interventionist measures. In addition, the U.S. should work on climate change measures. The achievement of these goals would bring indirect benefits, such as the creation of a stronger power base and the promotion of the enrichment of its middle class. The pursuit of these interests should be a way to facilitate the achievement of their vital interests. Moreover, the strategy of selective engagement, according to Art, is the one that proposes the best way (ART, 1999).

In the 21st century, authors begin to delineate American strategies with a view to the new century. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (2000-01) proposes to advance the intra-realist debate in order to think about an American grand strategy. The author admits that the current search for a strategy of preponderance adopted by the U.S. since 1991 may endure American unipolarity for longer, given its superiority in several areas. However, in the long-term, Taliaferro highlights the assumptions of defensive realism, and states that the distribution of power will change, bringing new competitors to the American power. In addition, the pursuit of American objectives with short-term, unilateral and potentially provocative strategies can have deleterious effects in the long-term (TALIAFERRO, 2000-01).

The author highlights that these dangers come mainly from the security dilemma that continues to hover under unipolarity, and that short-term actions that seek to increase American security diminish the security of other states. He points out that defensive realists advocate for the strategy of selective engagement, in view of the advantages of a selective U.S. presence that demonstrates power and has a dissuasive impact, as for example, the American action in Kosovo that resulted in the exposure of weaknesses of the European powers. He also argues for international action through cooperation via programs such as National Missile Defense and international organizations such as NATO (TALIAFERRO, 2000-01).

Posen (2003) highlights the prescience of the authors who bet on the hypothesis of a long "unipolar moment" of extraordinary relative power of the United States through the strategy of primacy as opposed to those who bet on the adoption of a more contained strategy aimed at the configuration of a multipolar world. Posen believes that unipolarity and U.S. hegemony can persevere for longer, but this will depend on which strategic path the U.S. follows. Unlike Bush's strategy of unilateral primacy guided by physical power, and Clinton's

more multilateral primacy guided by liberal principles and international legitimacy, Posen defends a strategy of selective engagement. His prescription involves arguments that highlight the efficiency of military resource allocation and how the selective engagement strategy will be more financially sustainable than the primacy strategy (POSEN, 2003).

Posen (2003) points out that the U.S. has command over the commons and common goods of the world. Commons, according to the author, are those that belong to no specific state and to everyone at the same time. As "command of the commons", he states it is the command of the sea while he understands as "command of the commons", the sea and space. In asserting command of the United States over these areas, Posen refers to its prominence of military use on sea, land and air more than any other state. This implies the ability to threaten, deny and/or allow the use of these spaces by other actors, in short, that American control of these areas is virtually unchallengeable. This command of the commons is the main element that grants the position of global power that the U.S. experiences (POSEN, 2003).

Posen (2003) attributes America's status as a global power to well-spent investments, to the fact that the U.S. is both a technological and economic power, and as a legacy of the Cold War. According to the author, the U.S. has large, multifunctional military headquarters, which coordinate and enable the allocation of space, air and sea command products. This increases the American efficiency of developing war plans and shortens the timeframe of possible actions. According to Posen (2003, p. 18), the U.S. has divided the world into "regional functional commands" that promote different courses of action in different theaters, such as,

PACOM is based in Hawaii and oversees U.S. forces in the Pacific. EUCOM, based in Europe, manages U.S. forces committed to NATO. CENTCOM oversees the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, but does so formally from Florida. Also in Florida, SOUTHCOM oversees Central and South America. These commands are each led by a four-star commander in chief (formerly referred to as a "CinC," pronounced "sink," they are now called "combatant commanders"). These are large multifunctional military headquarters, to which are often attached significant operational forces (POSEN, 2003, p. 18).

Posen's (2003) strategy of selective engagement aims at maintaining the command of the commons. This is a position of enormous disparity of American power, which in the short-term, rules out any kind of threat by any state, and in the medium-term, contemplates a more conscious action of resource allocation that maintains this comfortable position for the American state (POSEN, 2003).

To maintain command of the sea, the U.S. must preserve its techno-scientific capabilities to act in the open ocean by continuing the production and development of SSN submarines. In space, the author suggests a more aggressive approach. Strengthening

reconnaissance capabilities using drones, developing satellite stealth and maneuvers, as well as long-range strike capabilities. Maintaining its deterrence and defense capabilities and counter-offensives for deterrence and defense purposes and maintaining anti-satellite weapons research and production programs. In the air, Posen admits to American disparate capabilities, and suggests that the Pentagon look at suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Posen (2003) also notes the need to think about and develop a U.S position in contested areas where its presence could trigger conflict (POSEN, 2003).

Posen reaffirms that the United States is the greatest military power on the planet and the most potent power in the world. This tremendous amount of power gives the U.S. the power to attack other actors, but a more conservative policy of selective engagement, rather than expansive primacy, helps make the perception of American military power less offensive and more tolerable (POSEN, 2003).

6.3 Conclusion

Authors who suggested selective engagement had in view not the obvious multipolarity that was configured. The starting point was to take advantage of the present position for a long-term strategy. Not so boldly as to pursue hegemony, not so unrealistically as to retreat from international commitments as isolationism, and not so insecurely as to bet on an offshore balancing position. There is an idea of taking advantage of what they have to make the best of it; it is a strategy of prevention and maintenance of the status quo, not of hegemonic expansion. The selective engagements strategy in general is a long-term strategy, which proposes a combination of American action as both a regional hegemon and an offshore balancer.

It can be noted, however, that an ambiguity that presents itself is the understanding of multipolarity as a threat to American national security or as something that can be manipulated in its favor, which permeates prescriptions that vary from author to author, either of an active behavior in the world or with more isolationist tendencies. Either way, for the most part, American use of force is seen as something to be handled for deterrence purposes.

A new context of bipolarity is by consensus very unlikely. The notion of multipolarity in turn, is seen by all the authors as inevitable, although they differ on the possibility of prolonging the duration of a unipolar moment. The starting point of the authors also diverges on the strategy followed by the United States immediately after the Cold War, between containment and preponderance. In their majority, authors of earlier articles agree that a new grand strategy should start from the behavior of containment, on the other hand, authors from

1993 onwards, admit that the new strategy should start from the current American behavior of preponderance.

Another similarity is the consideration of potential rivals over time. In the immediate period, most authors predicted the rise of powers such as Japan and Europe, where American action should be focused. However, as the years passed, more attention was paid to the rise of China and the greater American presence in the Middle East. One constant concern that was observed was the Persian Gulf region.

7 REPORT: QUANTITATIVE DATA

From the content of each article, it was possible to compile the data of their prescriptions and establish the relationship of each grand strategy with the recommended handling of military forces for the achievement of American state objectives. The use of force prescribed by each strategy was established from the recommendations of American action per region established by each author as well as their recommendations on how the country should act in the system in the context of the publication of their articles, given their theoretical foundations. The following table describes how each grand strategy categorization prescribes a type of use of force. Given the goal, the expected duration of the strategy (short/long-term), and the country's scope of action in pursuing it (national/regional/global). It also frames the articles that prescribe them.

Table 17. Descriptions for the Use of Force Categorization Criteria

Grand Strategy	Articles	Period	Goal	Scope	Use of Force
Hegemonic Primacy (HP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Stability of a Unipolar World (1999) Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War (1997) 	Short-term. For it considers the probability that by nature, the anarchy of the international system will cause a new equilibrium to be established	Strengthen hegemony acting as an indispensable balancer. The U.S is the ordering provider of the system. Considers that not acting is more threatening than acting too much.	Global	DETERRENCE: In this strategy, the behavior is one of preponderance, of national strengthening and projection of power on a global scale. This implies the use of deterrent force because the stronger it is, the less other actors dare to confront it.
Collective Security (CS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future (1992) 	Long-term. Because he believes that, the world would prefer a beneficial great power that would act for the stability and maintenance of peace in the system.	Peace. Act in the world in a multilateral way through alliances and/or international institutions in any situation that threatens the peace in the system. Considers the balance of power logic but does not believe it will suffer a counter-balance.	Global	DETERRENCE: In this strategy, multilateral behavior decreases the expense of unilateral action, which facilitates the investment for national strengthening. In this logic, the country can strengthen itself and maintain its status as a beneficial hegemon, which implies the use of dissuasion force. Besides discouraging other actors from confronting it because of its greater relative strength, it also discourages them because of its importance as a peace maintainer, giving them the impression that it is a necessary actor in the system.
Neo-Isolationism (NI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation (1997) 	Long-Term. For he believes that the less interventionist a country is in international affairs, the less threatening it is perceived by the system.	Domestic Prosperity. Consists in global disengagement and internal investment. Isolates itself from the world and relies on the balancing of power of the others - engage in regional balance ONLY when it is necessary.	National	DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE: In this strategy, the behavior is one of deterrence and defense. The country focuses on strengthening itself nationally and not getting involved in international issues that do not concern it. It only acts as a response to a possible attack and is concerned with strengthening itself in order to avoid being confronted. It believes that by not intervening in international issues, it avoids becoming a focus of threat to other actors.

Offshore Balancing (OB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise (1993) • From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy(1997) 	<p>Long-term.</p> <p>For it considers that it is not possible to disengage from international commitments, but advocates to engage ONLY in those that affect its national interests, in regions of vital interest. This behavior is mostly of force projection and deterrence in these regions and does not offer as much threat to the world as a preponderance position would.</p>	<p>National security embedded in unipolar status. Increased relative power and regional balancing ONLY in regions of vital interests. Majorly projection of force action in these regions, engaging in compellence ONLY if there is a threat of another regional power rising in these locations.</p>	Regional	<p>DETERRENCE AND COMPELLENCE: In this strategy, the behavior is one of deterrence and compellence. The actor is concerned with increasing its relative power and acting in deterrence only in regions of vital interest, withdrawing from other regions. The actor can act to compel any actor that tries to assume a role of regional hegemony in the regions of American interest.</p>
Selective Engagement (SE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War • Bismarck or "Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity(1995) • After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity (1998) • Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement (1998-99) • Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited (2000-01) • Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony (2003) 	<p>Long-term.</p> <p>For it considers that the system creates incentives for the action of the strongest actor for the stability of the system itself, but this actor can choose which action to engage in because he suffers fewer consequences, given his superior position. Therefore, it seeks to act moderately in a non-threatening way in the world. Avoiding as much as possible to create incentives to be counterbalanced.</p>	<p>National Security. It must act according to the incentives of the system in a moderate way, as the status quo favors its national security. Acts globally when necessary but is more inclined to act as a regional hegemon in regions that affect its prosperity and security. Refutes the idea of preponderance, as it considers the possibility of being seen as a threat, but considers the need for action by the strongest actor in the world in situations that threaten the stability of the system.</p>	Global and Regional	<p>DETERRENCE: This strategy considers the American hegemonic position as favorable for a preponderant position, but advocates it only when necessary and not too costly. The country acting for the benefit of its national security implies actions with less threatening impact on the world, but acting globally reinforces its position as a hegemonic actor. The focus is on acting in a balanced way. This implies a behavior of deterrence, reinforcing its importance in the system and its national strength.</p>

Source: Table elaborated by the author

In the table (18) below are the strategy prescribed by each author sorted in a temporal manner, and their recommendation on how the U.S. should use the military force given their prescription of Grand Strategy:

Table 18. Report Table				
Year	Article	Author(s)	Prescription	Use of Force
1991	A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War	Robert J. Art	Selective Engagement	Deterrence
1992	Strategies Before Containment: Patterns for the Future	Terry L. Deibel	Collective Security	Deterrence
1993	The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise	Christopher Layne	Offshore Balancing	Defense, compellence
1995	"Bismarck" or "Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity	Josef Joffe	Selective Engagement	Deterrence
1997	Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War	Michael Mastanduno	Hegemonic Primacy	Deterrence
1997	Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation	Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky	Neo-Isolationism	Defense, Deterrence
1997	From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy	Christopher Layne	Offshore Balancing	Defense, compellence
1998	After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity	Charles A. Kupchan	Selective Engagement	Deterrence
1998 1999	Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement	Robert J. Art	Selective Engagement	Deterrence
1999	The Stability of a Unipolar World	William C. Wohlforth	Hegemonic Primacy	Deterrence
2000 2001	Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited	Jeffrey W. Taliaferro	Selective Engagement	Deterrence
2003	Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony	Barry R. Posen	Selective Engagement	Deterrence

Source: Table elaborated by the author

After relating each grand strategy prescription to its use of force, it was possible to conclude the relative and absolute frequency of the prescriptions of all selected articles. Below,

is the table of frequency (absolute and relative) of grand strategy prescriptions for the United States from the final pool of articles:

Table 19. Prescription Frequency

PREScription: FREQUENCY	ABSOLUTE	RELATIVE
SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT (SE)	6	50%
OFFSHORE BALANCING (OB)	2	16,67%
HEGEMONIC PRIMACY (HP)	2	16,67%
COLLECTIVE SECURITY (CS)	1	8,33%
NEO-ISOLATIONISM (NI)	1	8,33%

Source: Table elaborated by the author


Table 20 shows the frequency (absolute and relative) of type of use of force according to each grand strategy prescription for the United States from the final pool of articles:

Table 20. Use of Force Frequency by Prescription

USE OF FORCE:	Deterrence	Compellence	Defense
SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT (SE)	6	-	-
OFFSHORE BALANCING (OB)	2	2	-
HEGEMONIC PRIMACY (HP)	2	-	-
COLLECTIVE SECURITY (CS)	1	-	-
NEO-ISOLATIONISM (NI)	1	-	1
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	12	2	1
RELATIVE FREQUENCY	100%	16,67%	8,33%

Source: Table elaborated by the author

Figure 8. Graph of relative frequency (percentage) of each American grand strategy prescription and the type of use of force each advocate.



Source: Graph elaborated by the author

All grand strategies recommend a certain type of deterrence, because they all focus on national strengthening. Therefore, deterrence is the most frequent proposal. The most frequently proposed American grand strategy is the grand strategy of selective engagement.


Now it is necessary to compare the strategy most often prescribed by the literature with the evidence of reality. For this purpose, the next chapter describes the military activities of the United States in the post-Cold War period from 1991 to 2004.

8 TIMELINE: AMERICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM 1991 TO 2004

To assess whether the grand strategy of selective engagement was followed by the United States after the Cold War, as prescribed by the literature, it is necessary to analyze each American action in the world during this period. In this chapter, we sought to portray all American military activity in the world from 1991 to 2004. The data were collected from books, articles, official reports, government websites, and official websites of organizations such as NATO and the UN, among other historical sources that could provide a basis for the evidence of U.S. military action. One can see that American military action took place on all continents, but was concentrated in critical regions, such as the Persian Gulf and the Balkans.

Military actions are listed by regions such as Eurasia, America, Africa, and the Persian Gulf and are characterized by interventions, troop deployments, and military installations and bases. Whether for direct combat or military support for evacuation or peacekeeping missions. As the figure below illustrates, the timeline of American military actions took place as follows:


Figure 9. Timeline: American Military Activities Abroad (1991-2004)



Source: Elaborated by the author.

Turning these actions into a heat scheme, the following map is configured:

Figure 10. Map: U.S. Military Ventures from 1991 to 2004



Esri, FAO, NOAA | Esri, FAO, NOAA

Source: Elaborated by the author via Esri, FAO, NOAA | Esri, FAO, NOAA

8.1 American Military Undertakings in the Persian Gulf

American engagement abroad has had its most enduring focus in the Persian Gulf region, as prescribed by advocates of Selective Engagement strategy, and this region has proven to be of great American interest for its security and prosperity. With Iraq as its main enemy/rival, the United States has sought to establish stability in the Persian region since 1990. Among the conflicts that have unfolded in the Gulf region, the Gulf War and the Iraq War are the results of territorial, economic, and religious clashes that have resulted in terror. The American action in the Gulf was already underway since August 1990 with Operation Desert Shield, which consisted of operations leading to an increase of troops and defense in the Saudi Arabian territory, in order to guarantee protection in case of a possible Iraqi attack. For this operation, the U.S. sent more than 500,000 American troops to Saudi Arabia (MILLETT; MASLOWSKI; FEIS, 2012).

In April 1991, Operation Desert Storm began, as an escalation of Operation Desert Shield, which marked the beginning of the conflict in the Gulf region between Iraq and The Allies - an alliance through a collective security initiative led by the U.S. that brought together more than 40 countries. It was the first American foreign action in a major conflict after the

Cold War and was characterized by a more offensive engagement after the diplomatic failure of previous operations. Operation Desert Storm lasted from January to April 1991 and had the objective of ending Iraq's domination of Kuwait, one of the most important oil suppliers to the U.S. It was an operation carried out with the backing of the UN and is considered the main operation of one of the biggest conflicts in the region, with thousands of air campaigns and bombings, and with the participation of more than 600 thousand American soldiers (COLLINS, 2019).

Concurrent with this operation, on February 24, 1991, the US-led Allied coalition began Operation Desert Sabre, which consisted of a major ground offensive by Allied coalition troops from northeastern Saudi Arabia into Kuwait and southern Iraq. Lasting three days, this Operation managed to defeat Iraq and liberate Kuwait, despite numerous Iraqi attempts to resist (History, 2020). On February 28, U.S. President George H. W. Bush declared a ceasefire, and the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687. The resolution ushered in the suspension of sanctions on Iraq, but the blocking of Iraqi oil sales would continue until - under UN supervision - Iraq dismantled its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Despite accepting the peace agreement in April, Saddam Hussein continued to violate its terms, resulting in attacks by allied nations and UN sanctions (MILLETT; MASLOWSKI; FEIS, 2012; HISTORY.COM EDITORS, 2021).

With the end of Operation Desert Storm in April, the next operation was a humanitarian operation called Provide Comfort⁴¹, which lasted from April 1991 to 1996. This operation consisted of keeping American reserve troops in the KTO (Kuwait Theater of Operations) in order to strengthen Kuwaiti civil institutions and safeguard the population from possible retaliation by the Iraqi army led by Saddam Hussein. With an American initiative, camps were created in northern Iraq to shelter more than half a million Kurdish refugees who, victims of violent repression, were trying to leave Iraq and head for Turkey. At the end of July 1991, the responsibility for the refugee camps was transferred to the UN, and the number of American troops providing protection was reduced. This lasted until 1996 and was later transformed into Operation North Watch, which was promoted by President William J. Clinton consisted of maintaining the no-fly zone and no longer focused primarily on providing humanitarian aid (U.S...., 1991).

⁴¹ U.S. ARMY (The United States). Office of Army Reserve History. Technical report. Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, 2012. Available in: <https://www.usar.army.mil/OurHistory/OperationProvideComfort/>. Last access: may, 2021.

Operation North Watch and Op. South Watch was promoted by the United States in a coalition with the Allies, especially the British government. The operations were to protect Kuwait and contain Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's military endeavors by imposing no-fly zones and banning Iraqi flights in areas in southern and northern Iraq. The operation included conducting aerial reconnaissance and launching targeted attacks against the Iraqi air defense system. Both operations lasted until 2003 (TIRPAK, 2003).

Amid this context, another American military move took place in October 1994, when Operation Vigilant Warrior, the largest since Desert Shield, was launched. In a matter of days, the United States was able to display immense power projection to the other side of the world. The mobilization of tens of thousands of troops took only four weeks, forming nearly 7,000 Army troops in the theater supporting Operation Vigilant Warrior. By the end of the operation in 1994, total U.S. forces numbered 28,952 and consisted of such structures as “the CENTCOM forward headquarters, the ARCENT forward headquarters, two heavy brigade task forces, a Marine expeditionary unit, a carrier battle group, two Air Force squadrons, and significant support forces” (Moger, 2020, p. 17). The operation remained in effect until 1994 and consisted of the movement and reinforcement of the U.S. troop contingent to the Gulf to deter the Iraqi threat that was beginning to mobilize in southern Iraq (MOGER, 2020).

An attack by Saddam Hussein in Iraq's Kurdish north during the Kurdish civil war marked another serious violation of United Nations resolutions, which prohibited the repression of Iraq's ethnic minorities. In response to this Iraqi attack, the United States launched Operation Desert Strike, which consisted of an extension of the "No-Fly" zone in southern Iraq and an air campaign that launched 27 cruise missiles against selected targets in the Al-Kut, Al-Iskandariyah, An Nasiriyah, and Tallil regions (THE AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SUPPORT DIVISION, 2011).

In December 1998, Operation Desert Fox was launched, which was composed of a large contingent of assets that included aircraft and ships from the US Navy and US Marine Corps, Air Force, and Royal Air Force aircraft. The Operation was intended to ruin Saddam Hussein's ability to produce and use his weapons of mass destruction, and thus make it difficult for Iraq to engage in any clashes with neighboring nations. To that end, the Operation brought together American and British efforts in a four-day bombing run against military and security targets in Iraq. Through this operation, the U.S. also intended to demonstrate to the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, the implications of continually violating international obligations (U.S. DEPT OF DEFENSE, 1998).

After the 9/11 disaster, U.S. President George W. Bush further emphasized his fight in the War on Terror. In 2003, the American president got UN approval to form a coalition attack against Iraq, under the premise of an Iraqi violation of UN Security Council resolution 1441, which “prohibits stockpiling and importing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).” The coalition led by the United States included the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, and its objective was to seek peace in the Gulf region. In an operation called Iraq Freedom, an American military contingent composed of tens of thousands of assets was dispatched to strategic regions of Iraq. This was the longest U.S. engagement against Iraq and resulted in dozens of direct confrontations over the course of nearly nine years of conflict (NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND, 2020).

Table 21. The Persian Gulf			
1991: Iraq	Operation Desert Storm	The U.S. via Collective Security	Air to land offensive.
1991: Iraq	Operation Desert Sabre	The U.S. via Collective Security	Ground Offensive.
1991–1996: Iraq	Operation Provide Comfort	The U.S. via Collective Security; UN	Strengthening Kuwaiti civil institutions, delivery of humanitarian relief, and military protection in northern Iraq.
1991: Iraq	Deterrence action	The U.S.	President Bush promoted a limited introduction of U.S. forces into northern Iraq for emergency relief purposes.
1992: Kuwait	Deterrence and compellence actions	The U.S.	American military exercises in Kuwait, following Iraqi refusal to cooperate with UN inspection teams and the agreement terms.
1992–2003: Iraq	Operation Northern Watch; Operation Southern Watch	The U.S via Collective Security	Iraqi no-fly zones, prohibition of Iraqi flights in zones in southern and northern Iraq. Conducting aerial reconnaissance, specific attacks on Iraqi air-defense systems.
1994: Kuwait	Operation Vigilant Warrior	The U.S.	Moving American troops to the Gulf to strengthen the military contingent for deterrence purposes.
1996: Iraq	Operation Desert Strike	The U.S.	American Air Strikes against selected targets in Iraq.
1998: Iraq	Operation Desert Fox	The U.S. UK	U.S. and British forces conduct a major four-day bombing campaign on Iraqi targets.
2003–2011: War in Iraq	Operation Iraqi Freedom	The U.S via Collective Security	The United States leads a coalition that includes the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland to invade Iraq.

Source: Table elaborated by the author

8.2 American Military Undertakings in Eurasia: From the Balkans to South Asia

The United States was very active in Eurasia from '92 to 2004, in accordance with the prescriptions of those who argued for the grand strategy of Selective Engagement. Their engagement can be understood as a temporal transition from the Balkan region in the initial period from 1992 to 1999 and their movement towards Asian countries and Georgia from the end of the 20th century until 2004. One can also see that the American action in the Baltic region has mostly occurred in conjunction with NATO in support of the UN, while the other military ventures in Eurasia have been on solo counterterrorist initiatives.

In 1992, the United States began Operation Provide Promise, a humanitarian operation in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States alone launched this operation with the aim of providing humanitarian aid in the Bosnian territory and bringing relief to the population suffering from the separatist civil war in the former Yugoslavia that had been going on since 1991. The U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force played a role in supporting UN facilities, establishing a flow of food and medical supplies. It was the longest humanitarian air support operation ever undertaken by the U.S. Department of Defense, and ended only in 1996 (NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND, 2020).

In the period of 1993-1995, the United States, through NATO, initiated Operation Deny Flight. This operation was conducted with support from the Implementation Force (IFOR) through which it led the implementation of the military requirements of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the entire period of the operation, NATO imposed and controlled a no-fly zone on the warring parties, allowing only authorized flights and being free to take any action necessary to ensure compliance with the zone's restrictions (OWEN, 1997).

Still in the context of the separatist war in former Yugoslavia, in 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton authorized the deployment of a significant contingent of U.S. troops to support the UN Protection Force in the territory suffering from the conflict. About 300 American troops were sent to help maintain stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (United Nations, 1996). The following year, the U.S. President increased the U.S. Army contingent in UNPROFOR Macedonia. It was established via the U.S. European Command, which was reinforced by approximately 200 personnel from Company D, first Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, V Corps, Vilseck, Germany (U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE, 1994).

In 1994, the Banja Luka incident occurred. Among the many NATO engagements during Operation Deny Flight, the 1994 incident stood out as the organization's first combat engagement in the region. In this event, Bosnian Serb attack jets violated the no-fly zone, which

led NATO aircraft to bomb them, shooting down four of them (Atlantic Council, 2012). In August 1995, Operation Deliberate Force, NATO's first air campaign, began. In this operation, American and NATO aircraft launched precision strikes against Bosnian Serb Army targets in response to a Bosnian Serb attack (HENDRICKSON, 2005).

Operation Joint Guard was a follow-up operation in Bosnia launched by the U.S. and NATO in 1996 operating under the premise of Peace enforcement. In accordance with the terms of the UN, the U.S. and NATO established the SFOR (Stabilisation Force) peacekeeping forces to replace IFOR (Implementation Force) with the same authorizations in enforcing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. This operation provided for deterring further threats and hostilities, contributing to the progress of the unfolding peace agreement, and supporting the region's civil institutions in order to promote a safe and secure environment conducive to the achievement of peace (NATO, 2007).

Due to civil unrest in Albania, in 1997, the U.S. promoted Operation Silver Wake, which aimed to rescue and evacuate about 900 people – among them American citizens and other foreigners – from Albanian territory. U.S. Marine forces from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and U.S. Navy ships were mobilized (NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND, 2020).

Faced with the ensuing conflict in Kosovo, in 1999 Operation Allied Forces was launched. It marked the air campaign of American and NATO forces against Serbia and the Serbian army in Kosovo. The Operation ended the same year, and as a result, NATO sent KFOR (Kosovo Force) troops for a Peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (SAYERS, 2019).

Although American military ventures continue in Eurasia, since 1997 the course of these operations have taken a turn away from the Balkans, and have since focused more on Asia. In 1997, the U.S. embarked in Asia by sending a Task Force with a contingent of about 550 American military personnel. This operation aimed to rescue and promote the safety of American citizens in Cambodia, in the face of the civil conflict taking place in the country. The task force was deployed to Utapao Air Base in Thailand, on standby to promote possible evacuations (U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE, 1997).

In 1998, the direction of U.S. military action turned to containing the advancing terrorism of the Al-Qaeda organization. The focus of the fight against this terrorist organization and its leader Osama bin Laden was an American initiative, and all subsequent actions on the continent took place solely through American military operations and not in conjunction with NATO or the UN as most operations described previously. After U.S. intelligence identified bin Laden and his organization as the masterminds of the August 1998 attacks on the U.S.

embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, President Clinton authorized Operation Infinite Reach as a military response option. Upon discovering that the perpetrator of the terrorist attacks was hiding in facilities in Afghanistan, the U.S. government launched the operation by conducting a series of attacks in that country and in any other region that had sufficient suspicion of al-Qaeda involvement. In August 1998 the first cruise missile strikes of Operation Infinite Reach were launched, the first strike against two suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan, and the second against a suspected chemical plant in Sudan (THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 2004).

The only American joint venture with the UN on the Asian continent was in support of a series of "Stability Missions" for peace in East Timor from 1999 to 2000. The U.S. has dispatched a limited number of American military forces to make up the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and the Joint Task Force (JTF) in East Timor. The East Timor action, known as Operation STABILIZE, was sanctioned by the United Nations (U.N.), led by Australia, and aimed to restore peace in East Timor (Fowler, 2016). In 2000, the government authorized another dispatch of American INTERFET troops to make up the Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was promoting peacekeeping in the East Timor region (U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2001).

Also in 2000, following a terrorist attack on the U.S. Navy's USS Cole in Yemen in the port of Aden, the U.S. government authorized the establishment of several field offices in Aden to conduct the investigation into the perpetrators of the attack. About 100 agents from the FBI Laboratory's Counterterrorism Division were deployed and implemented protocols - authorized by the Yemeni government - for investigating evidence and interrogating suspects. The FBI-led investigation identified that the attack was authored and carried out by al-Qaeda members (U.S. Department of Justice, 2000). The U.S. intelligence reconnaissance points to an Al-Qaeda leader, *Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi*, who was killed in 2002 after an American Predator MQ-1 fired a missile at his car (THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, 2001).

A collision between a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) J-8II jet and a U.S. Navy EP-3E ARIES II reconnaissance aircraft occurred in April 2001 in Chinese territory on Hainan Island. After the collision, the Chinese aircraft and pilot disappeared while the American aircraft made a forced landing. The Chinese government, suspecting it to be a spy plane, threatened to detain the plane and the American crew on Chinese territory. The tension resulted in an international dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and

was later called the Hainan Island incident (NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND, 2002).

Soon after the September 11 attack, the Bush administration initiated the War on Terror, marked by the U.S. and British air campaign bombing Afghan territory, initiating Operation Enduring Freedom. This operation was employed with the objective of combating Al Qaeda terrorists and their supporters, and resulted in a decisive outcome in 2011, when U.S. Navy SEALs launched an attack on Osama bin Laden's compound, killing him (NAVAL HISTORY AND HERITAGE COMMAND, 2020).

In 2002, in another undertaking in the War on Terror, the U.S. government sent a military and intelligence contingent to improve Philippine counterterrorism capabilities. Called Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P), a U.S. Special Forces (SF) unit trained and equipped a Philippine Light Reaction Company (LRC) (Maxwell, 2004). For the same counterterrorism capacity-building purpose, combat-equipped and combat-support forces were also deployed to Georgia in 2003. Moreover, in 2004, to Djibouti for the additional purpose of monitoring the activities of al-Qaeda and other international terrorists in the Horn of Africa region (U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE, 2003).

The latest American endeavor in the Eurasian region was in the northern Asian country of Pakistan. A secret U.S. drone war began in the region, marked by the first drone strike in the north of the country killing Taliban leader Nek Muhammad in South Waziristan. (NEW AMERICA CA, 2021).

Table 22. EURASIA			
2003: Georgia and Djibouti	War on Terror	The U.S.	The U.S. combat equipped and support forces were deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their counterterrorist capabilities.
2004: Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Georgia and Eritrea	War on Terror	The U.S.	The U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway. Enhancing their counterterrorist capabilities.
THE BALKANS			
1992–1996: Bosnia and Herzegovina	Operation Provide Promise	The U.S.	Humanitarian relief operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav Wars.
1993–1995: Bosnia	Operation Deny Flight	The U.S. NATO	The U.S. and NATO enforced the no-fly zone over the Bosnian airspace.
1993: Macedonia	UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	The U.S. UN	President Clinton reported the deployment of 350 U.S. soldiers to the Republic of Macedonia to participate in the UNPROFOR.

1994: Macedonia	Increase contingent personnel	The U.S.	President Clinton reported that a reinforced company of 200 personnel had increased the U.S. contingent in Macedonia.
1994: Bosnia	Bombing action in Operation Deny Flight	The U.S. NATO	Banja Luka incident, NATO U.S. Air Force F-16 jets shot down four Bosnian Serb J-21 Jastreb single-seat light attack jets for violating UN-mandated no-fly zone.
1995: Bosnia	Operation Deliberate Force	The U.S. NATO	The U.S. and NATO aircraft began a major bombing campaign of Bosnian Serb Army.
1996: Bosnia	Operation Joint Guard	The U.S. NATO	The U.S. and NATO established the SFOR peacekeepers to replace the IFOR in enforcing the peace under the Dayton agreement.
1997: Albania	Operation Silver Wake	The U.S.	The U.S. military forces were used to evacuate certain U.S. government employees and private U.S. citizens from Tirana, Albania.
1999: Serbia	Operation Allied Force	The U.S. NATO UN	The U.S. and NATO aircraft began a major bombing of Serbia and Serb positions in Kosovo.
ASIA			
1997: Cambodia	Action to protect and rescue American citizens	The U.S.	An American Task Force was deployed at Utapao Air Base in Thailand for possible evacuations.
1998: Afghanistan and Sudan	Operation Infinite Reach	The U.S.	President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack against two suspected terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical factory in Sudan.
1999–2001: East Timor	Stability Missions - Peace Operation	The U.S. UN	Limited number of U.S. military forces deployed with the United Nations-mandated International Force for East Timor restore peace to East Timor. Joint Task Force, Timor Sea Operations (JTF TSO)
2000: Yemen	Response to terrorist attack	The U.S.	The U.S. military personnel were deployed to Aden, Yemen.
2000: East Timor	Stability Missions - Peacekeeping	The U.S.	A small number of U.S. military personnel were deployed to support the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
2001: Hainan Island	Military Tension (defensive position)	The U.S.	International dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China called the Hainan Island incident.
2001–2014: Afghanistan	War in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom)	The U.S.	The War on Terror begins, armed Forces invade Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks.
2002: Yemen	Retaliation for terrorist attack	The U.S.	An American MQ-1 Predator fired a Hellfire missile at an al-Qaeda leader - thought to be responsible for USS Cole bombing.

2002: Philippines	Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF-Philippines)	The U.S.	U.S. combat-equipped and combat support forces have been deployed to the Philippines.
2004–present: Pakistan	Drone Attack	The U.S.	The U.S. deploys drone strikes to aid in the War in North-West Pakistan.

Source: Table elaborated by the author

8.3 American Military Undertakings in Africa

The American endeavor on the African continent was entirely unilateral, since unlike in other regions, the United States acted without being in conjunction with NATO or the UN. The first American operation on the continent after the Cold War took place in the central region, in 1991, in Zaire. The U.S. government authorized the lending of C-141 military transport aircraft from the U.S. Air Force to France in order to transport its military contingent and supplies to the Central African country (JOHNSTON, 1991).

In the following year in 1992, Operation Silver Anvil was launched in Sierra Leone. A civil crisis had settled in the African country following a military coup that overthrew the government. Through USEUCOM, the Unified Command advanced in Operation Silver Anvil, American military forces managed to evacuate 439 Americans and other foreigners from the territory of Sierra Leone (Special Forces, 1993). In 1997, the U.S. was again active in the country with Operation Noble Obelisk. The situation of civil disorder and constant violation of human rights and other UN resolutions by the authoritarian government of Sierra Leone created a critical scenario in the country. Operation Noble Obelisk⁴² was also conducted in order to rescue Non-Combatant NEOs. The U.S. Department of Defense mobilized forces to be dispatched to Freetown to carry out the evacuation of U.S. government employees and private citizens. In May 2000, as the situation in the country remained unstable, the U.S. government offered Navy aircraft to provide any necessary support to the evacuation operations in that country (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2008).

In 1993, Operation Gothic Serpent was launched in Somalia. The 75th Ranger Regiment and Delta Force made up the largest part of the Ranger Task Force that acted in the first battle of Mogadishu. It was the bloodiest battle with American participation since Vietnam⁴³, with dozens of Americans killed in action and dozens more wounded (LAMBERT, 2004).

⁴² DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER. NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT. Technical report. Operation Noble OBELISK: An Examination of Unity of Effort, [S. 1.]: DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER, 5 feb. 2005. Available in: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA389782>. Last access in: may 2021.

⁴³ BBC. Black Hawk Down: The Somali battle that changed US policy in Africa. BBC News, [S. 1.], p. 1-1, 2 feb. 2017. Available in: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-38808175>. Access in: may 2021.

In 1996, U.S. President Bill Clinton authorized U.S. Marine Corps personnel from the Joint Task Force Assured Response to be dispatched to Bangui, Central African Republic. The military conducted Operation Quick Response, taking responsibility for the evacuation of American citizens and U.S. government officials, as well as reinforcing the security of Americans at the Embassy in Bangui (BERGHE; ANTAL, 2004).

In March 1997, Clinton authorized the deployment of a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel from the U.S. European Command to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville, Gabon. A large contingent of military force, equipment, and facilities were mobilized, which, although combat-ready, were intended to provide security for American citizens, government employees, and property. In addition to protection, the operation remained on standby to conduct evacuation of those citizens if necessary (ADMINISTRATION OF WILLIAM J. CLINTON, 1997).

In 1998, the U.S. government dispatched a team of 30 U.S. military personnel to form a standby response facility and evacuation forces in Monrovia, Liberia. In addition, this military contingent was to provide security for the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia (AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1993).

Also in 1998, the Department of Defense and the Department of State sent Emergency Response Teams to Nairobi, Kenya. In response to a bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the U.S. government mobilized a massive contingent of the military, medical, and investigative forces to the region. The teams were composed of medical personnel, disaster relief specialists, criminal investigators, and counterterrorism specialists (U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1998).

In 2000, hundreds of U.S. Special Forces soldiers were sent to Nigeria to conduct a training mission. One thousand soldiers and several warships were mobilized after a United Nations peacekeeping force organization was dismantled in the Sierra Leone region. This mission was intended to train Nigerian and Ghanaian battalions to act in Sierra Leone on the UN side and consequently secure American interests in the diamond-rich region. The mission was planned to last three years, and the Pentagon's estimated budget for the first stage of this mission was between \$50 million and \$100 million, which included training and equipment (TALBOT, 2000).

Amidst a scenario of instability in Côte d'Ivoire brought on by a mutiny and rebellion, in 2002 a U.S. military contingent was deployed to the East African country to provide security and support in the evacuation of American citizens from Bouanké. This mission mobilized a

U.S. military readiness evacuation force from the U.S. European Command, initially consisting of about 180 soldiers, fixed-wing aircraft, and equipment. In late 2002, the forces supported French forces in the evacuation of Americans, foreign nationals, Peace Corps volunteers, and missionaries (OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, 2002).

A second Civil War broke out in Liberia in June 2003, amidst which U.S. President George W. Bush reportedly sent a contingent of U.S. Army and U.S. Marines to Monrovia, Liberia. The military team was to protect the U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to provide support for any necessary evacuations in Liberia or Mauritania. In addition to providing support to peacekeeping forces operating in the region with logistical and communications support (STARR ; LABOTT, 2003).

For the purpose of training counterterrorism personnel, U.S. combat support and equipped forces were also deployed in Djibouti in 2004 (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2003). In the same year, troops were also sent to Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea; the operation had the additional purpose of monitoring the activities of al-Qaeda and other international terrorists in the Horn of Africa region (INSTITUTE'S RESEARCH AND STUDIES PROGRAM, 2004).

Table 23. THE AFRICAN CONTINENT: Western Africa			
1992: Sierra Leone	Operation Silver Anvil	The U.S.	The United States European Command (USEUCOM) Joint Special Operations Task Force evacuated 439 people from Sierra Leone to American bases in Europe.
1997: Sierra Leone	Operation Noble Obelisk	The U.S.	The U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone, to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of U.S. government employees and private U.S. citizens.
1998: Liberia	Deployment of troops	The U.S.	Deployment of a stand-by response and evacuation force to enhance security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia.
2000: Sierra Leone	Navy aircraft mobilization	The U.S.	The U.S. Navy patrol craft deployed to Sierra Leone to support evacuation operations from that country if needed.
2000: Nigeria	Deployment of troops	The U.S.	Special Forces troops and equipment are sent to Nigeria to lead a training mission in the country.
2002: Côte d'Ivoire	Troops mobilization	The U.S.	U.S. military personnel went into Côte d'Ivoire to assist in the evacuation of American citizens from Bouaké.
2003: Liberia	Troops mobilization	The U.S.	President Bush sent U.S. Marines into Monrovia, Liberia to help peacekeepers.
THE AFRICAN CONTINENT: Central Africa			
1991: Zaire	Transportation of troops via	The U.S.	American planes were arranged to transport supplies and French troops to the Central African Republic and hauled evacuated American citizens

	AIRFORCE		
1996: Central African Republic	Operation Quick Response	The U.S.	Deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct the evacuation and enhanced security for the American Embassy in Bangui.
1997: Congo and Gabon	Troops mobilization	The U.S.	A standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security and to be available for any necessary evacuation operation.
THE AFRICAN CONTINENT: Eastern Africa			
1993: Somalia	Operation Gothic Serpent	The U.S.	The 75th Ranger Regiment and Delta Force send out to make up the Ranger task Force to act in the first battle of Mogadishu.
1998–1999: Kenya and Tanzania	Deployment of troops	The U.S.	U.S. military personnel have been deployed to Nairobi, Kenya, to coordinate and control the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
2003: Georgia and Djibouti	War on Terror	The U.S.	The U.S. anti-terror-related activities were underway. enhancing their counterterrorism capabilities
2004: Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Georgia, and Eritrea	War on Terror	The U.S.	U.S. anti-terror-related activities were underway.
2004: Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Georgia, and Eritrea	War on Terror	The U.S.	U.S. anti-terror-related activities were underway.
2004: Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Georgia, and Eritrea	War on Terror	The U.S.	U.S. anti-terror-related activities were underway.
2004: Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Georgia, and Eritrea	War on Terror	The U.S.	U.S. anti-terror-related activities were underway.

Source: Table elaborated by the author

8.4 American Military Undertakings in America

The U.S. military action in the American continent was very limited compared to its other ventures in the world. The country's two military actions in the northern part of the continent targeted Haiti. The first American endeavor in the country was with Operation Uphold Democracy from 1994 to 1995, when with the support of the UN, the U.S. led an operation that sought to establish peace in the Haitian territory. Due to a military coup in 1991, a series of events triggered a civil and humanitarian crisis in Haiti, which caused the country's

population to seek refuge in other countries, the most sought-after of which was the United States. The critical situation of the country's population was so devastating that it drew the attention of the UN, which, in response to the coup, passed resolution 970 imposing a trade embargo on Haiti. The situation worsened after the embargo and, bordering on social and economic collapse, more than 21,000 people left the country, and a migration crisis began to mount. Despite many diplomatic attempts at reconciliation and eventual suspension of the embargo, rebel forces that mobilized amidst the crisis in the country strongly resisted any foreign military aid that tried to intervene in the country. In 1994, in the face of the humanitarian crisis, the UN Security Council authorized its member countries to use whatever means were necessary to reinstate the elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide (FINLAYSON, 2009).

American president William J. Clinton took the lead in the multinational effort to structure a plan to restore democracy and peace in Haiti. The Army Corps and the 3rd Special Forces Group (3rd SFG) were mobilized for the operation, and in September 1994, the first air campaign would take place in Port-au-Prince and start the retaking of control of the Haitian government by American forces. In March 1995, Operation Uphold Democracy formally ended and the U.S. government transferred peacekeeping responsibility to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The U.S. also provided continued support to UNMIH with a contingent of military personnel and equipment in preparation for the official installation of government in June 1996 along with the civil, social and economic restructuring of the country (FINLAYSON, 2009).

The second American effort in Haiti took place in 2004, but unlike the previous one, it was brief and unilateral. In the midst of an environmental flooding disaster that triggered a humanitarian and social crisis in the country, a coup d'état forced out the re-elected president Aristide. American forces were sent into the country to protect the American embassy as well as American citizens and property in Haitian territory (U.S Department of State, 2005). A large military and economic contingent was mobilized for this action, which was intended to facilitate the work with MINUSTAH and other international donors to whom responsibility would be transferred, as well as provide technical and logistical assistance to the troops that would follow in the country. The U.S. government remained in the country, mostly through USAID, for the restructuring of the country's democratic, economic, and social institutions (OTI HAITI PROGRAM; USAID, 2004).

Table 24. American Continent			
1994–1995: Haiti	Operation Uphold Democracy	The U.S. UN	U.S. ships led an embargo against Haiti. U.S. military troops were deployed to Haiti to restore democratically elected Haiti President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
2004: Haiti	Troops mobilization	The U.S.	The U.S. sent a military contingent to augment the U.S. Embassy security forces in Haiti, to protect American citizens and property. Sent an additional U.S. combat-equipped, military personnel force to prepare the way for a UN Multinational Interim Force, MINUSTAH.

Source: Table elaborated by the author

8.5 Bringing Other Sources Into The Debate

Samuel P. Huntington (1991) analyzes the possible grand strategy for the United States considering the success of the grand strategy followed by the American state after the end of World War II. From the author's point of view, the strategic decisions made allowed the country to perform effectively in the Cold War. The containment and deterrence strategies of the late 1990s reached their objective (HUNTINGTON, 1991).

Huntington (1991) observes that the new nature of the post-Cold War international system may be of a uni-multipolar world. Within it, the United States holds an enormous disparity of power, being the only superpower, followed by other great powers such as the Soviet Union, Japan, China, Germany, United Kingdom and France. In view of this new environment, the author sought to identify American interests and to propose the strategies that the United States should follow to promote them. For Huntington (1991), the new interests were,

- i) to maintain the United States as the premier global power, which in the coming decade means countering the Japanese economic challenge; (ii) to prevent the emergence of a political-military hegemonic power in Eurasia; and (iii) to protect concrete American interests in the Third World, which are primarily in the Persian Gulf and Middle America. (HUNTINGTON, 1991. p. 8)

In view of these new interests, Huntington (1991) argues that old habits of the American state must be revisited. For instance, the author rejects the possibility of permanent multilateral alliances such as NATO remaining of great importance.

Huntington (1991) states that ad hoc coalitions for specific issues, such as the Gulf Crisis, will become more preferable. The strategy to be pursued is fundamentally different from that pursued during the Cold War; the new grand strategy must seek maintenance, prevention and protection. To accomplish this, the United States must allocate resources differently, as well as reshape the policies, programs, and military forces necessary to meet its new interests. The author advocates a considerable reduction of the armed forces by reshaping the former

overseas deployments of deterrence. The author prescribes that for the maintenance of balance in the regions of American vital interests (Eurasia, Southwest Asia, and Central America), America's military forces abroad must be transformed into more modest "presence" forces (HUNTINGTON, 1991).

In this sense, the prescribed strategy takes on very similar contours to a grand strategy of selective engagement. Its prescription advocates a behavioral military presence abroad capable of supporting the most important American combat units in a scenario where the balance is threatened. Facing the world that was configuring itself, the American focus should turn to the investment and development of intelligence technologies and war sophistication, while military capabilities became less important in the short-term. As in selective engagement, the author prescribes a strategic positioning that foresees the maintenance of the status of American power, its position in the system, and the engagement upon issues that directly involve its security and prosperity (HUNTINGTON, 1991).

The following year, Robert J. Art (1992) proposed to *Survival* a new U.S. military strategy for the 1990s, which would seek a position of insurance and reassurance. This strategy would be formulated to achieve the new vital and desirable interests of the U.S. in the post-Cold War context. For Art, these interests were,

Vital interests include the following: first, protection of the US homeland from attack and destruction; second, preservation of US economic prosperity; third, prevention of great power wars on the Eurasian continent; and, fourth, assured access to Persian Gulf oil. The desirable interests include the following: preventing, retarding or even reversing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons; fostering the spread of democracy and free market systems; and, in non-democratic states, promoting human rights, especially preventing the slaughter of a nation's citizenry, either by a ruthless dictator or by the breakdown of governmental order. (ART, 1992. p. 5)

The author, however, believes that the containment of weapons proliferation and the promotion of democracy are fundamental desirable interests in order to achieve the vital interests of security and prosperity. For the author, acting against nuclear proliferation guarantees the United States' strategic position as a nuclear power while the spread of liberal values favors the rise and prosperity of the American economy. The spread of democracy, especially, would make possible the continuity of the zones of peace established by the U.S. during the Cold War, and thus, the alliances formed in function of these zones, may also continue (ART, 1992).

As in his 1991⁴⁴ article for *International Security*, Art offers the outlines of a strategy that resemble those of the grand strategy of selective engagement. An insurance and reassurance strategy is based on two premises. The first premise is internal security, which the United States must ensure by strengthening and safeguarding its nuclear capability, and the second premise is the continuity of military presence abroad, ensuring peace in regions of vital American interest and strengthening alliances. The first premise, according to Art, makes it possible for the second to be carried out successfully, especially in terms of legitimacy (ART, 1992).

Art (1992) perceives the need for the U.S. to assume the leadership role in the transition of the post-Cold War world, and advocates the use of American military power cautiously, as one of "leadership without dominance" (1992. p. 20). When considering the Balance of Power theory, the author prescribes an American strategy that is not considered a threat by the other actors. A behavior that avoids provoking in others the impulse to form coalitions to counterbalance it. American strategic behavior should however prioritize collective rather than unilateral action. Collective engagement, in this logic, would be a means to lead in order to prosper. Since, for Art, the privileged position of the United States may be temporary, and therefore it must be maintained as much as possible. This requires not only allies, but also recognition that assuming a leadership role without dominating the system is the best behavior to adopt at this moment (ART, 1992).

Unlike the prescriptions of the 1990s, in the 2000s the starting point has changed, no longer from the containment strategy adopted during the Cold War, but from the grand strategies adopted by the Clinton administration. The prescriptions are aimed at the transition to the Bush administration. Kagan (2001) bases his strategic prescription on the assumption of "benign hegemony" behavior adopted by the United States after the Cold War. The author advocates for the continuity of this position of benign American hegemony in the world, he prescribes an American behavior of relative passivity. Kagan (2001) outlines his strategy following the same contours of a grand strategy of hegemonic primacy.

The author evaluates the performances of Clinton and Reagan, criticizing the Clinton administration for its passivity and drawing attention to the Reagan administration. The author notes President Bush's propensity to resemble the Reagan administration, his prescription for American strategy thus advocated that the United States must "lean forward". By adopting a

⁴⁴ ART. Robert J. A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War. *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4. 1991. p. 5-53

posture that indicates that the inclination to intervene when crises erupt is more likely than less likely. One that would demonstrate the possibility of American intervention in a more latent sense, possible even before a crisis erupts (KAGAN, 2001).

Kagan (2001) prescribes a behavior that enables the U.S. to continue a position of benign hegemony as well as its superpower status. The strategy to be followed aims at achieving a pattern that resembles the grand strategy of hegemonic primacy. For Kagan (2001), projecting American power by assuming relative passivity is the best alternative for American strategy, the only one which aligns with American pretensions to shape the international environment.

As expected, the prescriptions of grand strategy after September 11, 2001 turned not only to the evaluation of American positioning throughout the 1990s but to the need to rethink it. John G. Ikenberry (2001) argues that the unipolar American order established in the post-cold war period was a source of concern around the world. Even if it did not immediately and drastically shake international relations, it was a source of concern for all actors. Both in terms of the extent of American power and leadership, as well as the tenuous line that limits the exercise of its power.

Ikenberry (2001) evaluates the position of the Bush administration towards the international system, which was based on the distancing from international commitments and treaties without suffering great costs. This mostly unilateral position may have adverse consequences at a time when the United States needs international support in the fight against terrorism.

The "American system", according to Ikenberry (2001) is based on two pillars built upon bargaining. The "realist" bargain, originated in the Cold War, in which the United States receives partnership on diplomatic, logistical, and economic support while offering protection, security, and other accesses emerging from an open global economy. And the "liberal" bargain, which guarantees to partners the American binding of the rules, which creates multilateral commitments that make possible the checking of power. And upon these pillars, American power was safeguarded, perceived as beneficial to the entire system and thus undisputed. After the Cold War, bargaining became more complex and underdeveloped by the rulers. Ikenberry, however, advocates for a grand strategy that would bring them back into play with greater vigor (IKENBERRY, 2001).

Ikenberry (2001) calls for a grand strategy for the United States that would lead it toward connecting with other states to combat terror. In order to do so, the U.S. state would have to re-restrict its power as well as commit to multilateral partnerships, through which U.S. power could be checked. This would be mutually beneficial, both in terms of costs and in terms of

gaining back the trust of states in the United States. By restraining and compromising, other countries might feel more inclined to cooperate with the American state (IKENBERRY, 2001).

The grand strategy at that moment takes more of a shape of the grand strategy of collective security, where the fight against terror would be a fight for peace in the system. When the United State finds itself alone after acting excessively unilaterally, Ikenberry proposes a way out, a grand strategy that re-invokes multilateral aspirations. According to the author, the best way to fight terrorism is through coalitions, and the United States should lead the way in spreading incentives for a more collaborative approach (IKENBERRY, 2001).

9 CONCLUSION

Under the circumstances of a (then) recent end to a decades-long conflict, it was naturally expected that the post-Cold War world would be a relatively calmer one for the great powers. However, it can be seen that the military forces of the most powerful country in the world have worked more than ever before. As an interesting paradox, the end of the Cold War for the United States was not followed by a period of restraint or relaxation, but by a rapid increase in American participation in regional conflicts and military commitments abroad.

No longer driven by superpower rivalry, the U.S. has sought to evolve its national security policy to pursue U.S. interests. Aiming at the configuration of a more fragmented and complex multipolar system. Although several military operations took place during the Cold War, after its end, the number of deployments surpassed those of the past. The strategy of American preponderance placed the United States almost everywhere on the globe. Whether through NATO, ad hoc alliances, or unilaterally, the American strategy had as its main objective the strengthening of its hegemonic status.

It must be considered that the drastic reduction of its military forces in the 1990s⁴⁵, the various peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, conflict mediation and coalition leadership, counter-terrorism undertakings, the Gulf War, and other trends influenced the formulation of the American grand strategy. This dramatic turn in the international security environment has transformed the world in profound ways. As the strongest actor, the United States acted not only as the maintainer of world order, but created an order around itself.

The literature observed the predominant American behavior and proposed strategic suggestions either for the prolongation of its hegemonic condition or for its modest and cautious adaptation to a multipolar configuration. The system, as predicted by the Balance of Power theory, responded to the Great Power's behavior. It gave incentives for action and presented its costs, which were very low for such a powerful actor. The "American system" as Ikenberry (2001) called it, needed to maintain itself after it was established, and the fuel for its functioning was the American engagement in any situation that would disturb the systemic peace.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the prescriptions identified in the first three years were diverse. The moment was one of transition and the first prescription recommended retrenchment with selective engagement inclinations (Art, 1991). The world could go on without American interference, safeguarding was the behavior that would guarantee the new order of a world that would inexorably become multipolar.

⁴⁵ See Table 2.

Deibel (1992) in turn brought a different view; he saw that the action of a hegemonic leader was necessary to achieve a new peace and stability in the system. The world needed the United States and that is why unipolarity would tend to last. From a liberal viewpoint, the strategy of collective security prescribed that the American state would lead the world in the quest for peace. Through international institutions and organizations, the U.S. would lead the world in the fight against violence and non-compliance with values essential to peace, such as human rights and democracy. With no real threat in sight, or any nation that could reach the American power, the ideal strategy was to guarantee world peace, share burdens, and turn its investment to a collective military force. The hegemonic position was necessary and benign for the entire system.

With a more defensive view, Layne (1993, 1997) disagreed with the necessity of U.S. action in the system. By considering anarchy as a moderating principle, the strategy of offshore balancing was the most appropriate for the latent multipolar configuration. The best transition to this configuration would be to turn inward and disengage from situations that did not involve the United States. American action would take place in case of a direct threat to its position in the system. With a combination of presence deterrence and compellence in case an actor dares to balance it in the regions of interest, but mostly the U.S. should assume a defensive position. Preservation of national security and prosperity would be achieved by its domestic strength and non-threatening behavior in the system.

At the end of the 1990s, Eugene Gholz *et al* (1997) and Wohlforth (1999)⁴⁶ warned about the need for a more self-centered American position. Not as if the system needed a hegemonic actor, but the American position would make it possible to pursue its interests in the world without suffering great costs. Likewise, the constraints of acting as a world police could be overlooked without too many consequences. American power would enable this. The world could manage without the United States, but American action therein was beneficial to all, and an American system was preferable and indisputable. The incessant interventions in peace and in all conflicts were not its place, the American state could choose where to act, but the choice of action would strengthen and create a dependence in the system upon its power. The unipolar position would be prolonged precisely by these actions.

⁴⁶ It is worth noting that the prescriptions for American strategy described in this paper were identified and framed within the pre-established criteria, taking into account **only** the information obtained in the **selected articles** from the final pool. Therefore, positions and clarifications expressed by authors in other articles, texts, books, interviews etc. are not taken into account, for methodological reasons.

It can be seen that Academia, in its majority, prescribed the American state to respond to the incentives of the system - or to exploit them, and to handle them as it wished. The position in the system guaranteed them a choice of whether or not to be constrained, since the costs were not so drastic. In response to the American performance, most scholars sought to warn of a more cautious positioning, envisaged a use of force that projected just enough of its power and moderate strategies of selective engagement. Most of the prescriptions tended towards a defensive realism, against the expansionist and offensive premise adopted by the nation. Defensive because strengthening itself should be a secondary concern, while maintaining its position was a first priority. The recommendation was to consider first the adversaries' gains and seek to balance them rather than assume any dominant position (Art, 1991, 1998-99; Joffe, 1995; Kupchan, 1998; Taliaferro 2000-01; Posen, 2003).

The terrorist attacks of September 11, as expected, provoked drastic changes in American grand strategy, as well as in the prescriptions of the literature. It was a direct attack against the "indispensable balancer". The behavior that was perceived was that of an actor who acted fundamentally in the world, but was not constrained by it. And the especially neoconservative unilateral position dominated the country's entire strategic plan over the following years.

The more liberal prescription of collective security occurred in the midst of the Clinton administration at a time of immediate transition from the post-Cold War context. The author perceived the need for the United States in the world and the responsibilities that came with a condition of world hegemony (Deibel, 1992). After September 11, the authors drew more attention to the need for burden sharing in the war on terror, instead of acting unilaterally (Ikenberry, 2001; Posen, 2003).

When assuming a multilateral liberal position after the Cold War, under the Clinton administration, the prescriptions were of strategies with more realistic tendencies. While under a more realistic and neoconservative position led by the Bush administration, the prescriptions remained mostly of selective engagement. Naturally, the prescriptions of the authors were generally opposed to the behavior adopted by the U.S. at the time their articles were published, and this may explain why most of them presented more realistic premises rather than new liberal perspectives. In the midst of this, the major strategy of selective engagement was a combination of the two strands. It can be inferred, therefore, that the prescription most opposed to preponderance is that of selective engagement. And, at the same time, the one that most resembles it.

Authors who advocated selective engagement (Art, 1991, 1998-99; Joffe, 1995; Kupchan, 1998; Taliaferro 2000-01; Posen, 2003), claimed that by assuming this behavior, the allocation of military resources should be adapted. The military framework would be diminished, but investment in military capabilities would still guarantee a relative hegemonic position. Unlike what neo-isolationists and supporters of collective security advocate, military cutbacks would not be drastic to the point of withdrawal or to be adapted to act strictly by coalition. Imagining a multipolar world, the United States would seek a position of advantage among equals rather than hegemonic dominance. This strategy distinguishes from the strategy of hegemonic primacy inasmuch as it considers power as the means and not the end to be pursued and expanded. As their proponents illustrate in the table below,

Table 25. SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT: PART 1						
Analytical Anchor	Major Problem of Int'l Politics	NATO	Nuclear Dynamics	Conception of National Interests	Regional Priorities	
Traditional balance of power realism	Peace among the major powers	Maintain	Supports status quo	Restricted	Industrial Eurasia	
SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT: PART 2						
Nuclear Proliferation	Preferred World Order	Regional Conflict	Ethnic Conflict	Humanitarian Intervention	Use of Force	Force Posture
Discriminate prevention	Balance of power	Contain; discriminate intervention	Contain	Discriminate intervention	Discriminate	Two-MRC force

Source: Adapted from POSEN, Barry R. and ROSS, Andrew L. *Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy*. *International Security*, 21 no. 3, winter, 1996-97. p. 6.

The grand strategy of selective engagement would provide more tranquility to formulate combinations between the American means and ends to be achieved in the international system. The ends are the great vital objectives and basic goals, and the means are the great American military capacity. Vital interests, in this sense, becomes a goal to be achieved by international security policies. As noted, authors (Art, 1991, 1998-99; Joffe, 1995; Kupchan, 1998; Taliaferro 2000-01; Posen, 2003) delineate vital interests as homeland security, the maintenance of peace and stability in regions of vital American interest such as Eurasia, and the maintenance of the flow of oil supplies in the Middle East. This latter vital interest is linked to both national security

and American prosperity, and is considered vitally important both to the United States and to global economic stability.

Selective engagement incorporates realist power dynamics, since it is concerned with relative power, but encompasses a set of desirable interests that go through ideological premises, such as the diffusion of liberal values. This combination allows for a performance in the balance of power, weighing security and sovereignty with the handling of fungible powers, but also considers that the multipolarity that is configured is fragmented and much more complex, and therefore the ideological framework can facilitate the formation of alliance patterns in the midst of systemic tensions.

The commitment to values of sovereignty, binding institutions, democracy and economic freedom, for advocates of this strategy, enables non-threatening competition from the United States in the multipolar environment and prevents it from being perceived as a dominant player. It puts hegemonic power in check, does not increase distrust between states and allows it to pursue its international ambitions while recognizing its capabilities in the system are limited. Therefore, selective engagement prescribes to the United States a limit on the quantity and intensity of conflicts in which the United States chooses to engage in the world.

Furthermore, all prescriptions infer deterrence as the best means of using force, but in a lighter form than deterrence during the Cold War. The use of force as deterrence was also prescribed in conjunction with the use of force in the form of compellence and defense. In these cases, deterrence was taken as a given, considering the recognition of the United States as an unreachable superpower. Nuclear deterrence enters as a new instrument of power projection concomitant with the American promotion of combat against nuclear proliferation. Originated in the Cold War, nuclear deterrence is a strategy used to demonstrate relative advantage (Layne 1997; Art, 1999). In view of the theory of neorealism, the great powers are the main actors in the international system, however, a medium or small power, by possessing nuclear weapons, acquires a place in the balance of power. The smaller powers in the post-cold war era no longer matter only when they engage in alliance patterns, but now also when they possess nuclear weapons. All actors equipped with nuclear weapons are able to sit at the table with the great powers and even counterbalance them. This implies the great American journey to promote treaties and agreements that seek to contain nuclear proliferation, because it directly influences their position in the system. The fewer countries have nuclear capabilities, the more the American position is privileged.

By noticing most predictions of selective engagement in the literature, it is possible to infer that the concern of scholars regarding the United States was to maintain its position of

power. A posture that was based on neorealist thinking of preserving its position in the system, acting internationally only in situations that jeopardize national security. That is, in situations that threaten its relative gains. Power as a means is essential to the understanding of the grand strategies of selective engagement, the end is always national security.

This work made it possible to argue that the grand strategy of selective engagement was the most prescribed strategy in the post-Cold War period from 1991 to 2004 by the literature. As an alternative to a preponderance strategy, advocates of selective engagement prescribed the maintenance of American hegemony but through less offensive paths, in a hybrid combination of neorealist and liberal propositions. American action in the world would be more selective, aiming at its position in the system directly linked to its national security.

It is not possible, however, to make precise statements, since the processes of decision-making and policy formulation are much more complex. However, the objectives pursued here were achieved. The contributions derive from a theoretical debate about the contribution of science to such an important actor in the international system. It is hoped, therefore, that several other hypotheses can be raised from the data that could be collected here, and that science can continue to expand.

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